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An appealing ethical view is that there are a number of different
characteristics that make acts obligatory and others that make acts wrong.
Being an instance of promise-keeping makes an act obligatory, while being
an instance of causing harm makes an act wrong. Another appealing view is
that we can do what we are obligated to do. Accepting both of these views
poses well-known problems. Imagine that a person makes two incompatible
promises. Either the person is not obliged to keep each promise, or the
person cannot satisfy both obligations. One of these appealing views must
be rejected or modified.
W.D. Ross offered a theory with a modification of the first view as its
centerpiece. He introduced the term "prima facie duty" to describe the
moral status of acts having a characteristic such as being an instance ot
promise keeping. He claimed that a person having mutually exclusive
prima f acie duties can be morally obligated to satisfy at most one ot them.
v
the others being "overridden." Ross did not, however, make clear what is
involved in one prima facie duty overriding others, or the relationship
between prima facie duties and moral obligation.
I am sympathetic to Ross’s approach, but realize that it needs closer
examination. I begin by stating his view as carefully as possible and laying
out the problems with it. Various attempts have been made to explicate the
relationship between prima facie duties and moral obligation. These range
from arguing that principles expressing prima facie duties are analogous to
physical laws with ceteris paribus caveats to defining both concepts by use
of a third normative concept such as requirement. I examine some of these
attempts and find them flawed. I conclude that it is a mistake to suppose
that there is some principle expressing the relationship between primafacie
duties and moral obligation. 1 argue that the difficulties with Ross’s view
can be traced to Aristotelian elements in it. These elements cause Ross’s
theory to be an unfortunate mix of two approaches to ethics: an
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Not so long ago I asked my friend Joe to see a movie with me. He
told me that he would like to go but could not because he had promised
his wife that he would wash and wax the floors. He also said that he
really would prefer to go to the movies, but since he had promised he
really ought to do the floors. It was clear from our conversation that if
he had not promised to do the floors he would have gone to the movies.
Equally clear was that he believed he had a moral obligation to do the
floors and that he believed he had explained why he had that obligation.
His explanation of why he has that obligation is, I believe, fairly typical
of how persons account for their obligations. When an ordinary person,
like my friend Joe, explains why he is morally obligated to do something
he usually picks out certain features of the relevant act and says that he
has the obligation because the act has those features . 1 The feature of
the act that Joe picked out in giving an account of why he was obligated
to stay home and do the floors is that it was something he promised to
do. We can say of the act that it was an instance of promise-keeping, as
well as one of mopping.
2There are, of course, features of acts other than being an instance
of promise-keeping that are ordinarily thought to be indicative of an
obligation to do them. Let us imagine that Joe finds a victim of a hit and
run in the middle of the road that fronts his house. This man is
grievously injured and Joe administers first aid to him. Now imagine
that after the ambulance leaves we ask Joe why he helped this person.
What would he say? Knowing Joe, I suspect that he would say that it
was his duty to help. He would, in all likelihood, say something about
being obligated to help people that are grievously injured. If so, he
again would have picked out a feature of his act and said that he had the
obligation because the act had that feature. Being an instance of
helping someone in dire need is thought to be indicative of an
obligation to do it.
Some features of acts are ordinarily thought to be indicative of an
obligation not to do them. Let us talk about Joe a bit more. His wife
does not like him to smoke cigars. One day she noticed avery peculiar
odor clinging to his coat and asked him if he had been smoking cigars
again. Joe replied, sheepishly, that he had. She refused to talk to him
for the rest of the day. When asked why he did not deny that he had
been smoking cigars, thereby avoiding his wife s scorn, Joe replied that
it would have been wrong to lie. Being an instance of lying is ordinarily
thought to be indicative of an obligation not to do an act.
3Not all features of acts are thought to be significant in accounting
for moral obligations. Again consider Joe’s explanation of why he was
obligated to do his floors. That he would use his red bucket instead of
his white bucket is a feature of the act he would not mention or think
important when giving his explanation. Not all features of an obligatory
act are ordinarily thought of as significant to its being obligatory.
In addition to these aspects of ordinary moral reasoning, there
are a few others that I would like to point out. The first is that the way
persons reason about and explain their obligations suggests that they
can know and sometimes do know what they are obligated to do. The
very fact that persons believe they can give adequate explanations of
their obligations requires, it seems to me, that those obligations are
knowable. In one of the above examples, Joe explains why he is
obligated to stay home and do the floors. Most persons, Joe included,
giving a similar explanation in a similar situation would find it
remarkable to be told that they really cannot know what they are
obligated to do. I also suspect that most persons would find it even
more remarkable to be told that it is really impossible ever to know
what they are obligated to do.
Finally, the way that persons reason about their obligations
suggests that they can do what they are obligated to do. Joe can do the
floors and he can refrain from lying about his cigar smoking. He would,
in all likelihood, think it odd if someone tried to explain to him that he
4was obligated to do something he could not do, such as grow afoot taller
or save someone’s life by performing brain surgery. Although he may
not always consciously decide that he is able to do something before he
accepts that he is obligated to do it, if it turns out that he cannot do it he
would appeal to his inability when explaining why he really did not have
the obligation.
Why should we be at all concerned about how people explain
their moral obligations? Answering this questions requires that 1
digress slightly and talk about how ethical theories can be evaluated.
When testing or evaluating an ethical theory I look both for some
features that I think should be had by all theories and for some features
that I think should be had by ethical theories in particular. For each of
these features, the requirement that an adequate ethical theory must
have that feature is a constraint on a theory. Constraints on all theories
are formal constraints, while constraints on a theory in a particular
area, such as a moral theory, are substantive constraints.
Here are some of the formal constraints on an ethical theory: It
must be internally consistent, it must be general and it must be
externally consistent. A theory is internally consistent when its
application cannot generate a contradiction. An ethical theory would
be inconsistent if, for instance, it allowed for the possibility of a person
being, at the same time, both obligated and not obligated to do the same
act. This formal constraint, however, does not and should not preclude
5the possibility of there being real moral dilemmas. A theory can satisfy
this formal constraint and not preclude such possibilities as that of a
person being obligated to do mutually exclusive acts or that of a person
being both obligated and forbidden to do the same act . 2 A theory is
general when it is applicable to all of the phenomena of the relevant
kind. If, for instance, an ethical theory is a theory about what acts
persons are obligated to perform, then for any act, a, and any person, s
,
the theory should have something to say about whether s is obligated to
do a . 3 A theory is externally consistent when it is consistent with all
"well accepted" theories. Usually what happens is that we check to see
whether the theory is consistent with other theories that are better
accepted. It may happen, of course, that an ethical theory throws doubt
on some hitherto accepted theory and the reasons for accepting the
ethical theory are so good that the theorist is justified in no longer
accepting the other theory. In practice, trying to satisfy this formal
constraint becomes a balancing act.
There certainly may be other formal constraints on theories, not
all of which are as obvious as the above. Is it, for example, a constraint
on a theory concerning the occurrence of some phenomenon that it give
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of that
phenomenon? Or, is there some other kind of explanation that nvglr
suffice? Settling on all the formal constraints would require a general
discussion of the logical structure of theories. Such a discussion would
6lead us far astray, into territory where I would risk becoming
disoriented and lost. The above is offered merely as a way to see what I
have in mind as formal constraints on an ethical theory.
In addition to the formal constraints there are substantive
constraints on an ethical theory. These constraints give the general
outline of an ethical theory, but do not fill it in. They are the principles
against which we test ethical theories. It is reasonable to believe, for
example, that one of the substantive constraints on an ethical theory is
that it must be consistent with the claim that we can do what we are
obligated to do. Let me call this constraint Cl:
Cl. We can do what we are obligated to do.
Given the importance of substantive constraints on a theory, a
natural question arises: How do we determine these constraints?
Unfortunately, they are not at all obvious.
As I see it, we can determine the substantive constraints on an
ethical theory only by having a clear understanding of the entities that
are the subject of ethics. Unhappily, it is not even perfectly clear which
are the entities of ethics. Some of the likely candidates are persons,
properties, relations, propositions, acts, states of affairs and events. I
believe that the main way that we come to better understand these
entities is by considering ethical concepts. When we have become
aware of something, such as a property or relation, I take it we then
have acquired a concept of that thing. So, we understand the entities of
7ethics only by considering what is involved in our awareness of those
entities. It was by considering the concept of moral obligation and the
relationship between that concept and other concepts such as
responsibility and possibility that I came to believe that Cl is a
constraint on an ethical theory.
It is no easy matter to specify all of the substantive constraints on
a theory. Although ethical concepts are the only guides to the entities
of ethics, they are guides that we can follow only uncertainly. There are
a number of reasons why this is so. One is that awareness occurs in
degrees, so that having the concept of something also comes in degrees.
One person may have a clear concept of something, while another
person has a vague concept of the same thing. When a concept is vague
a person may confuse awareness of one thing for awareness of another,
so a person may mistake one concept for a closely related one.
Preferably, the conclusions about what substantive constraints there are
on an ethical theory will be drawn from consideration of ethical
concepts that are had perfectly clearly.
It is sad, but true, that we usually do not have these concepts
perfectly clearly. As a result it is sometimes necessary to decide
whether we should reject some feature of an ethical theory because it is
inconsistent with conclusions that we draw from consideration of an
ethical concept, or whether we should accept that feature of the theory
and dismiss the inconsistency as being brought about by a lack of clarity.
8In addition, since we sometimes draw inconsistent conclusions from our
consideration of concepts, we may have to decide which of the
conclusions to give up in order to clarify the concept.
There is another obstacle to a clear understanding of these
ethical concepts. Most of us do not get introduced to ethical concepts
directly or in isolation from other concepts. In fact, ethics is so
important in our daily lives that almost everyone has something to say
about these concepts. We hear various claims about these ethical
concepts whenever and wherever we stop and listen for them. Some of
us are even introduced to relatively complete theories at one time or
another. Sometimes the views presented by these theories are radically
different. For example, both Hermann Hesse’s S iddhart ha and Ayn
Rand’s The Fountainhead are intriguing works of fiction that discuss
interesting ethical questions. Each answers the questions in away that
seems to assume the truth of an ethical theory. The theories, however,
are not even in the same ballpark. Although there are opposing
theories in most interesting areas of inquiry, seldom does it matter as
much in our everyday lives. All of this is well known. It is brought up
now because it seems to be particularly difficult to grasp ethical
concepts.
We are now back to the question of why we should talk about
popular ethical views at all when engaging in ethical theorizing. There
are two related answers to this question. Which answer is appropriate
9depends on the project in which we are engaged. We might he engaged
in the project of giving an account of ordinary moral reasoning, or a
rational reconstruction of moral reasoning
.
4 If this is the project, then
it is easy to see why principles such as Cl, garnered from reflecting on
ordinary moral reasoning, are constraints on the theory: they express
the phenomena the theory is meant to explain. Offering a theory of
ordinary moral reasoning would be an attempt to systematize and show
the logical connections between the views expressed by the principles.
Another, no less interesting project is to offer a theory of moral
obligation. The relevance of how persons engage in ordinary moral
reasoning to a theory of moral obligation is less certain. Just because
persons tend to think about moral obligation in a certain way does not
make them right. For example, many persons tend to think about solid
matter as a unity, or, at best, contiguous unities, while solid objects are
really sparse clouds of atoms. However, the way that persons reason
about moral obligation does express some fundamental intuitions about
moral obligation and moral concepts. Since moral concepts are so
difficult to grasp on their own, a moral theory consistent with these
intuitions would be of great interest. That a reasonable theory could be
developed consistent with these intuitions would not justify acceptance
of the theory. That a theory ; s consistent with ordinary moral reasoning
might, however, lend credibility to it.
10
In which project am I engaged? A rational reconstruction of
moral reasoning or a discussion of a theory of moral obligation? I
prefer to think of it as the latter. If there is a reasonable theory of
moral obligation consistent with the intuitions behind ordinary moral
reasoning, it will also be a reconstruction of moral reasoning.
Let us now reconsider the examples of ethical explanation
presented at the beginning of this chapter. Remember, I take them to
involve perfectly ordinary ways of explaining moral obligation and to
express ethical views that are suggestive of constraints on an ethical
theory. Further, I believe that these constraints have been given short
shrift recently, often dismissed as spurious and not really central to
ethical thinking. Before discussing any moral theory, I should marshal
and clarify the ethical views that I have in mind.
The first view I want to consider is captured in constraint Cl.
Although I accept Cl as a constraint on an ethical theory, I would not
claim that the concepts I considered were perfectly clear to me. The
relevant concept of possibility is a somewhat vague concept for me.
Consequently, the proper way to understand the constraint is not
perfectly clear. In spite of this difficulty, this constraint is so important
that something should be said about the relevant concept of possibility.
In order to distinguish ; t from other concepts of possibility, such as
metaphysical possibility, I call it "deontological possibility." There is a
very rough test that I use for determining whether something is
11
deontologically possible. Since it is reasonable to hold people
responsible for satisfying their moral obligations, if it would be
reasonable to hold someone responsible for doing something, then it is
deontologically possible for that person to do it. This test is fairly
awkward because it appeals to the normative notions of reasonableness
and responsibility, which are not the clearest of concepts. Nonetheless,
it is the best I can do for now and considering it helps to get onto the
notion of possibility I have in mind.
The reasonableness of holding a person responsible for
something depends, in part, on that person’s skills, knowledge and
experience. Consequently, what is deontologically possible varies over
persons and times. For example, it would be unreasonable to hold me
responsible for the death of someone because I did not perform needed
open-heart surgery on that person; I do not have the necessary training
and it is unreasonable to expect me to have the training. It may be
reasonable to hold someone else, say a heart specialist, responsible for
the death of someone because he or she did not perform the surgery. It
is deontologically impossible for me to perform such surgery, while it is
deontologically possible for some doctors to perform it. Additionally, it
may be reasonable to hold someone responsible for something that
person does not know, if it is reasonable to expect that the person know
it. Another example is in order. At the present time it is unreasonable
to hold anyone responsible for not preventing an earthquake. It is
12
deontologically impossible for anyone to prevent one. At some time in
the future, however, it may be reasonable to hold someone responsible
for this. At such a time, it would be deontologically possible for that
person to prevent an earthquake.
Another important view expressed in ordinary moral reasoning is
that an act can be obligatory by virtue of having any one of some number
of discrete features. Some of these features are such that a person can
be obligated to perform an act by virtue of its having one of them. The
other features are such that a person can be obligated not to perform an
act by virtue of the act having one of them. For example: A person may
be obligated to perform an act by virtue of its being an instance of
promise-keeping or may be obligated to perform an act by virtue of its
being an instance of helping another person. A person may be obligated
not to perform an act by virtue of its being an instance of lying or may be
obligated not to perform an act by virtue of its being an instance of
harming another person. For convenience sake, let me call these
features "Right Making Characteristics" ("RMCs") and "Wrong Making
Characteristics" ("WMCs") respectively . 5
It is difficult, for example, to give an account where it comes out
that utilitarianism proposes only one RMC, being no worse than any
alternative. Since each alternative has its value for a particular reason,
for example that it is an instance of promise keeping, it is difficult to
give an account that makes being an instance of promise keeping an
13
RMC on a nonutilitarian account of obligation while not making it one
on an utilitarian account of obligation. For example, let us say that a
property is an RMC just in case in some circumstance having it is a
sufficient but not necessary condition for generating an obligation.
Since being an instance of promise keeping is being of highest value in
some circumstances, being an instance of promise-keeping would be an
RMC even on an utilitarian account of obligation
It is part of the job of a theory to give such an account of the
nature of RMCs or to give reasons why one cannot be given. The best
we can do here is to use examples in an attempt to elucidate the notion
of an RMC. Above, both being an instance of promise-keeping and
being an instance of helping another person are supposed to be RMCs.
The constraint expressing the view that there are a number of these
characteristics can be stated as follows:
C2. There is more than one RMC.
Also inherent in the way that persons reason about their
obligations is the view that they sometimes know what those obligations
are. It would be going too far to say that the ordinary view is that
persons always know what they are obligated to do, or even that they can
always know what they are obligated to do. Sometimes our obligations
are impossible to determine; sometimes they are very difficult to
14
determine; sometimes, however, they are easy to determine. Here is the
constraint expressing this view:
C3. Persons sometimes know what they are obligated to do.
There is a corollary to C3. It is that there are methods persons
can use to determine some of their obligations. If we sometimes know
what our obligations are and this knowledge is the result of engaging in
a reasoning process, then engaging in this reasoning process is a method
for determining a person’s obligations. Here is the constraint
expressing this view:
C4. There are methods that persons can use to determine some
of their obligations.
A theorist attempting to develop an ethical theory consistent with
ordinary moral reasoning should begin with the supposition that Cl, C2,
C3, and C4 are constraints on the theory. It may, of course, turn out in
the long run that they really are spurious constraints, but they should
not be dismissed without good reason.
Without a doubt, there will be many difficulties encountered as a
result of accepting these constraints and it is easy to see that any theory
that tries to satisfy them is not going to be tidy. Still, these constraints
are so plausible that even theorists who reject them often try to account
for the widespread belief that they express important ethical views. Let
me give some examples of this.
15
The main problem standing in the way of accepting C3 and C4
arises from the acceptance of the view that some of our obligations are
forward looking, that is, sometimes the consequences of our actions are
morally significant. As difficult as it is to describe the world as it is, it is
much more difficult to say how it is going to be; yet if the consequences
of our acts are morally significant and we can know our moral
obligations, then we must be able to know what those consequences are.
In "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics
or Decision-Making Procedure?" Eugene Bales says a number of things
that might be taken as showing how we can reasonably reject C3 and C4
as substantive constraints on an ethical theory. 6 He argues that we can
make a distinction between a theory about the conditions that must be
satisfied for a phenomenon to occur and a theory about the decision
making procedure for telling whether that same phenomenon has
occurred. Given this distinction, he argues that it is unreasonable to
require a theory to do both. Applying this reasoning to the case at hand,
we could argue that a theory about the conditions that must be satisfied
for someone to have a moral obligation is distinct from a theory about
how a person’s obligations should be determined, so we would be
mistaken to object to a theory because it does not do both.
Consequently we should reject C3 and C4. Bales’s argument is very
interesting and will be considered at length in a later chapter.
16
The difficulties encountered by accepting both Cl and C2 may be
even more extreme. Consider C2, the view that there is more than one
RMC. Let us say that there is a finite list of these characteristics. Let
us also assume that refraining from performing some act is performing
an act. So, for example, mopping the floors is one act and not mopping
the floors is another. Given these assumptions, let us formulate an
ethical theory and call it the Common Sense View of Morality (CSVM):




(i) s can do a and
(ii) a has a RMC.
There is a very interesting consequence of CSVM. If it is true,
there are unresolvable conflicts of obligation. That is, there will be
situations where someone has more than one obligation, can fulfill any
of them, but cannot fulfill all of them. This is due to the fact that a
person sometimes is presented with a number of mutually exclusive
alternatives each of which has at least one RMC. In such a situation a
person can perform any one, but not all. In addition, there are
situations where an act, a
,
has an RMC and the act which consists of
refraining from doing a has an RMC. Since a person cannot both do
something and refrain from doing it, in such a situation there will be
some act with an RMC that the person cannot perform.
17
Joe, for example, may have promised his wife that he will mow the
lawn now and be ready to start work when he notices a hit and run victim
in the road. If he mows the lawn he will not be able to help the
grievously injured person as the injuries would prove fatal before he is
done with the lawn. If he helps the injured person he will not be able to
mow the lawn now, because he cannot mow and help the injured person
at the same time. Here are two mutually exclusive acts, each having a
RMC. Also, Joe, foolishly, could have promised to cover for a friend.
Bill, by telling Bill’s wife that Bill spent the afternoon at a baseball
game with him, when, in fact, Bill was meeting with another woman.
Both lying to Bill’s wife and telling her the truth have RMCs. Lying to
her is the keeping of a promise; telling her the truth is refraining from
lying. Yet he cannot do both. This consequence of CSVM is not very
palatable, or, at least, I do not find find it so.7 Here is a constraint
reflecting this view about conflicts of obligation.
C5. There are no real conflicts of obligation.
Even if we accept C5, we still have to explain the apparent
conflicts of obligation generated by accepting C2 and C5. There seem
to be two main alternatives for providing this explanation. The first is
that that C2 is really a spurious constraint, there is only one RMC, and
it is comparative in nature.8 The second alternative is that CSVM
incorrectly expresses C2, and a theory that correctly interprets it does
not have this undesirable consequence.
18
Even those who accept the first alternative, hence reject C2,
should try to explain why it appears that there is more than one RMC
and why they appear to conflict. There are a number of ways this may be
done. One way to explain why it appears that there is more than one
RMC is just to say that the view is merely left behind baggage from when
we were young and naive and had to be taught simple, easy to remember
rules. 9 A much more promising way is to say that having one of the
features taken to be a RMC is indicative of having some other
characteristic, and it is by virtue of having this other characteristic that
acts are obligatory. If alternative acts can have this characteristic to
different degrees, it may be that the alternative that has it to the
greatest degree is the obligatory act. If it does not come in degrees, it
may be that having one of features taken to be a RMC is usually, but not
always, indicative of having this other characteristic. We could then
explain how it appears that there is more than one RMC by citing the
fact that each of the features that is indicative of this characteristic
seems to be an RMC, while not actually being one. In short, we would
be confusing the usual sign of a thing with the thing itself. 10
Offering an explanation of apparent conflicts of obligations
seems to me to be one of the long suits of utilitarian views. Let us
consider a hypothetical situation where there is no apparent conflict of
obligation and then examine one where there is an apparent conflict of
19
obligation to see how a utilitarian could account for the person’s
obligations.
Let us say that Joe’s alternatives are going to the beach or
mowing the lawn as he promised to do. In such a situation there seems
to be no conflict of obligations, because only mowing the lawn seems to
have a RMC. A utilitarian might say that he can account for Joe’s
obligation to mow the lawn by appealing to the fact that he promised to
do so and the fact that promise keeping has high utility. Being an
instance of promise keeping is itself not a RMC, rather it is indicative of
the act’s having high utility. Now say that Joe’s alternatives are helping
a hit and run victim or mowing the lawn as promised. Here there seems
to be a conflict of obligation because it seems that each of the
alternatives has a RMC. However, a utilitarian might say that he can
easily account for Joe’s obligation to help the hit and run victim.
Helping someone in dire need has even greater utility than keeping a
promise to mow a lawn. Of course neither being an instance of helping
someone in dire need nor being an instance of promise keeping is an
RMC, but each appears to be one since they are indicative of the act’s
having high utility. In this way, the apparent conflict of obligation is
given a reasonable explanation.
As interesting as is this denial of C2 and the explanation of
apparent conflict of obligation, it is not the alternative in which I am
most interested. Instead of denying C2, I will examine the possibility
20
that CSVM incorrectly expresses it. That is, I will see whether it is
possible to maintain that there is more than one RMC, while denying
that every act having one is obligatory.
W. D. Ross, in his seminal work of 1930, T he Right and the
Good
,
and his later work. The Foundations of Ethics , presents a
theory that seems consistent with all of the previously mentioned
constraints. 11 He presents a theory that seems to be consistent both
with the view that there are a number of different features that an act
may be obligatory by virtue of having and with the view that there are no
real conflicts of obligation.
Not only did Ross offer one of the few theories that purports to
satisfy all of the above constraints, but in offering it he also introduced
an important technical term. The technical term is "prima facie
duty". 12 This is one of those terms that has immediately found a home in
philosophical discussions of ethics, both among professional and
amateur philosophers. Indeed, a seemingly analogous term has even
found its way into discussions of political rights. The reason for its
widespread acceptance is, I believe, that it is taken to express a concept
that is absolutely central to any adequate explanation of the moral
status of those features of acts that the ordinary view of morality holds
are the grounds of obligation -- those features I have called RMCs.
Here is what Ross says of the term:
21
I suggest 'prima f acie duty’ or ’conditional duty’ as a brief
way of referring to the characteristic which an act has, in
virtue of being of a certain kind, of being an act which
would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of
another kind which is morally significant. 13
Once he introduces the term he uses it in his acceptance of
something like my C2. He says:
I would contend that in principle there is no reason to
anticipate that every act that is our duty is so for one and
the same reason. Why should two sets of circumstances, or
one set of circumstances, not possess different
characteristics, any one of which makes a certain act our
prima facie duty? When I ask what it is that makes me in
certain cases sure that I have a prima facie duty to do so
and so, I find that it lies in the fact that I have made a
promise; when I ask the same question in another case, I
find the answer lies in the fact that I have done a wrong.
And if on reflection I find (as I think I do) that either of
these reasons is reducible to the other, I must not on any a
priori ground assume that such a reduction is possible. 14
He also suggests that mutually exclusive acts can each be a prima
facie duty, and that there are no real conflicts of duties. This may be
taken as suggesting he would accept the compatibility of my C2 and C5.
He says:
If, as almost all moralists except Kant are agreed, and as
most plain men think, it is sometimes right to tell a lie or to
break a promise, it must be maintained that there is a
difference between prima facie duty and actual
duty.. ..Any act that we do contains various elements in
virtue of which it falls under various categories. In virtue
of being the breaking of a promise, for instance, it tends to
be wrong; in virtue of being an instance of relieving distress
it tends to be right. Tendency to be one’s duty may be
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called a parti-resultant attribute, i.e. one which belongs
toan act in virtue of some one component in its nature.
Being one’s duty is a toti-resultant attribute, one which
belongs to an act in virtue of its whole nature and of
nothing less than this. 15
Although the notion of a primafacie duty is clearly Ross’s
primary theoretical legacy to moral philosophy, he also has a number of
interesting things to say about our knowledge of obligations. In at least
one place he says things consistent with accepting C3 and C4. For
instance, he says that "anything that we ought to do must be something
that we not only can do, but can do with the knowledge or at least the
opinion that it is our duty." 16 At other times, however, he suggests that
we cannot know what we are obligated to do. 17
Despite the near certainty that there are insurmountable
problems with Ross’s theory, examining the approach he takes has the
potential to be very productive. I will now describe how I shall proceed
in this examination.
Closely examining Ross’s work is a good way to begin, and that
beginning shall be made in Chapter II. I will pay particular attention to
his attempts to characterize prima facie duties and his explanation of
the relationship between moral obligations and prima facie duties.
His explanation suggests a number of accounts, each of which needs
further elucidation. I will discuss his "official" account of prima facie
duties in Chapter II, leaving a discussion of other interesting families of
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strategies for providing an account of prima facie duties for Chapters
III and IV.
One of the most promising strategies involves trying to show that
the characteristics making an act a prima facie duty gives it a certain
weight and the one with the most weight is morally obligatory. 18
Different theorists working along this line might believe that the
weighting involves different features. For example, some might say that
a prima facie duty is one that tends to be moral obligatory and the one
with the greatest tendency is actually obligatory. 19 Another strategy
worthy of close examination has it that both prima facie duty and duty
proper are defined concepts and their definitions share some other
normative concept, such as requirement or fittingness.
In Chapter V I will turn away from the notion of prima f acie
duty and discuss moral knowledge. The discussion of moral knowledge
will center on constraints C3 and C4. In particular, I will concentrate on
Ross’s explanation of how we can have moral knowledge and an
argument that seems to suggest that we can accept that we sometimes
know what we are obligated to do while rejecting that a theory of moral
obligation should be usable for deciding what we are obligated to do.
The arguments in Chapters II - V will lead me to the conclusion
that, as it is commonly understood Ross’s theory is inadequate and
modern interpretations are not likely to fare much better. I will argue
that the difficulties in Ross’s theory can be traced to Aristotelian
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elements in it. These elements cause Ross’s theory to be an unfortunate
mix of two approaches to ethics: an investigation of the ethical life and
an investigation of ethical concepts.
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Notes
1 Throughout this introduction I will talk about properties of acts as the
grounds of obligations. It may be that this is not quite right and it is
actually something else like properties of states of affairs that are the
grounds of obligation. I do not want to decide this question just yet, so,
for now, I assume the naive view.
2 Ruth Barcan Marcus makes a similar point in "Moral Dilemmas and
Consistency," The Journal of Philosophy, LXXVII (March 1980), p.
133, when she argues that "the consistency of a set of moral rules, even
in the absence of a complete set of priority rules, is not incompatible
with the reality of moral dilemmas."
3 Admittedly, this is a very weak, perhaps trivial, constraint. It rules out
very few theories. It would, however, rule out the following theory of
moral obligation: If S promises to do A, then S is morally obligated to
do A. This theory says nothing about acts that do not involve promise
keeping.
4 As far as I can tell the first one to use this phrase is Rudolf Carnap in
The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in
Philosophy
,
trans. Rolf A. George (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1967). See Chapter A, p. 1, where he says that "a constructional
system undertakes more than the division of concepts ito various kinds
and the investigation of the differences and mutual relations between
these kinds. In addition, it attempts a step-by-step derivation or
’construction’ of all concepts from certain fundamental concepts." I
thank Fred Feldman for pointing this out to me.
5
I will concentrate on giving an account of RMCswith the
understanding that, if I am successful, an analogous account can be
given of WMCs.
6 Eugene Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making
Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American
Philosophical Quarterly , VIII (1971), pp. 257-265.
7 There is a substantial literature on conflicts of obligation or moral
dilemmas. A few noted proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas
are Bas van Fraassen, "Values and the Heart’s Command," The
Journal of Philosophy LXX ( 1973), pp. 5- 19; Marcus, "Moral
Dilemmas and Consistency," pp. 121-136; Bernard Williams, Ethical
Consistency," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973), pp. 166-186. (His argument largely rests on the
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fact that an agent will feel regret for not being able to satisfy one of the
conflicting "obligations." He attempts to refine the relevant notion of
regret in "Moral Luck," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), pp. 27-33). Argumentsfor the possibility of
conflicts of obligation seem largely to consist of descriptions of
scenarios where there are conflicts. Replies to these arguments usually
take the form of explanations for the scenarios sans the conflicts. See,
for example, Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can
,
(Dordrecht: D.
Reidel Publishing Co., 1986), pp. 200-206. Some arguments for the
impossibility of conflicts of obligation rest on the acceptance of the
principle that Op&Oq-> Op&q (usually called the "agglomeration
principle") and some version of Cl. See Feldman, pp. 40-41; Azizah al-
Hibri, "Deontic Logic: A Comprehensive Appraisal and a New
Proposal" (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), pp.
18-21. Others distinguish between two kinds of obligation and say that
one kind can conflict, one kind cannot conflict and the existence of two
kinds of obligations accounts for the varying intuitions about moral
dilemmas. See Philippa Foot, "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma,"
T he J ournal of P hi l o sophy LXXX ( 1983), pp. 370-398; William
David Ross, Foundations of Ethics , (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1939), pp. 108-1 10. Earl Conee, in "Why Moral Dilemmas are
Impossible," American Philosophical Quarterly XXVI ( 1989), pp.
133-141, takes a seemingly new approach. He argues that given the
circumstances a person is in at a particular time there is an ideally good
way (or equally good ways) to live out his or her life and that the person
is morally obligated to do whatever is required to live out his or her life
in that way. He then argues that obligations cannot conflict because
these ideally good ways of living out a life cannot conflict. At most,
some can be equally good. This really seems to be an appeal to
something like Cl and the agglomeration principle. His view requires
that you can live your live in the way that is ideally good; hence, that you
can do everything you are obligated to do.
8 By "comparative" I mean that it is a characteristic involving
comparison of the act having it to its alternatives. Being no worse than
any other alternative and being preferred by most people are both
comparative characteristics.
9 This seems to be the point Fred Feldman makes in his Doing the Best
We Can
, pp. 142-144.
10 Interestingly, Feldman says some things in Doing the Best W e Can
that would leave this kind of explanation open to him. See, for example,
p. 25.
it William David Ross, The Right and the Good (London: Oxford
University Press, 1930). W.D. Ross The Foundations of Ethics
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939). His view changes within and
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between the two books, so it is not perfectly accurate to talk about ’a’
theory. I do believe, however, that lurking in there somewhere is at
least one theory that is intended to be consistent with the views
expressed by the constraints.
12
I use prim a f acie duty and prim a facie obligation interchangeable.
12 Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 19.
14 Ross, p. 24.
15 Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 28.
16 Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 163.
17 Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 31-32.
18 If two or more acts are such that there is no other act with a greater
weight, then each is morally right.
19 Again, if two or more acts are such that there is no other act with a




In The Right and the Good and Foundations of Ethics Ross
intertwines many strands of a theory of human conduct. His topics
range from the meaning of ethical terms to the nature of political rights.
In fact, his discussion is so encompassing that it is convenient to loosen
some of these strands so that we can focus on them in isolation. We
would do well, however, to remember they are a parts of a whole. My
focus will be on the strands that constitute his metaethical theory and
his normative ethical theory.
Ross outlines a metaethical theory when he discusses topics
concerning the structure of his normative ethical theory. These topics
include the kinds of things an ethical theory is about and the meaning
of ethical terms such as "right," "wrong" and "obligatory." For instance,
one metaethical theory might propose that when the term right' is used
in its ethical sense it expresses a property that is had by acts, while
another might propose that it is used in expressing a speaker s feelings
about a state of affairs. A normative ethical theory, on the other hand,
is a theory about when something is right, wrong or obligatory. One
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normative theory might propose that an act is right just in case doing the
act produces more pleasure than pain, while another might propose that
an act is right just in case it has the approval of the majority of a
particular population.
Proponents of different normative ethical theories can subscribe
to the same metaethical theory. For instance, two theorists may each
believe that rightness is a property had by acts and, at the same time,
disagree on when it is had by an act. Since the way that a normative
theory is stated presumes particular answers to metaethical questions, it
is not obvious how proponents of different metaethical theories can
subscribe to exactly the same normative ethical theory. They may,
however, subscribe to analogous theories. This can be seen by
considering a fairly recent change in metaethical theorizing brought
about as the result of difficulties in individuating alternative acts . 1
Quite a number of modern theorists have gone from seeing
obligation as a relationship between persons and acts to seeing it as a
relationship between persons and states of affairs . 2 Theorists who
previously offered normative theories whose central premise was that
we ought to do acts that maximize utility and who now say that we ought
to bring about states of affairs that maximize utility can fairly be
characterized as utilitarians, both before and after the shift in the
metaethical theories they advance. In truth, however, they cannot hold
exactly the same normative theory before and after such a shift. If we
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take the prototype theory of something to be a statement of necessary
and sufficient conditions for its existence, then it is obvious how
different metaethical theories can require different normative theories:
Theories that are about different things are different theories.
Consequently, if acts are different from states of affairs, then a theory
about a relationship between persons and states of affairs must be
different from a theory about a relationship between persons and acts.
Due to the intimate relationship between normative and
metaethical theories it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to
consider one completely divorced from the other. Consequently, even
though I am brought to considering Ross’s work because of certain
features of his normative ethical view, I am bound to take into account
his metaethical views. At the moment I will neither discuss them in
great detail nor criticize them. I will simply give an overview of them.
In later chapters, however, I will discuss certain features of his
metaethical view in more detail. Following my overview of his
metaethical views I will give a gloss of his normative ethical view. After
this I will focus on the features of his theory that are most relevant to
the constraints C1-C5.
jk».me Features of Ross’s Metaethical View
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"Obligatory" expresses one of the most important of
these properties. Of course, this term is also used in expressing other
properties. We talk, for instance, about social obligations as well as
moral obligations, and it by no means is apparent that they are the same
thing. The property it expresses in a particular use is a function of the
context of that use. To be aware of the property expressed by using the
term in ethical discourse is to have the concept of moral obligatoriness.
Although Ross claims that this concept is unanalyzable, he is not so
clear about whether it is a simple property. In F oundations of Ethics
he says that, like redness, "moral rightness is a complex characteristic ."4
His reason for making this claim appears to be that he takes moral
rightness to be a form of suitability. Although the concept of moral
obligatoriness is unanalyzable, he does, however, hold that
interdefinitions can be made between it and the ethical notions of right
and wrong: That which is obligatory not to do is wrong, and that which
is not obligatory not to do is right . 5 Ross seems to have supposed that
"obligatory" expresses the most basic ethical concept of the suite of
right, wrong and obligatory. However, it is not clear how we can justify
this supposition. Consequently, the most charitable way to understand
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him is as claiming that there is no normative notion by which these all
can be analyzed that is not equivalent to one of them.
Although we often talk as though acts are obligatory, this is
talking elliptically. Obligations, Ross says, are had by persons:
I have spoken of acts as being obligatory, and this language
is often convenient, for brevity. But it is not strictly
correct. For consider the situation when an obligation
really exists, viz. before the act in question, or any
alternative act, has been done. We cannot then, strictly
speaking, say ’such and such and act is obligatory’, for the
act is not there, to be either obligatory or anything else.
Nor, again, can we say ’such and such an act would be
obligatory if it were done’; for clearly its obligatoriness, if
it has any, does not depend on its being done. The only
strict language which we can use in the circumstances is ’so
and so is obligated to act in such and such a way’. In fact,
obligatoriness is not a characteristic that attaches to acts;
obligation is something that attaches to persons .6
Ross is not being as careful as he should. Being obligated is not a
property that attaches to persons in the same way that a person has the
property of being six feet tall. Obligations always have objects, much as
when we have an interest there is always an object of that interest. Even
in the above passage when he talks "strictly," Ross talks about the object
of the obligation when he says that our obligation is to act "in such and
such a way." Talking about the objects of obligation, however, seems
particularly confusing and misleading. We can see that Ross is actually
talking about the connections among at least three things: a person, a
property and the object of the property. Consequently, it is more
perspicuous to talk about obligation as a multi-place relation, one
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having a person as one of its relata and the object of obligations as
another. Looking at obligation in this way will also make it easier to
modify Ross’s view, if need be. For example, it may be that obligations
can change over time and the time of the obligation is actually a third
relatum.
Given this, we still need to determine the kinds of things that can
be in the second place of the relation. Are we obligated to have certain
beliefs? Bring about certain states of affairs? Or, as is implied in the
above passage, act in particular ways? In The Right and the Good
Ross seemingly vacillates about the kinds of things that can be the
second relatum. He sometimes talks as though we are obligated to do
acts of the ordinary variety, such as returning a book or donating money
to a hospital. At other times, however, he talks as if persons are
obligated to bring about certain states of affairs.
In order to make a closer examination of Ross’s view on the
nature of the second relatum, suppose that I receive a book from my
friend Joe and I promise to return it to him when I am done with it.
Further suppose that as consequence of my promise I have incurred a
moral obligation to return it to him. Ross would say that the obligation
is a characteristic that attaches to a person: it is had by me. I propose
that we understand this as claiming that persons are the kinds of things
that can be one of the relata. We still need to discover towards what
34
kind of thing is this obligation directed, or what kinds of things can be
the other relatum.
According to Ross, if I don’t return the book as promised, then I
have not fulfilled my obligation. It does not matter what I do in an
attempt to return the book or how hard I try. Mailing the book is
insufficient if the mail does not go through. Giving it to a generally
reliable mutual friend who promises to relay it to Joe is insufficient if he
loses it. It would seem that even leaving it on his office desk is
inadequate if his office burns down before he gets to work. In fact, as
Ross puts it, "non-attainment of the result proves the insufficiency of
the means" and, thus, my failure to fulfill my obligation .7
Since attaining a certain result is necessary for fulfilling my
obligation, it would seem that the state of affairs of Joe’s having the
book is the object of my obligation. Also, since there are many ways to
do it--one as good as another--it would seem that there is no particular
act that I must perform to satisfy the obligation. Surprisingly, Ross does
not come to this conclusion. Instead, he concludes that we are obligated
to perform an act that brings about the relevant state of affairs. In my
example, the act must bring about the state of affairs of Joe's having the
book. Nonetheless, it is the act that I am obligated to do . 8
The above is Ross’s view in The Right and the Good. Ir
Foundations of Ethics Ross presents a radically different view. He
no longer proposes that ordinary acts are the objects of obligations; he
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argues that we are obligated to a very special kind of act of "setting
ourselves about" doing an act that will bring about that state of affairs.
Again consider the above hypothetical case. According to this
new view, when I promised to return the book to Joe I did not become
obligated to perform an act resulting in Joe’s having the book, although
I became obligated to do an act closely associated with it. I became
obligated to "set myself about" doing the act. In addition, the act is not
necessarily one that will bring about his having the book; instead, it is
one that I believe will bring about his having the book. That is, what act
I am obligated to set myself about doing entirely depends on my
perception of the situation. If, for instance, I truly believe that I can
best ensure Joe’s getting the book by putting it in the garbage, then I am
obligated to set myself about putting it there.
Let us quickly consider Ross’s reasons for changing his view on
the relationship between a person’s beliefs and the act that he is
obligated to set himself about to do. In particular, we need to get a
better idea of what he takes to be involved in 'setting oneself about'
doing an act and why it is that acts of that kind are the objects of
obligations, or the second relatum.
Ross cites H. A. Prichard’s lecture 'Duty and Ignorance’ as
providing the main impetus for his change of view about the objects of
obligation . 9 One of the most important conclusions Ross accepts from
this lecture is that there is an important distinction between doing
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something directly and doing it indirectly, and "the only changes we can
be said quite strictly to bring about are those which we bring about
directly ." 10 The mark of a change that we can bring about directly is that
we can be certain that we can bring it about. Since the only changes we
can be certain to bring about are mental changes, it is only these mental
changes that we can bring about directly. When we make a mental
change in an attempt to bring about something indirectly we are ’setting
ourselves about’ doing that thing. By way of an example Ross says:
[I]f we ask what we mean when we say T can make a loud
noise’, we find that what we mean is not that there is a
special kind of activity of which we are capable consisting
in bringing about a loud noise, but rather that a special
kind of activity of which we are capable, consisting of
setting ourselves to make a loud noise, would have a loud
noise as an effect. 11
.
It is clear that in Foundations of Ethics Ross accepts a
constraint similar to Cl and, as a consequence, holds that persons can
be obligated to do only those things that they can be sure of doing . 12
Consequently, he claims that we can only be obligated to set ourselves
about bringing about some result. He says:
The most important point, I think, which emerges from
Professor Prichard’s discussion is that the only thing to
which a man can be morally obligated is what I will call a
self-exertion, a setting oneself to effect this or that change
or set of changes. He cannot be obligated to perform an
’act’, in the ordinary sense. For the noun 'act', as we
ordinarily use it, stands for a complex thing; viz. the
causing of a certain change by setting oneself to cause it;
than this includes as an element in it the occurrence of the
change . 13
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In Foundations of Ethics Ross also makes an important
distinction between three notions of duty: objective duty, subjective
duty and what I shall call d-subjective (doubly subjective) duty. As I
have presented his view, Ross holds that when a person has a moral
obligation, it is to set himself to do an act that will bring about a certain
state of affairs. 14 Since I have not yet presented his normative ethical
view, I have not yet determined the salient features of these acts and
states of affairs. In order to make my explanation of these three notions
of duty easier, let me assume for a moment that these questions have
been settled and that the relevant states of affairs are distinguished by
their having a certain feature, FI.
As we all know, there is sometimes a difference between what a
person believes and what is true. Thus a person may mistakenly believe
that an act has a certain feature or that doing it has a certain
consequence. Whether or not a person has true beliefs about the
features had by an act or the consequences of doing the act generally
has no bearing on whether the person has an objective moral obligation
to do that act. So, for any person, SI, act, Al, and state of affairs, PI, if
S 1 can do A 1, A 1 brings about PI, only PI has FI and of all of the acts
that SI can do only Al brings about PI, then SI has an objective moral
obligation to do Al. The possibility, or even plausibility, that SI does
not know and does not believe that doing A 1 will bring about P 1 has no
bearing on Si’s having an objective duty to do A 1 . Therefore, even if S
1
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believes that doing A 1 will preclude Pi’s being brought about, S 1 is
objectively obligated to do it.
A person’s epistemic state always is relevant in determining both
kinds of subjective duties. According to the second notion of duty,
subjective duty, a person’s beliefs about what act will bring about the
relevant state of affairs plays an important role in determining that
person’s duties. Let say that SI mistakenly believes that doing act A2
will bring about PI. SI would have a subjective duty to do A2.
According to the third notion of duty, d-subjective duty, the person’s
beliefs about what state of affairs has the relevant characteristic and
what act will bring it about are both relevant. Let us say that SI
mistakenly believes that P2 has FI and SI mistakenly believes that
doing A3 will bring it about. SI would, therefore, have a d-subjective
duty to do A3. To be more precise, SI would have a d-subjective duty to
set about doing A3.
Ross admits that objective duties exist and that a theory about
such duties is important. He also admits that there is an important
relationship between objective and subjective duties. In fact he goes so
far as to characterize a person's subjective duty as that which the person
believes to be his objective duty. 15 According to this characterization, if
a person were omniscient then the person’s objective and subjective
duties would be the same. Nevertheless, Ross concludes that the
ordinary notion of obligation involves d-subjective duty, or the third
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notion of duty that I mentioned. The justification for this conclusion
stems from his acceptance of something like constraints C2 and C3. He
claims that we usually know what we are obligated to do, and usually can
be justifiably held accountable for doing it. Speaking of these three
notions of duty he says:
It is only by thus distinguishing different rightnesses or
suitabilities and by making duty depend on the last of the
three that we can do justice to a thought which is
inseparable from the thought of duty. This is the thought
that anything that we ought to do must be something that
we not only can do, but can do with the knowledge or at
least the opinion that it is our duty. 16
He also says:
The notion of obligation carries with it very strongly the
notion that the non-discharge of an obligation is
blameworthy. Now suppose that of two men one does that
which he mistakenly believes to be his objective duty, and
the other does that which is his objective duty, believing it
not to be so, we should regard the former as at least less
blameworthy than the latter. 17
The view that we can know what we are obligated to do is a
marked change from his view in The Right and the Good. There he
explicitly denies this. Following a discussion of our knowledge of our
obligations he says "There is therefore much truth in the description of
the right act as a fortunate act. If we cannot be certain that it is right, it
is our good fortune if the act we do is the right act." 18
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In a later chapter I again will take up the question of ethical
knowledge. There, I will reconsider and evaluate Ross’s view
concerning subjective duty.
Some Features of Ross’s Normative Ethical View
One of the most important features of any normative ethical view
is what it has to say about when an act is morally right. Ross’s normative
view seems to include an account of moral rightness. In The Right and
the Good
,
he says that "right acts can be distinguished from wrong acts
only as being those which, of all those possible for the agent in the
circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie rightness...." 19
Given Ross’s metaethical views, we can understand this claim as
proposing an account of moral rightness, which I will label "RMR1".
RMR1: A person, s, is morally right in doing an act, a , if and only
if
i) s can do a and
ii) none of s’s alternatives has a greater degree of prima
facie rightness than does a.
RMR1 appeals to two unfamiliar concepts: the concent of prima
facie rightness and the concept of acts having prima facie rightness
to different degrees. 20 If RMR1 is the account of moral rightness
behind Ross’s claim, it can only be understood and evaluated after we
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come to understand these two concepts. Since our understanding of
prim a facie rightness may determine our understanding of how prim a
facie rightness comes in degrees, I will concentrate on the concept of
prima facie rightness. I will start by discussing some features of
prima f acie obligations.
Some Features of Prima Facie Obligations
Ross holds that there are a number of different properties that
confer a special moral status upon any act having one of them. A person
has a prima facie duty to do an act having any one of these
properties
.
21 He provides a list of the kinds of prima facie duties, but
admits that there may be additional prima facie duties of which he is
not aware
.
22 There are prima facie duties of fidelity, reparation,
gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement and nonmaleficence . 23
In explaining these kinds of duties he says that we have prima facie
obligations to keep promises and tell the truth (fidelity); to make
amends for past misdeeds (reparation); to benefit those that have
performed services for us (gratitude); to distribute goods and the means
to goods according to merit (justice); to improve others (beneficence);
to improve ourselves (self-improvement); and not to harm others
( nonmaleficence ). 24
Although Ross usually describes prima facie obligations as
properties, he is not nearly as consistent when speaking of the kinds ot
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things that have them. When he "officially" introduces the notion in
The Right and the Good Ross speaks as if they are characteristics of
acts when he says:
I suggest ’prima facie duty’ or ’conditional duty’ as a brief
way of referring to the characteristic which an act has, in
virtue of being of a certain kind, of being an act which
would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of
another kind which is morally significant
.
25
He also talks as if prima facie duties are properties of kinds of
acts when he says, "[sjomething should be said of the relation between
our apprehension of the prima f acie rightness of certain types of act
and our mental attitude towards particular acts ."26 Finally, he talks as if
a person is prima facie obligated to do an act when, for example, he
talks of a person’s "prima facie duty to do A ."27
Which is it? Are prima facie duties characteristics of acts,
characteristics of kinds of acts or had by persons? Earlier I quoted from
Foundations of Ethics where Ross said that for convenience's sake
we talk of moral obligatoriness as a property of acts, while it actually is
a characteristic that attaches to persons. I believe that the same is true
of prima f acie obligatoriness. We should take talk of prima f acie
obligatoriness being a property of acts as being elliptical. Persons have
prima facie obligations and acts are not, strictly speaking, obligatory.
This still leaves us to explain his talking of them as characteristics of
kinds of acts. This too is elliptical. Although persons have prima
facie obligations to do particular acts, they have prima facie
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obligations to do every act they can that is of certain kinds. For
instance, the claim that promise-keeping is a prima f acie duty is
elliptical for the claim that a person is prima facie obligated to
perform every act that he or she can that is an instance of promise-
keeping.
Prima facie and moral obligations are had by the same kind of
entities, but are they directed towards the same kind of thing? As I
pointed out, while writing The Right and the Good Ross believed that
obligations are directed towards ordinary acts, but the the story is more
complicated in Foundations of Ethics where he talks about
subjective and objective moral obligation and of the act of "setting
oneself about" doing something. Ross does not explicitly say whether
there are objective and subjective prima facie duties, nor does he say
whether or not they are directed towards the special kind of act of
"setting oneself about" doing something. However, he does often talk as
though one of the acts that a person is prima facie obligated to do is
morally right or obligatory for the person. From this we can reasonably
conclude that prima facie and moral obligation are directed towards
the same kind of things. Or, if my earlier proposal is accepted, prima
facie obligatoriness is a relation having relata of the same kind as
moral obligatoriness.
Despite numerous similarities, moral and prima facie
obligations differ in some important respects. One is that prima facie
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obligations, unlike moral obligations, seem to come in degrees. Ross
expresses this in a number of different passages. At various places he
says that a prima facie duty can be "more incumbent than any other",
one of them may be the "more stringent prima f acie duty", and and an
act may have "the greatest balance of prima facie rightness ". 28 A
second important respect in which moral and prima facie obligations
differ is that, according to Ross, moral obligations never conflict, while
prima facie obligations often do conflict
.
29 Consequently, a person
can always satisfy all of his moral obligations in any situation, but often
cannot satisfy all of his prima facie obligations.
This second feature of prima facie obligations has an
interesting consequence for specifying the relationship between prima
facie rightness and prima facie obligatoriness. Remember, Ross
holds that moral obligation and moral rightness can be interdefined
thus: that which is not obligatory not to do is morally right to do. If we
assume that there is a counterpart to this definition that holds between
prima facie obligation and prima facie rightness, it does not seem to
have the same force. In fact, there seems to be no difference between
prima fa cie rightness and prima facie obligatoriness, while there is
an important difference between moral rightness and moral
obligatoriness. Let me e v plain.
From the fact that one of a person’s mutually exclusive
alternatives is morally obligatory for that person, we can inter that none
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of the others is morally obligatory for that person . 30 From the mere fact
that one of them is morally right, we cannot, however infer that none of
the others is morally right. Prima facie obligation seems to be more
like moral rightness than moral obligatoriness in this respect. From the
fact that one of a person’s mutually exclusive alternatives is prima
facie obligatory, we cannot infer that none of the others is prima
facie obligatory. It even seems that whenever an act is prima f ac ie
right for a person it is also prima facie obligatory for that person.
This difference seems to be a consequence of accepting the
agglomeration principle for moral obligations, while rejecting it for
prima facie obligations. This principle proposes that, for any two acts,
a and b
,
if a person is obligated to do a and the same person is
obligated to do b
,
then that person is obligated to do both a and b.
The epistemic relationships we stand in to prima facie duties
are quite different from the ones we stand in to moral obligations. As I
pointed out, Ross’s view about our knowledge of our obligations
changes somewhat from The Right and the Good to Foundations of
Ethics. In the former Ross holds that we usually do not know what we
are morally obligated to do. In the latter he says the same of objective
moral obligation, adding that we can usually know what we are
subjectively mo ally obligated to do. The difference is largely one ol
emphasis. In The Right and the Good he has little sympathy for the
view that subjective obligation is of much importance, while in
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Foundations of Ethics he has come to believe it of central
importance. I suspect that in The Right and the Good
,
if he had
talked about it, he would have thought we can know our subjective duty.
In any case, he has a similar view in both works about our knowledge of
our prima facie obligations. In both he has the view that we nearly
always know our prima f acie duties. These differences in our the
epistemic relationships to prima facie and moral obligations can be
traced to the difference in how we would come to know about the
obligations.
As I said above, a person is prima facie obligated to do an act by
virtue of it being of a certain kind. Supposedly, that a kind of act is
prima facie obligatory is directly known and certain. The kinds of acts
in question should be expressible by a number of general principles, and
these principles should be able to be directly known. Let us call these
principles "Principles of Prima Facie Obligation", or "PPFO" for short.
Here are three of these principles:
PPFOl: We are prima f acie obligated to keep promises.
PPF02: We are prima facie obligated to produce good.
PPF03: We are prima facie obligated to avoid harming others.
Whether or not a person is prima facie obligated to do a
particular act (or refrain from doing it) depends on whether or not it
satisfies a PPFO. Alternatively we could say that whether or not a
person is prima f ac ie obligated to do an act depends on whether or not
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it has any one of a number of specified properties. These properties are
expressed in the Principles of Prima Facie Obligation. For example,
the property of being an instance of promise keeping is expressed in
PPFOl. If a person has made a promise to do an something then, by
application of the general principle PPFOl, that person is prima facie
obligated to do it. Since different principles can apply to one act, a
person can be prima facie obligated to do and not do the very same
act. One and the same act may, for example, result in harm to others
and fulfill a promise. Since we only have to focus on one aspect of an
act to tell whether or not we are prima facie obligated to do it, it is
supposed to be relatively easy to tell whether or not we are prima facie
obligated to any act . 31
Although we are supposed to be able to know directly that a
property makes acts having it prima facie obligatory, it is difficult to
say why we should accept this supposition. Consider the principles
listed above. The technical term "prima facie obligation" appears in
each PPFO. As I have pointed out, this is a technical term, one that, as
of yet, has not been adequately explained. It may be that when the
technical term is completely unpacked we will find that PPFO’s are
clearly true. Perhaps I can be accused of being uncharitable to Ross by
ir~luding the technical term "prima facie obligation" in the principles.
Perhaps what he had in mind were principles more like "we have a duty
to keep promises." At best, the notion of duty in such a principle is
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ambiguous. If we take the notion to be that of moral duty and the
principle is supposed to have universal applicability, then it is clearly
false. If the notion is not that of moral duty, then it needs unpacking.
That the notion needs unpacking is made explicit by the stating the
principles as PPFOs.
Even if we admit that the properties mentioned in the PPFOs
have some special moral significance, we are not committed to
accepting any PPFO until the notion of a prima facie obligation is
further explained. As of yet, we cannot be certain that the moral
significance will be captured by any acceptable theory about prima
facie obligations. That we be decided by establishing the moral status
of prima facie obligations and their relationship to moral obligation.
Since prima f acie obligations, unlike moral obligations, are had
to varying degrees, there is the additional question of whether we can
know to what degree we are prima facie obligated to do something.
Even if PPFOs are self evident, and we admit they have a special moral
status, it would still be difficult to tell to what degree we have a prima
facie obligation. To see how difficult it is to determine the stringency
of a prima facie obligation we need only consider the supposed prima
facie obligation to do acts that result in the production of good.
A natural assumption is that the degree to which we have such a
prima f acie obligation depends, in part, on the amount ot good
produced. It is relatively easy to tell whether an act will produce some
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good; it is much more difficult to say how much is produced. Quite
often we are ignorant of the total amount of good produced as a
consequence of doing any act.
It even would be difficult to determine the stringency of a prima
f acie obligation to keep a promise. Does it depend on the person to
whom the promise is made? Most difficult of all would be determining
the stringency of the prima facie obligation to do an act having both
properties making it prima facie obligatory and properties making it
prima facie wrong. If an act is an instance of promise keeping,
producing good and harming others, just how stringent is the prima
facie obligation to do it? If we are speaking of subjective prima f acie
obligation, there is some little chance we can tell by examining our
beliefs. If we are speaking of our objective prima facie obligation,
however, the chance of our being able to tell the stringency of our
obligation dwindles to nil. Ross expresses his awareness of this when he
says:
Any possible act has many sides to it which are relevant to
its rightness or wrongness; it will bring pleasure to some
people, pain to others, will be the keeping of a promise to
one person, at the cost of being a breach of confidence to
another, and so on. We are quite incapable of pronouncing
straight off on its rightness or wrongness in the totality of
these aspects .... 32
To summarize: prima facie obligations are had by persons.
They are had to various degrees. A person has a prima f acie
obligation to do an act when it is of certain kinds, for example, when it is
50
an instance of promise
-keeping. A person can be prima facie
obligated to do incompatible acts, or both to do and not to do the same
act. It is supposed to be fairly easy to tell when we have a prima facie
obligation to do an act, but much more difficult to tell the degree to
whichwe have a prima f acie obligation.
Prima Facie Obligations and RMCs
Ross at times seems to claim, or his claims seem to imply, that
there is more than one RMC. In The Right and the Good he seems to
be making this claim when he says, "It may be said that besides the duty
of fulfilling promises I have and recognize a duty of relieving distress,"
and "I would contend that in principle there is no reason to anticipate
that every act that is our duty is so for one and the same reason ."33 He
makessimilarclaimsinFow/idano/iso/Er/i/cswhere^orinstance,
he says:
The view that admits only one intuition--that only the
production of maximum good is right--gratifies our natural
wish to reach unity and simplicity in our moral theory. We
have a natural wish to reach a single principle from which
the rightness or wrongness of all actions can be deduced.
But it is more important that a theory be true than that it
be simple; and I have tried to show that a system which
admits only this one intuition is false to what we all really
think about what makes acts right or wrong. It is, to my
mind, a mistake in principle to think that there is any
presumption in favour of the truth of a monistic against a
pluralistic theory in morals, or, for that matter, in
metaphysics either. When we are faced with two or more
ostensible grounds of rightness, it is proper to examine
them to find whether they have a single character in
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common; but if we cannot find one we have no reason to
assume that our failure is due to the weakness of our
thought and not to the nature of the facts ."34
If we were to consider only these passages it would be natural to
conclude that Ross holds that there is more than one RMC. When he
questions the presumption that any true ethical theory must be
"monistic" or that any act that is our duty must be so for "one and the
same reason" he is arguing for that possibility.
Doubts arise, however, about the justification for this view when
we consider the context in which Ross makes these statements. In each
of these passages he might be taken as commenting on prima facie
obligation, not moral obligation. Let us see why we might believe these
comments are actually directed towards prima f acie obligations.
In a footnote to the first passage from T he Right and the Good
Ross says, "These are not strictly speaking duties, but things that tend to
be our duty, or prima facie duties ." 35 Immediately after the second
passage from The Right and the Good he says, "[W]hy should two sets
of circumstances, or one set of circumstances, not possess different
characteristics, any one of which makes a certain act our prima f acie
duty ?" 36
The passage from Foundations of Ethics is also suspect. In the
paragraph following it he replies to the objection that the moral
intuitions he talks about may conflict by claiming that "[mjoral
intuitions are not principles by the immediate application of which our
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duty in particular circumstances can be deduced. They state what I have
elsewhere called prima facie obligations”. 37
Viewed in the proper context, each of the passages where he
seemed to be making statements in favor of the view that there is more
than one RMC should be construed as only supporting the claim that
there is more than one property that makes a person prima facie
obligated to do an act.
However, we can now see how someone advancing Ross’s theory
might try to explain how constraints C2 and C5 can be consistent. The
explanation would have two parts. The first part would be to identify
the properties that make acts prima facie obligatory with RMCs,
maintaining that any property making an act prima facie obligatory
for a person is a RMC. Since there is more than one kind of prima
facie duty, there would be more than one RMC. The second part of
the explanation would appeal to the characterization of morally right
acts as ones whose degree of prima facie rightness is at least as great
as any of their alternatives and the characterization of a morally
obligatory act as one whose degree of prima f acie rightness is greater
than any of its alternatives. If there is only one right act, it would also
be obligatory. If there is more than one act whose degree of prima
facie rightness is at least as great as its alternatives, then each of these
acts would be right, but none would be obligatory. Since there can be at
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most one obligatory act in a set of mutually exclusive alternative acts,
there cannot be real conflicts of obligation.
This explanation, however, is still incomplete. One main reason
why it is incomplete is that it is not at all apparent why RMCs and the
characteristics making acts prima facie duties should be considered
the same. It is not at all apparent that commitment to the existence of
more than one property that makes acts prima facie obligatory
requires commitment to there being more than one RMC. This can be
best explained by drawing an analogy between what he says and what a
utilitarian might say in trying to explain away the apparent plausibility
of constraint C2. Let us take Ross’s rough characterization of
utilitarianism from the above passage and transform it into a statement
of Simple Utilitarianism:
SU. For any person, S, and any act. A, S is morally obligated to
do A if and only if doing A produces more good than doing any
other act that S could do instead. 38
Presumably Ross would take a theory like SU to be a "monistic"
theory because there is only one condition on the right-hand side of the
if and only if . This one condition is supposed to specify the only RMC.
Now let us consider a relationship similar to being a RMC, but having to
do with the production of good.
A property is a Good Making Characteristic (GMC) it an act
results in the production of good by virtue of having that property.
Obviously there are many GMCs. For example: The properties of being
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an instance of increasing pleasure and being an instance of increasing
knowledge each may be had by an act, and the act would produce good
by virtue of having those properties. Each of these properties is a GMC.
Although there may be more than one GMC, if SU is true there is
supposed to be only one RMC. Similarly, there may be many properties
making acts prima facie obligatory, but only one RMC.
Consequently, we are not justified in concluding that there is more than
one RMC from the mere fact that there is more than one property that
makes an act prima facie obligatory. We need an argument to
establish that the properties that make acts prima facie obligatory are
RMCs.
Not only do the statements appearing to support the claim that
there are many RMCs turn out on closer examination only to support
the claim that there are many properties making acts prima facie
obligatory, but, surprisingly, Ross also seems to deny explicitly that
there is more than one RMC. At times he seems to talk as though there
is at most one characteristic that is a RMC while there are a number of
different ways that an act may acquire this characteristic.
Consider again the passage where he says that a right act has the
greatest balance of prima facie rightness . 39 In this passage he seems
to be expressing the view that some acts have the characteristic of
having the greatest balance of prima facie rightness. Of course
different acts acquire this characteristic in different ways; for example,
some have it because they are instances of promise-keeping, other
because they are instances of not harming others. Nevertheless, it is a
property that can be had by acts and. if Ross is right, every act that is
morally right is so by virtue of having it. Given this, it seems to be the
only RMC and the characteristics making acts prima facie duties
seem more like GMCs than like RMCs.
Less obvious, but perhaps even more telling, is that it may be very
difficult for anyone who considers a moral theory to involve the listing
of necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to be right to maintain
there is more than one RMC. Consider SU above. The right hand side
of the if and only if is supposed to be a list of necessary' and sufficient
conditions for an act to be morally right. In general, such lists may have
one element, or it may have many. Regardless of the length of the list, if
the right hand side consists entirely of a list of conditions that the act
must satisfy, then it can always be made into one condition by the
designation of a special property that an act has when all the conditions
listed are satisfied. It would be reasonable to consider this special
property the only RMC. Granted, the characteristic would be an odd
one. but it is a fact that there only would be one property that is a RMC.
We should not. however, be too confident that there is a
fundamental problem with the theory until we more c'osely examine it.
Most importantly, we need to know more about the relationship
between prima facie and moral rightness. In particular, we should try
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to determine whether the characteristics that make acts prima facie
obligatory are RMCs. Since the characterization of RMCs in Chapter I
was incomplete, the best way to do this is to attempt to define prima
facie rightness and see whether the definition also reflects the
intuitions about RMCs expressed in Chapter I. Let us now turn to the
relationship between prima facie and moral rightness and the
characterization of prima facie rightness.
The Relationship Between Prima Facie and Moral Rightness
Merely because Ross uses the terms "obligation" and "duty" in
talking about persons having prima facie obligations to do some kinds
of acts, we should not conclude that prima facie obligations or prima
facie duties have any special moral status. At first glance, it appears
that the only relevant moral status of any act is its moral obligatoriness,
rightness or wrongness. Not all duties or obligations are moral duties or
obligations. As I pointed out earlier, social duties may differ from
moral duties and, in fact, our social duties may conflict with our moral
duties.
Ross has a number of things to say about the special moral status
of prima facie obligations. He says that our relationships with others
are morally significant and, in fact, are the foundations of prima facie
obligations; that prima facie obligations sometimes reflect claims had
on us by others; and, in his "official" introduction of the notion of a
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prima facie duty that I quoted in Chapter I, that prima facie
obligations would be a moral obligations if they were not of another
kind that is morally significant
.
40
It is important to notice that in each of these explanations of the
moral significance of prima facie duties the thing which makes it
morally significant is distinct from simply being a prima facie duty.
Ross’s talk about relationships as the foundation of prima f acie
obligations, claims being reflected by prima facie obligations and the
prima f acie obligations being of particular kinds indicates that he
thinks that the notion a prima facie obligation is not fundamental or
unanalyzable, unlike that of moral obligation.
Unfortunately, these comments of Ross’s are not very
enlightening. It surely is true that if the relationships at the foundation
of prima f acie obligations are morally significant, then we can be
certain that prima f acie obligations are morally significant. We need
an explanation of what it is about these relationships that make them
morally significant, or what is involved in this moral significance. To be
interesting the moral status of prima facie obligations must be weaker
than the moral status of moral obligations, but stronger than
alternatives that are morally neutral.
In an attempt to make clear th~ relationship between prima
facie and moral rightness, let us take a closer look at Ross’s "official
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definition of a prima facie duty. Remember, the definition is
expressed in the following passage:
I suggest 'prima f acie duty’ or ’conditional duty’ as a brief
way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from
that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of
being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of
being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at




Given Ross’s metaethical views and their relation to his views
about prima facie obligations, we can formulate the definition of a
prima facie obligation as follows:
DPFOl: A person, j, is prima facie obligated to do an act, a,
with characteristic, c, =def.
i. s can do a
,
and
ii. 5 would be morally obligated to do a by virtue of its
having c if it were not to have any another morally
significant characteristic.
If this definition is accepted, then we would have an explicit
account of what it is to be an RMC and why prima facie duties are
morally significant: Those characteristics which c can take as a value
are RMCs and the concept of a prima facie duty is defined via the
concept of moral obligatoriness.
This definition, however, has some important problems. One is
that it does not show how prima f acie rightness or obligatoriness can
come in degrees. Also, it does not take into account any of an act’s
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alternatives. An act may have a characteristic, such as being the
keeping of a promise, have no other morally significant characteristics
and not be morally obligatory because there is some other act that is
morally obligatory.
We can change condition (ii) to overcome the latter problem.
Here is the revised version:
ii *. s would be morally obligated to do a if none of its
alternatives were to have a morally significant
characteristic.
This definition also has fundamental problems. Its appeal to the
notion of a morally significant characteristic either makes the definition
trivial or makes it circular. In this context, there are two interesting
interpretations of when an a characteristic is morally significant. The
first is that a characteristic is morally significant when any act having it
is morally right. The second is that any act having it is prima facie
right. Assume that a morally significant characteristic is one that makes
an act morally right. If none of an act’s alternatives are morally right,
then it is trivially true that the act is morally obligatory. The other
interpretation appeals to the very notion we are trying to define and,
consequently, is circular.
In "The Definition of Prima Facie Duties" Frank Snare
proposes to define th^ notion of a prima facie duty in away that
expresses the idea contained in the passage I quoted, but which avoids
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the difficulties found in my formulations.42 Let me label his definition
DPF02. The definition is as follows:
DPF02: There is a prima facie duty to do act-tokens which "fall
under" the act-type P = def.
Act-type P belongs to a class of act-types C(Pl,P2,...,Pn)
such that the following normative claims hold which
respect to all these act-types:
( 1 ) For any act-token a , if a "falls under" at least one act-
type from class C and if -a "falls under" no act-type from
class C, then there is a duty to do a.
(2) For any act-token a , if there is a duty to do a, then a
"falls under" at least one act-type from class C.43
In explaining this definition. Snare says that he uses 'a' to refer to
an act and '-a' to refer to its omission.44 He also says that the
conditional in ( 1) and (2) is not the material conditional; it is strong
enough to support counterfactuals. 45 The notion of an act-token "falling
under" an act-type is a technical notion, so Snare gives some conditions
explicating it.
Act-token a falls under act-type P when
(i) a is a token of type P;
(ii) a is the only act-token that can generate act-token b
and b is a token of type P (one act-token generates
another in a set of circumstances when performing one
is performing the other, e.g. giving my brother his book
may be my keeping of my promise to him); and
(iii) it is necessary to perform a in order to perform b and
b is of type P (e.g. it may be necessary to get my
brother’s book back from my friend before I can return
it to him).46
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This definition is meant to be general. To maintain that a
property is in class C, thereby founding prima facie duties and being a
RMC, the properties comprising class C do not need to be fully
determined. All that is needed is a commitment to the existence of the
class and a determination that the property satisfies conditions ( 1 ) and
(2). Following Ross, let us say that we want to maintain that being an
instance of promise-keeping is an RMC. If I make a promise to return
my brother’s book to him, returning it to him falls under the act-type of
being an instance of promise-keeping. If not returning it to him did not
fall under any of the act-types of class C, the other characteristics
making acts prima facie obligatory, then it would seem that I would
have a duty to return the book to him. Consequently, I have a prima
facie duty to return the book to him.
Snare adds two conditions to DPF02. Condition (3) is meant to
exclude the possibility of generating complex prima facie duties from
logically equivalent simple prima facie duties. If we were to allow
this, there would be an indefinite number of prima facie duties. For
example, the act-type of being an instance of promise-keeping or being
an instance of flyfishing should not be a prima facie duty, yet it
satisfies conditions ( 1 ) and (2).47 Condition (4) is used to decide
between equivalent classes of properties that meet conditions ( 1-3).
The conditions are as follows:
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(3) For any two act-types P and Q, if Q logically entails P
but not vice versa and if Q and P belong to a class Cl
of act-types which meets conditions ( 1 ) and (2) but the
class C2 (which is Cl with Q deleted) also meets (1) and
(2), then Q does not belong to C.48
(4) If more than one class of act-types meets conditions
( 1 ), (2) and (3’), then C will be the smallest such class.
If there are several with the lowest number, then one of
them will be arbitrarily chosen to serve as C. 49
Although Snare’s view is very complicated and very interesting,
there do seem to be problems with it. One problem is that he does not
say how prima facie obligations can come in degrees. He admits his
proposal has nothing to say about this. 50 Another problem is that there
is at least one property that is undefined under this definition.
Consider the property some acts have of being the only possible act.
Although we may be morally obligated to perform an act having this
property, this definition says nothing about this property. Condition ( 1)
requires that its omission either fall under or not fall under an act-type
in C. Unfortunately, an act with this property has no omission.
The previous problem may be a fairly minor technical problem.
There is a bigger, conceptual problem. It has to do with the nature of
the conditional in conditions (1) and (2). The conditional must be
strong enough to support counterfactuals, otherwise almost no acts
would satisfy condition (1). In orderfor (1) to be satisfied it must be
possible for every act-token to have been such that it falls under a
property in C while it omission did not. That this is possible is not at all
obvious. Let us follow Ross and say that we have a prima facie duty to
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help others and a prima facie duty not to harm others. Now consider
the hypothetical act-token of my cutting off my brother’s gangrene leg.
It falls under the act-type of helping others and its omission falls under
the act-type of not harming others. In fact, this act-token cannot fall
under one without its omission falling under the other. Consequently, it
cannot be evaluated under condition (1).
Since there are many act-tokens which involve helping someone
at the expense of harming that same person and DPFD2’s condition (1)
cannot apply to them because of the kind of conditional required by
condition ( 1), DPFD2 should be rejected.
In his discussion of prima f acie rightness, Ross makes various
comments suggesting other strategies for providing an account of
prima facie rightness. In the two succeeding chapters I will discuss
accounts that can be developed by using these strategies. Before doing
so, however, I will point out the strategies.
Other Strategies for Characterizing Prima Facie Obligation
Ross at times seems to equate moral rightness with some kind of
moral suitability. In his discussion of objective and subjective duty in
Foundations of Ethics , for example, he says:
Now we may distinguish several different self-exertions
which might have some claim to be consider right, orwhat
the person ought to do:
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(A) The self-exertion which is morally most suitable to the
objective circumstances.
(B) The self-exertion which is morally most suitable to the
agent’s state of mind about the circumstances.
(C) The self-exertion which he thinks to be morally most
suitable in the circumstances. 51
If there is an account of rightness lying behind these statements,
then it may be that both prima f acie and moral rightness can be
defined in terms of suitability and the relationship between the two
properties can be explained by this definition. Defining them in this
way would also al low us to understand RMR1. Since suitability comes
in degrees, as evidenced by Ross’s use, an act with any suitability would
be prima facie right, while the act with the most suitability would be
morally obligatory .52 Let us call this "The Moral Suitability
Explanation".
Ross also says that prima facie duties "tend" to be our moral
duty. 53 Sometimes he seemed to use "tendency" to express a directional
relationship. He did this when he drew analogies between the
gravitational forces operating on a body and the relationship between
prima facie and moral duties. He said that just as the direction in
which a body moves is influenced by the relative strength of the
gravitational pull of the other bodies in the region, what act, if any, of
some alternatives is obligatory is determined by the relative strength of
each of the alternative’s moral pull, or prima facie obligatoriness.54
65
Although it is not mentioned in either The Right and the Good
or F oundations of Ethics , it seems that "tendency" may be taken to
express other relationships. For instance, it may express a relationship
of probability, or confirmation: if an act is prima facie obligatory,
then it is in all probability morally obligatory, or the prima facie
obligatoriness of an act confirms its obligatoriness. If were to
characterize a prima facie right act as one having a property that
tends to make it right, and this tendency comes in degrees, then a
morally obligatory act would be one that has the greatest tendency. It
will be worthwhile to investigate whether we can adequately explain the
relationship between prima facie and moral obligation by making use
of these notions. Let us call this suite of explanations "The Tendency to
be Right Explanations."
Conclusion
The central thesis that I have tried to establish in this chapter is
this: Evaluating those aspects of Ross’s theory that can be used as a
strategy for showing constraints C2 and C5 to be consistent requires
that we first understand the relationship between prima facie and
moral obligation. In evaluating his "official" definition of a prima
facie obligation, I have tried to show that Ross did not clearly explain
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what this relationship involved. I have stated various strategies for
understanding that relationship that I will explore. In addition, I have
tried to point out some of the interesting features of the relationship
between Ross’s metaethical views and his normative theory. In doing so
I concentrated on his view about our ability to know our moral
obligations and what he took to be the objects of our obligations.
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CHAPTER III
THE TENDENCY TO BE RIGHT EXPLANATION
P. F. Strawson’s Objection
Some of the most penetrating criticisms of a theory come from
those who review the theory soon after it is offered. Much of what is
good and bad in Plato, for instance, can be found by studying Aristotle.
Similarly, one of the best criticisms of Ross’s theory can be found in
"Ethical Intuitionism" by P. F. Strawson . 1 In this paper Strawson
focuses the interesting question of how, if moral rightness is an
unanalyzable property, we can come to know what acts are right. He is
especially concerned with intuition and, as the name of the article
suggests, the role intuition plays in ethical theory, including Ross’s
theory. I will not review his entire argument. Here I will concentrate
only on that small part of Strawson’s criticism that is directed towards
Ross’s characterization of the relationship between prima facie and
moral obligation.
One of Strawson’s main contentions is that it is a mistake to
believe that we can directly intuit the moral rightness of any act or the
truth of any general substantive moral principle, such as those
principles expressed by "it is wrong to cause harm and all acts of
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promise keeping are right. "2 Strawson develops his criticism of Ross’s
introduction of the notion of a prima facie obligation and
characterization of the relationship between prima facie and moral
obligations when countering a possible reply to his objections
concerning the existence of moral intuition. The essence of the reply is
that, following Ross, we can accept that there is moral intuition without
claiming that we directly intuit the moral rightness of acts or the truth
of general principles about what is morally right. We can do this by
claiming that what is intuited is the prima facie rightness of acts and
general principles about prima f acie rightness. If Strawson can show
that introducing the notion of a prima facie obligation leads to
unresolvable difficulties, then he will have undercut this reply to his
objection.
Strawson states the following to display what he takes to be Ross's
view on the relationship between prima f acie and moral rightness:
All acts of promise-keeping tend as such to be right (or
have prima facie rightness)’.... And we derive our
knowledge of such general necessary connections from
seeing, in particular cases, that the rightness of an action,
the goodness of a state, follows from its being an action
or state of a certain kind . 3
Although he speaks only of the prima facie rightness of keeping
promises, it is clear from the context that Strawson is using this example
to demonstrate a general feature of the relationship between prima
facie and moral rightness. Consequently, we should take this as his
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encapsulation of Ross’s position and make it more general. Instead of
just talking about acts that are instances of promise-keeping, we will
generalize it to be a view about all of the characteristics that make acts
prima facie right or obligatory.
Recall that Ross sometimes made statements like the following:
We have a duty to keep promises. Since, as I pointed out in an earlier
chapter, Ross’s view is that we have prima facie and moral obligations
to do particular acts, not kinds of acts, it must be that statements like
this are elliptic. They should be taken to express Principles of Prima
Facie Obligation. These principles express the characteristics that can
make an act prima facie obligatory for a person. Since it has been
proposed that we take these characteristics to be RMCs, let us define
the notion of a prima facie obligation using the notion of a RMC.
Doing so will allow us to concentrate on explicating the notion of a
RMC.
Here is the definition of a prima f acie obligation:
DPF03: A person, s
,
is prima f acie obligated to do an act, a ,
= def.
1. s can do a , and
2. a has a right making characteristic (RMC).
Although the explanation of this principle should begin with a
discussion of the notion of possibility expressed in condition one, it is
enough, I believe, to point out that it is the same notion of possibility
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that I discussed in Chapter I when introducing constraint Cl. Let us
turn to condition 2 of DPF03.
It is apparent that the problem of determining the relationship
between prima facie and moral obligation has its locus in condition 2
of DPF03 and it can only be understood by understanding what makes a
characteristic a RMC. Strawson’s encapsulation of Ross’s view can be
understood as ascribing to Ross a certain view about the nature of
characteristics that can make acts prima facie obligatory and, since we
are taking these characteristics to be RMCs, a view about the correct
account of what makes a characteristic an RMC.
Strawson says that Ross’s view is that "promise-keeping as such
tends to be right." If we generalize this to be a view about RMCs, then
claiming that a characteristic is a RMC is to claim that acts having it
tend to be right. Lets call this PRMC1:
PRMC1: A characteristic, c, is a RMC =def.
if a person, s, can do an act, a, and a has c, then it tends to
be morally right for s to do a.
We want to know the following of this view: Is it consistent with
what Ross said, and does it satisfactorily answer the questions raised in
Chapter II?
In "Ethical Intuitionism," it is clear that Strawson thinks any
theory relying on PRMC1 should be rejected. He thinks that, in the
given context, there are two interesting interpretations of the phrase
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"tends to be right". The first is to understand it as being used to ascribe
the simple property of "tending to be right’ to certain acts; the second is
to understand it as being used to claim that more often than not acts
with certain properties are morally right. Strawson claims that
accepting the first interpretation commits us to attributing a
non-existent property to acts, while accepting the second interpretation
is inconsistent with accepting certain important aspects of Ross’s
theory. Let us examine these claims.
According to first interpretation, the phrase "tends to be right" is
used in the relevant context to express a simple property. Anyone
accepting this interpretation would thereby be committed to ascribing
to some acts that simple property and, therefore, the existence of that
property. In order to reflect this interpretation more clearly, we should
reformulate PRMC as follows:
PRMC2: A characteristic, c, is a RMC =def.
if an act, a, has c, then a also has the property of tending to
be right.
Of this interpretation Strawson says:
When we say of swans that they tend to be white, we are not
ascribing a certain quality, namely ’tending to be white, to
each individual swan. We are saying that the number of
swans which are white exceeds the number of those which
are not, that if anything is a swan, the chances are that it
will be white.4
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Strawson generalizes this observation and says that when we
claim that something tends to have a characteristic "we are talking of a
class of things or occasions or events; and saying, not that all members
of the class have the property of t e nding- 1 o - hav
e
a certain
characteristic, but that most members of the class do in fact have that
characteristic."5
These observations are supposed to apply to Ross’s claim that
certain types of acts tend to be right. If this is the correct understanding
of Ross’s view, then Strawson’s criticism is compelling. Although
Strawson may be wrong about there being properties expressed by the
phrases "tending to be white" and "tending to be right," if the phrases do
express properties they are not simple properties. Such phrases are
usually a shorthand way to express some more complicated properties.
We should not, however, be satisfied with that observation. In being
charitable to Ross, we should see whether there is an interpretation of
"tends to be morally right" that does not demand the existence of a
simple property.
Strawson discusses such an interpretation. It involves the
numerical notion of tendency suggested in the above passage. Under
this interpretation the claim "promise-keeping tends to be morally
right" would be understood as "more often than not, promise-keeping is
morally right." A more general version of this interpretation is
reflected in a new version of PRMC:
76
PRMC3 : A characteristic, c, is a RMC =def.
if a person, 5, can do an act, a, and a has c, then more often
than not 5 is morally right in doing a.
This interpretation also has some serious defects. In the first
place, as Strawson suggests, it seems to be inconsistent with some other
important features of Ross’s theory. It also has the defect that some
characteristics satisfying it obviously should not satisfy it and some not
satisfying it obviously should satisfy it.
Strawson rejects the numerical tendency interpretation because
he believes that it commits Ross to the view that some propositions
expressing numerical tendency are necessary propositions, while
"[njobody would accept the claim that a sentence of the form 'Most As
are Bs" expresses a necessary proposition ."6 Let me explain this
objection.
One of the most important features of Ross’s view is that the
Principles of Prima Facie Obligation, such as "we have a prima facie
duty to keep promises," can be known directly and are perfectly general.
They may even express necessary truths. These principles are also
supposed to express what characteristics are RMCs; if we can directly
know what kinds of acts are prima facie obligatory, then we can
directly know what characteristics are RMCs. The same is not true
about the moral obligatoriness of individual acts. In fact, at times Ross
held that we may not be able to know of any act whether we are morally
obligated to do it. Even when he came to believe that we could know
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that we are obligated to do some acts, he did not seem to think such
knowledge was direct. It was always as the result of some form of
calculation. To be consistent with Ross’s other views, it seems that we
would have to be able to know directly that some characteristics satisfy
the right hand side of PRMC3, which is unlikely.
Consider for a moment the characteristic of being an instance of
promise-keeping. That we directly know it is a RMC or that we are
prima facie obligated to keep-promises is reasonable to accept. It
seems true that promise-keeping has a special moral status. Still, I do
not know whether or not it turns out that most of the alternatives that
persons are presented with that have the characteristic of being an
instance of promise-keeping are morally right.
In addition to the argument suggested by Strawson, there is
another reason to believe that PRMC3 should be rejected: it fails to
pick out the proper characteristics. It has a consequence that some
characteristics are not RMCs when it is clear that Ross would have said
that they are RMCs; it also would have some characteristics as RMCs
when it is obvious that they should not be considered RMCs. These
defects seem to arise because it is largely a contingent matter as to what
particular properties morally right acts actually have.
When a person is presented with a large a number of alternatives
acts, many or all of them may have some RMCs. Even if the person has
a hundred alternatives and of those there is only one that the person is
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morally obligated to perform, many of the other acts may have RMCs.
There is absolutely no reason to believe that there is any kind of
uniform distribution of the acts that a person is morally obligated to do
over the kinds of RMCs that acts have. So there may be RMCs that
many acts have, but are seldom had by acts that persons are obligated to
do.
Ross said that we have both a duty of not harming others and a
duty of helping others. He takes the duty of non-malevolence to be
"more binding" than the duty of beneficence. Although part of what 1
am doing is trying to give a sense to the expression "more binding," we
can reasonably conclude that he thinks that when faced with a choice
between not harming or helping we usually will be obligated not to
harm. If it so happened that most of the time when we can help some
people we also must harm some people, then helping others would be a
prima facie duty, but seldom a moral duty. If this were true, then
according to PRMC3 the property of being an instance of helping others
is not an RMC, which is the wrong result.
There also may be some characteristics that PRMC3 would have
as RMCs that it should not. Let us imagine that my friend Joe is usually
correct when he guesses which of the alternatives he is faced with is
morally right. Granted, he may be correct for the wrong reasons;
perhaps he decides by the toss of a coin or looking at goat entrails,
depending on what is handy. Nevertheless, he is correct. Now it seems
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that there is a property that some acts have and others do not: guessed
by Joe to be right. Clearly, according to PRMC3 this property would be
a RMC. Just as clearly it should not be one. Indeed, there is no good
reason to believe that there are not some properties that are had by
most right act, not had by most others, but are really accidental to the
act’s rightness.
Strawson thinks that there are two plausible interpretations of
Ross’s notion of prima facie obligation. They both have it that an act
with a RMC tends to be morally right. Under the first we are to
understand "tends to be right" as a simple property, while under the
second we are to understand it as expressing a claim about the
percentage of times an act with an RMC will be morally right.
Understanding prima facie obligation in either way leads to
difficulties. So, if Strawson is right, Ross’s proposal is in trouble. If
Strawson is wrong, he could have gone wrong in one of two ways. Either
the "tendency to be right" interpretation is mistaken, or there are more
ways to understand it. I shall now investigate the possibility of him
going wrong in this latter way.
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A, C, Ewing's Response to Strawson
The two interpretations of "tends to be right" noticed by Strawson
are not the only interesting interpretations. A. C. Ewing, in Second
Thoughts in Moral Philosophy
,
says that Strawson’s objection
"assumes that tendency statements are reducible to the form A is usually
B, and that is by no means clear even in the case of causal tendencies ."7
Ewing claims that in the context of a discussion of prima facie
obligation the relevant notion of tendency is "the notion that, other
things being equal, A will be B, though this may be prevented by
counteracting circumstances, the tendency being regarded as based on
something positive in A ."8
There are two parts to Ewing’s view. The first is his
understanding that a person has a prima facie obligation to do acts
that, other things being equal, would be morally obligatory for that
person. The second is his attribution of the tendency to the act itself.
Although Strawson may be correct in saying there is no simple property
of "tending to be right," Ewing claims that on his interpretation there is
a plausible way to understand the act as having the tendency.
According to Ewing, there are two features of prima facie
obligations that support his view. The first is that an act’s having a
RMC is a reason for doing it, even if there are reasons for not doing it.
Having the property is a fact about the act and, hence, why "the
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tendency is based on something positive" in the act.9 Or, in other words,
it is the act itself that has the RMC. The second is that even when one
prima facie obligation is "overruled" by another it does not follow that
the person’s "conduct ought to be unaffected by the former obligation."
Ewing says the following in giving an example:
[I]f I must say something to A which hurts his feelings I
ought to do it as kindly as possible compatibly with the
fulfillment of the purpose of the action. If I have to break
a promise even for a good reason, I ought, if possible, to
ask the promisee to release me from it, or at least warn him
that I cannot keep it, or if that cannot be done in advance,
apologize to him and ’make it up to him’ later in some
fashion. 10
This view about unsatisfied prima facie obligations is supposed
to indicate that there is a feature of the act itself that gives it a special
status, not just that acts of that kind are usually morally obligatory. If
Ewing is right, we will have gone a long way towards explaining how
prima f acie obligations can have a special moral status, but fall short
of being moral obligations.
Since I am making use of the notion of a RMC, I want to restate
PRMC to reflect Ewing’s view:
PRMC4: A characteristic c, is a RMC =def.
if a person, 5
,
can do an act, a , and a has c, then other
things being equal it is morally right for s to do a.
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The main difficulty with PRMC4 is with understanding when
other things are equal." Unfortunately, Ewing does not have much of
interest to say about this.
Nancy Cartwri ght. Ceteris Paribus Laws and Prima Facie
Obligations
Although Ewing offered his view on prima f acie obligations
some time ago, recent work in the Philosophy of Science has some
bearing on the understanding of PRMC4. In her essay "The Truth
Doesn’t Explain Much" Nancy Cartwright discusses the role physical
laws play in explaining why particular phenomena occur, and it has been
suggested that there is an enlightening analogy between the
relationship scientific laws have to particular phenomena and the
relationship that principles of prima facie obligation have to
particular moral obligations. 11
As I see it, a claim that there is an interesting analogy between
two relationships, even ones seemingly less disparate than the ones in
question, is tricky to evaluate. Analogies come in degrees and few are
perfect. Even when there actually is an analogy between two things, the
analogy is interesting only when we can learn something about
something lesser known by studying the features of one better known.
However, since it is usually possible that the analogy breaks down just at
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the point where we are trying to make an extrapolation, it is never easy
to decide whether we have actually learned something about the lesser
known thing.
Say that we are investigating a purportedly interesting analogy
between two things, A and B. We have some evidence of their being
analogous things as we see that each has the properties P We
also discover that A is better known than B, as we have discovered that
A has property P5 and we have no way of directly investigating B to see
if it has P5. Can we, by appealing to this analogy between the two,
reasonably conclude that B has P^ and, thus, that we have learned
something about B? I suggest that drawing such a conclusion is not
reasonable unless we first find a certain connectedness between the
properties. In particular we should show that accepting that a thing has
P5 is required by accepting that it has Pj,..^. Unless accepting that
the thing has P5 is required by accepting that it has Pj,..^, the analogy
may break down at just that point. The worth of an analogy depends
mostly on the strength of the requirement, which varies from case to
case.
To see more clearly how easily an argument can fail, consider this
hypothetical case: A person has Pj when he is blue-eyed, P2 when he
has blond hair, P3 when he is from S. Deerfield, P4 when he drives a
Chevy and P<^ when he has murdered his mother. Assume that John has
P!,..,P5 . Although Tony is a blue-eyed, blond,
Chevy driving person
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from S. Deerfield, just like John, we cannot reasonably conclude that he
has also murdered his mother. Having P5 is not required by having
P],.., P4.
In examining the claim that the proposed analogy between
scientific and moral explanation is enlightening, I will do the following:
(i) Set out Cartwright s view on the relationship between physical laws
and individual phenomena, (ii) see how the relationship between prima
facie and moral obligation is supposed to be similar to the
relationship between physical laws and individual phenomena, (iii)
explain the enlightening conclusions we are supposed to be justified in
drawing from accepting those similarities, and (iv) decide whether or
not we, in fact, are justified in drawing those conclusions.
Cartwright's View
One of Cartwright’s central claims is that scientific theories have
two jobs: describing and explaining. A theory describes nature when it
provides laws of nature, fundamental constants, etc. 12 A theory gives an
explanation of a particular phenomenon when, by appealing to the
description of nature by the way of laws, etc., we can give an account of
the phenomenon. According to Cartwright, the standard view about
how this appeal works is the "covering law model." She argues that this
model is inadequate. Let us see what this model is and why she believes
it is inadequate.
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According to the most basic formulation of the covering law
model, scientific explanation goes like this: After formulating physical
laws that describe regularities in nature, we then can explain a
particular phenomenon if its occurrence can be deduced from the
occurrence of other phenomena and the physical laws. The laws "cover”
all occurrences of a kind of phenomenon so that if we knew all the laws
and could accurately describe each physical phenomenon, then we could
explain the occurrence of each individual phenomenon. Suppose, for
instance, that there is a meteorological law to the effect that whenever
the temperature is less than the dewpoint fog occurs . 13 If we notice that
there is fog, take the appropriate meteorological readings and find that
they satisfy the requirements of the law, we could then give a scientific
explanation for the occurrence of the fog. This is a simple instance of
explanation within the covering law model; explanations do not come
nearly this neat, and the covering law model I have mentioned may be
too simple. More ambitious versions might allow for probabilistic laws.
For example, there might be a law to the effect that smoking increases
the probability of getting heart disease . 14
Cartwright argues that this model of scientific explanation is
inadequate. Her criticism of this model focuses on the role covering
laws play in the explanation. Her central claim is that either the laws
are false or the laws are so general that they fail to provide an adequate
explanation of many particular phenomena. This is so, she claims.
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because many physical laws include ceteris paribus caveats, either
implicitly or explicitly. Without the caveats the laws are false, while
with them they rarely apply to actual phenomena. It is easiest to see
why this is so if we consider an example. Cartwright uses a textbook
formulation of Snell's Law as an example of a ceteris paribus law in
her explanation. The example I will use is much simpler and, because of
that, I believe it allows us more clearly to see the point being made by
Cartwright. 15 I will consider different versions of a possible physical law
concerning the boiling of water. I will consider a version of the law that
does not have a ceteris paribus caveat, show why it is false, show how
improving it still leaves it false and, then, discuss how adding the caveat
saves it from being false, but only at the cost of it not being applicable
to many particular phenomena.
In order to consider possible laws about boiling water, we need to
start with a variable for temperature, "f". In addition, for the first
proposal we need a constant, K, which has a value of 100C. The
simplest version of a possible physical law about boiling water would be
this: t = K. To be adequate, this proposed physical law would have to
have universal applicability. It fails in this respect. Water at sea level
might boil at 100C, but water at higher altitudes does not boil at that
temperature. At 10,000 feet above sea level, for instance, water is
supposed to boil at 90C. So if this proposed law is accepted, the
covering law model seems to fail. However, we should not give up on
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the covering law model just because this simple proposed law does not
have the required universal applicability. It may be that the proposed
law, or proposer of the law, should be more clever. Another version
may have the required universal applicability.
It is certainly easy enough to make a proposed law concerning
boiling water more general by describing a relationship between
altitude and boiling water. Such a law would require only a bit more
machinery: a variable that takes a measurements of altitude as its
value, say
"
a ", and a constant that expresses the relationship between
altitude and the boiling temperature of water, let us again use "K". A
more general version of the law might go something like this: t = 100 -
a(K), where t is the boiling temperature of water in degrees Celsius, a
is the altitude deviation from sea level in hundreds of meters and
K = 1/3. 16 If a is zero then r is 100C, and for each unit change of a, t
changes by -(a(K)). For example: if a decreases by one, t increases by
1/3 degree; if a increases by 3, t decreases by 1 degree. Upon
reflection, we can see that this proposed law correctly takes into
account variations in altitude.
Unfortunately, there is also an important problem with this
version of the proposed law: it is false. Water is not a very
homogeneous substance. It usually contains a variety of particulates
and gasses. Each of these may affect the boiling temperature of water.
Again, it may be objected that even this proposed law is too simple, and
88
an even more complicated law would have the required universality. In
fact, it is doubtful that we could ever formulate a law that took into
account all of the various solutions that can constitute water. This is
where the caveat comes in to play. When we add the ceteris paribus
caveat it may, in this context, be taken to be satisfied only when the
substance in question is "pure water," where this is taken to be a
substance composed entirely of H20. Given this, the law with the
caveat would be equivalent to a law that is prefaced with something
along these lines: if the sample is H2 O...." The resulting law might well
be true. Unfortunately it also fail to apply to very many actual
phenomena. There is very little pure water in existence.
For the proposed law that I use as an example, we can reasonably
conclude that without the caveat it is false and with the caveat it applies
to very few actual phenomena of boiling water. This, however, is not a
feature limited to such simple and uninteresting proposals. Cartwright
claims that many physical laws are ceteris paribus laws and we can
conclude the same of them. For instance, she says:
Flow processes like diffusion, heat transfer, or electric
current are described by various well-known
phenomenological laws--Fick’s law for diffusion: Fourier’s
for heat flow; Newton’s law for shearing force; and Ohm’s
law for electric current. But these are not true laws: each is
a ceteris paribus law which describes what happens only
so long as a single cause (e.g. a concentration gradient or a
temperature gradient) is at work. Most real life cases
involve some combination of causes; and the general laws
which describe what happens in these complex cases are
not available. 17
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If ceteris paribus laws have such an obvious defect, being
applicable to very few actual phenomena, why should we keep them
around? The standard view, as Cartwright presents it, is that these
ceteris paribus laws are just stand-ins until the sciences progress and
we are able to formulate perfectly general and true laws. Cartwright
says, ”[w]hen we use a ceteris paribus ’law’ which we know to be false,
the covering law theorist supposes us to be making a bet about what
form the true law takes ." 18
Her own view, however, is markedly different from the standard
view. She believes that ceteris paribus laws are the best that we can
do. When speaking of them she says:
Covering law theorists tend to think that nature is well-
regulated; in the extreme, that there is a law to cover every
case. I do not. I imagine that natural objects are much like
people in societies. Their behavior is constrained by some
specific laws and by a handful of general principles, but it is
not determined in detail, even statistically. What happens
on most occasions is dictated by no law at all . 19
Despite the fact that ceteris paribus laws do not describe many
actual phenomena, Cartwright holds that they play an important role in
explaining natural phenomena. Of this role she says this: "One thing
that ceteris paribus laws do is to express our explanatory
commitments. They tell what kinds of explanations are permitted," and
"[t]he pattern of explanation derived from the ideal situation is
employed even where the conditions are less than ideal ...."20 In the
example I gave concerning boiling water the law that I formulated will
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give us a pretty good idea of when water will boil and why some
particular water is boiling. In addition, if we have a grasp of the force of
the caveat and if we have some water that will not boil when expected,
we may suspect that the sample has some substance in it that affects the
boiling temperature.
It is crucial to notice and understand this essential feature of
Cartwright’s view: That a particular phenomenon occurs and,
consequently, the proper explanation of its occurrence, does not follow
from the physical laws at work and the nature of the other relevant
phenomena. I call the view that she is denying "nomological
determinism," or "ND" for short:
ND: That a particular phenomenon occurs follows from physical
laws and the nature of the other relevant phenomena.
To drive home her denial of ND she considers an everyday
example of explaining why some camelias died. She offers the following
in giving the relevant ceteris paribus laws, relevant facts, the
phenomenon to be explained and the explanation:
Last year I planted camelias in my garden. I know that
camelias like rich soil so I planted them in composted
manure. On the other hand, the manure was still warm,
and I also know that camelia roots can’t take high
temperatures. So I did not know what to expect. But when
many of my camelias died, despite otherwise perfect care, I
knew what went wrong. The camelias died because they
were planted in hot soil . 21
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The ceteris paribus laws are that camelias thrive in rich soil and
that they are are damaged by high temperatures. The facts are that the
camelias were planted in rich soil that is is also warm. The phenomenon
to be explained is the death of a number of the camelias. These deaths
are explained by citing one of the relevant ceteris paribus laws and the
relevant fact. However, the occurrence of this phenomenon is not
derivable from the laws and relevant facts. As Cartwright says:
So, we have an explanation for the death of my camelias.
But it is not an explanation from any true covering law.
There is no law that says that camelias just like mine,
planted in soil which is both hot and rich, die. To the
contrary, they do not all die. Some thrive; and probably
those that do, do so because of the richness of the soil they
are planted in.22
Furthermore, it is not because the laws are inadequate that the
occurrence of the phenomenon is not derivable from the laws and
relevant facts:
If, as is possible, the world is not a tidy deterministic
system, this job of telling how we are to explain will be a job
which is still left when the descriptive task of science is
complete. Imagine for example (what I suppose to actually
be the case) that the facts about camellias are irreducibly
statistical. This it is possible to know all the general
nomological facts about camellias which there are to know-
-for example, that 62% of all camellias in just the
circumstances of my camellias die, and 38% survive. Still,
one would not thereby know how to explain what happened
in my garden. You would still have to look to the Sunset
Garden Book to learn that the heat of the soil explains
the perishing, and the richness explains the plants which
thrive. 23
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Let me briefly recount Cartwright’s view as I see it. Physical laws
have two functions: they describe patterns of regularities found in
nature, and they are used to explain individual phenomena. They also
have two faults: if they are not understood to have ceteris paribus
caveats, most are false; if they are understood to satisfy the appropriate
ceteris paribus caveat, they apply to few actual phenomena. As a
consequence of this, that an individual phenomenon occurs need not
follow from ceteris paribus laws and the nature of other relevant
phenomena. Still, ceteris paribus laws are of value because they tell
what sort of explanations are permissible for particular kinds of
phenomena.
I will not try to evaluate Cartwright’s view as it pertains to the
scientific process or formulation of physical laws. Instead I want see if
what she says concerning ceteris paribus laws has any bearing on
understanding the relationship between prima facie and moral
obligation. As I mentioned earlier, there are a number of steps to take
in deciding this. The first step is to notice what similarities there are
between the two relationships.
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Xfr<? An alo SV Between Cet eris Paribus Laws and Principles of Primn
Facie Obligation
Where Cartwright was trying to show how we provide scientific
explanation of individual phenomena, we are trying to explain the
rightness, wrongness and obligatoriness of individual acts. When it is
right for a person to do something we want to have an explanation of
why it is right, just as when a physical phenomenon occurs we want to
know why it occurs. If Ross is correct, any explanation of the existence
of a moral obligation will involve reference to certain characteristics
had by the act. In particular, it must refer to one or more of the
characteristics that I have called RMCs. Something like the ceteris
paribus caveat was in Ewing’s definition, so it might be thought that
the definition of a RMC is what plays an analogous role to that of
ceteris paribus laws. This will not work however. In order for the
analogy to be at all plausible, the ceteris paribus caveat must modify a
principle that can apply to particular situations. Since definitions, like
that of a RMC or that of prima facie obligation, are not the kinds of
things that apply or do not apply to situations, they cannot be what is
modified by the caveat. We did discuss some relevant principles
however. Remember, RMCs, or the properties that can make acts
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prima f acie obligatory, are expressed by what I have called Principles
of Prima Facie Obligation (PPFOs). It would seem that it is these
principles that are to play an analogous role to that played by
statements of physical laws in Cartwright’s theory.
If we understand the relationship between PPFOs and particular
moral obligations to be similar to that between ceteris paribus laws
and particular phenomena, then we should, in effect, consider the
PPFOs to be general assertions of moral obligation with ceteris
paribus caveats. Here is an example of a PPFO revised to reflect this:
PPFOl : Ceteris Paribus
,
if a person, s
,
can do an act, a
,
and a
is an instance of promise-keeping, then s is morally obligated
to do a.
If PPFOs revised along the lines of PPFOl * play an analogous
role in explaining moral obligations to that played by ceteris paribus
physical laws in explaining physical phenomena, we might expect them
to have analogous features. Let us see if that is so.
The most important feature of ceteris paribus principles or laws
in Cartwright’s theory is that without the caveat they are false and with
it they describe very few actual phenomena. If the analogy between the
relationships is to be accepted, this should also be true of PPFOs.
Consider PPFOl *. The claim expressed by this principle seems to have
features remarkably similar to the ones had by claims expressed by
ceteris paribus physical laws. If we drop the caveat, the resulting
principle is not true. It is apparent that we must sometimes break
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promises in order to fulfill our obligations and, consequently, not every
act that has the property of being an instance of promise keeping is also
morally right.
In order to decide if retaining the caveat makes the principle
inapplicable to many actual or situations, we have to have some
understanding of what it would take to satisfy the ceteris paribus
caveat in the present context. As I understand it, in the case of physical
laws the caveat is taken to be satisfied when there are no forces present
other than the one with which the law is concerned. It would appear
that what counts as satisfaction of the caveat changes with the context.
In physical laws, it is the absence of other forces; in the case of PPFOs it
would be the absence of other morally relevant characteristics.
If I have understood the caveat correctly, then it is clear there
there are very few real situations where the principle would apply. If we
grant that Ross’s list of principles of prima f acie obligation is near the
mark, then we can readily see that there are very few real alternatives
that do not have more than one of the feature expressed by those
principles. Hence, with the caveat, the principle would fail to apply to
many actual situations. However, if the ideal situation exists, one where
only one alternative act out of many had one of these features, I would
’•eadily grant that we would be obligated to perform it.
We even can tell a story about explaining moral obligation that
seems seems similar to the story Cartwright tells concerning scientific
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explanation. Just as, according to Cartwright’s view, ceteris paribus
laws tell us what is allowed in explaining physical phenomena,
principles of prima facie obligation tell us what is allowed in
explaining why we have the moral obligations that we do have. If we
believe that a person has a moral obligation to do some act and we want
to give reasons for this belief, we should be ready to point out the
relevant PPFOs. Doing a particular act may not satisfy any PPFO,
because the caveat is not satisfied, but, as Cartwright says, they tell us
what kinds of explanations are permitted. Any adequate explanation of
why a person is morally obligated to do a particular act must make
reference to some PPFO.
Earlier, I talked about the conditions that must be satisfied if we
are to be justified in accepting a conclusion by way of an argument from
analogy. In particular I talked about when it is appropriate to conclude
that a lesser known thing has a characteristic by appealing to the fact
that a better known and analogous thing has that characteristic. I
suggested that such conclusions are justified only when the lesser known
thing has features had by the better known thing and its having these
features require us to accept that the better known thing has the
characteristic in question. Exactly what conclusion are we supposed to
be justified in accepting about the relationship between prima facie
and moral obligations by appealing to its analogy to the relationship
between ceteris paribus laws and individual phenomena?
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What We Can Le arn From the Annlngy
If it is good, there seems to be a quite a bit that is to be learned
from considering the analogy. Considering PPFOs to be analogous to
teterisparibus physical laws would allow us to explain the following:
(i) Why PPFOs are cited when explaining why acts are morally
obligatory. It is because they play the same role in explaining moral
obligations as do physical laws in explaining individual physical
phenomenon, (ii) Why every moral obligation is also a prima facie
obligation, but not every prima facie obligation is a moral obligation.
Moral obligation can only be explained by citing PPFOs, so every moral
obligation is a prima facie obligation. We know that some mutually
exclusive acts can each have characteristics expressed in PPFOs and,
since we accept that there are no real conflicts of obligation, at least
one of the mutually exclusive acts having such a characteristic is not
morally obligatory, (iii) Why prima facie obligations have a special
moral status. This is because any act having a characteristic expressed
in a PPFO would be obligatory if the ceteris paribus caveat were
satisfied, (iv) Finally, why it is that an ethical theory need not provide
criteria for an act to be morally right, thus avoiding the problems
mentioned in Chapter II. Just as no theory can tell us what happens
when a variety of different physical laws are applicable in one situation,
no ethical theory can tell us what happens in the case where a person’s
alternatives include a number of acts that have characteristics
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expressed in the PPFOs. It should be noted that I have not as yet said
we should accept these explanations. I am only pointing them out as
explanations that are supported by the analogy.
To see if we should accept these conclusions we should try to
understand the argument from analogy more clearly. Let me give an
outline of the argument as I understand it. The characteristics that the
two relationships have in common are that general principles are used
to explain individual phenomena (physical phenomena or individual
moral obligations); the principles are understood to have an implicit or
explicit caveat; without the caveat the principles are false, while with
the caveat they do not apply to many actual phenomena; and these
principles are useful because they tell what is allowable in the
explanation of individual phenomena or moral obligations.
I still need to state the most important part of the analogy: the
feature of better known relationship that we are allowed to conclude is
also a feature of the lesser known relationship. It is because the
relationship has this feature that the analogy is supposed to support the
above explanations. The feature is this: There are no principles more
fundamental than the principles with the caveats. Ceteris Paribus
principles are the best we can do in science; Principles of Prima Facie
Obligation are the most fundamental principles of moral obligation.
They are the very best we can do.
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Given that the Principles of Prima Facie Obligation are the best
we can do, we can see why we should accept the reasoning leading to the
above conclusions. We need to cite these principles in explaining why
an act is obligatory, but cannot give more fundamental principles. Since
there are no more fundamental principles and being prima facie
obligated to do an act does not imply being morally obligated to do it,
there cannot be criteria for being morally obligatory. We can also see
how the notion of moral obligation is the most fundamental moral
notion. The most fundamental principles are given in terms of it.
Is the Analogy Good?
One objection to accepting the view that PPFOs are analogous to
ceteris paribus physical laws is that it does not suggest how we can
formulate interesting general definitions of a RMC and prima facie
obligation consistent with it. 24 We might propose to define a RMC as,
roughly, a characteristic that is expressed by a revised PPFO. The
definition might look something like this:
PRMC5: A characteristic, c, is a RMC =def.
ceteris paribus
,
if a person, s
,
can do an act, a
,
and a has
c, then s is morally obligated to do a.
This definition has a problem, however. If we understand the
ceteris paribus caveat as requiring that other morally relevant
properties be absent, then it may be thought that explaining how the
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caveat is satisfied requires appeal to a concept, that of being a morally
relevant characteristic, much like the concept that is being defined.
This problem aside, we still have to decide whether we should accept
the analogy and the conclusions reached by accepting it.
Are we justified in accepting that the principles of prima facie
obligation are the best we can do? Not based on the analogy as it has
been presented so far. Accepting that the principles of prima facie
obligation are the best we can do is not required by accepting that
prima f acie obligations, like ceteris paribus laws, are false without
the caveat, do not apply to many actual situations with it but, in any
event, are useful for explaining the occurrence of individual phenomena
or moral obligations. The covering law theorists mentioned by
Cartwright could accept that the relationship between ceteris paribus
laws and individual phenomena has all of these features and not accept,
or be required to accept, that ceteris paribus laws are the best we can
do. These theorists may reasonably believe that there is some further
underlying law, as yet undiscovered, that will make the use of ceteris
paribus laws unnecessary. A ethical covering law theorist could just as
well, and as reasonably, believe that there is some underlying moral
principle that, when discovered, will render the use of Principles of
Prima Facie Obligation unnecessary in an explanation of particular
moral obligations.
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It should he apparent that Cartwright’s denial of ND is really at
the heart of the acceptance of ceteris paribus laws as the best we can
do. If we accept that the world is, as she says, an "untidy place," then we
would have reason to accept her conclusion. Otherwise, we need not
and, I believe, should not accept it. Accepting that the world is an
untidy place, or the denial of ND, is not required by accepting her
description ot cet er is paribus laws. Again, covering law theorists
could accept her description of ceteris paribus laws, but reject her
conclusion. Since the properties that the two relationships are
supposed to have in common do not require us to accept the conclusion
that Principles of Prima Facie Obligation are the bestwe can do, we
should not accept the argument from analogy as it stands.
The story might be different, of course, if we were to find that
there is an analogue of ND in ethics, and we were to discover good
reason to reject it. If that were so, then we might be required to accept
the conclusion. I have said "might" because there I have some doubts
about whether all of the characteristics I have said that both
relationships have in common are actually had by both. In particular,
the relationship between ceteris paribus laws and individual
phenomena involves, at its root, explanation. We are trying to explain
the occurrence of individual phenomena. I have some doubts about
whether explanation is at the root of the relationship between prima
facie and moral obligation. I will put this question aside for the time
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being; now I will discuss the ethical analogue to ND and try to decide
whether or not it should be rejected.
The first step in determining whether or not we should deny the
ethical analog to ND is to figure out what it is. Intuitively, the
underlying idea behind ND is that what phenomenon occurs in a
situation follows from the nature of antecedent phenomena and the
relevant physical laws
.
25 It seems that an ethical version of ND, ethical
determinism or "ED" for short would be something like this:
ED: For any person, s, and act a
,
if s is morally obligated to do a,
then that s is morally obligated to do a follows from the facts
about the situation, and the relevant moral principles.
If ED is true then the principles of prima f acie obligations are
just stand-ins for more complete principles of moral obligation, which
could be stated truthfully sans the caveat. Here is why: Assume that ED
is true and PPFOs with the caveat are the relevant moral principles.
Since the caveats are satisfied in very few situations, including some
where we have moral obligations, there will be some situations where
that we are obligated to do something does not follow from the
principles and the facts about a situation.
If ED is true, then that a person has a particular moral obligation
could be derived from these more complete principles of obligation and
the relevant facts about the person’s situation. If we deny ED, then we
are holding that a person’s duties in a situation do not follow from the
relevant facts and the relevant ethical principles.
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Either denying or accepting ED will cause problems for someone
trying to explain Ross’s notion of prima facie obligation by appeal to
an analogy with ceteris paribus laws. On one hand, if we do not deny
ED then either the relationship between principles of prima facie
obligation and particular moral obligations is not interestingly
analogous to the relationship between ceteris paribus laws and
physical phenomena, or, unlike what Cartwright believes about ceteris
paribus laws, Principles of Prima Facie Obligation are really
unnecessary and are just stand-ins until we can formulate better
principles. On the other hand, the denial of ED seems incompatible
with some very important features of Ross’s view and with some of the
constraints on ethical theories that I have mentioned. I will explain
each of these alternatives and its difficulties in turn.
Let us look at the easier case first. Let us assume that we accept
ED. We would be holding that a person’s moral duty follows from the
relevant facts and the relevant ethical principles. It should be clear that
a person’s moral duty does not follow from the PPFOs and the relevant
facts, so the PPFOs are not the relevant principles. If we believe that
PPFOs are interestingly similar to ceteris paribus physical laws, then
we would have to accept that they are just stand-ins for more complete
principles. If Cartwright is right, then the coverinq law theorists are
wrong about physical laws, but some sort of covering law theory would
be correct about ethical principles. Therefore, we would have little
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reason to believe that the PPFOs are fundamental ethical principles, or
that they are the best that we can do. Yet it seems that Ross thought
they were the best we can do. If we accept ED then either Ross was
mistaken and, in the end, PPFOs are not needed, or the PPFOs should
not be understood as analogous to ceteris paribus laws.
Now let us see what would happen if we were to deny ED. Since it
is so radical, it is fairly difficult even to understand what its denial
involves. Start by considering that there would be no possible
circumstances in which we could be certain which of some alternatives is
obligatory. Even if we had a perfect grasp of every ethical principle and
perfect knowledge of all the relevant facts in a situation, we could not
be sure what our obligation is in that situation. This is because the
fundamental consequence of denying ED is that we would have to
accept that our moral obligations are not only accidental, but deeply
accidental. Let me explain. Sometimes we do not fully understand a
situation, so we do not know what we are objectively obligated to do.
We may not know, for example, that some alternative will cause great
harm. Giving penicillin to someone who is allergic to it may cause great
harm, but we may not know of the allergy. Whether or not we satisfy our
objective obligation in such a situation is accidental.
When an obligation is deeply accidental, on the other hand, which
act of some alternatives is obligatory at a time is not fully determined by
the nature of the alternative acts or the state of the world prior to that
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time. If there were something about the world that determined which
act was obligatory, then, it seems, those features of the world could be
expressed in principles and statements of fact. If we deny ED, then we
are holding that there are no such principles about moral obligations.
Whether or not doing a particular act will satisfy our moral obligations
is deeply accidental whenever more than one of our alternatives
satisfies a PPFO
.
26 The very best we could do is give some indication of
the probability of a particular alternative being obligatory. We could
also explain why some alternative was obligatory. For example, I could
explain why I was obligated to return a book to my brother by pointing
out that I promised to do so.
That moral obligations are deeply accidental is incompatible with
some important features of Ross’s meta-ethical views. It should be
obvious that if an obligation is deeply accidental then it is accidental;
that is, if there is nothing about the world that implies that a certain act
is obligatory, then there is nothing that we can know about the world
that will imply it. I believe that Ross eventually came to the conclusion
that we could know, and often do know, what we are morally obligated
to do. In Chapter II, I laid out my reasons for this belief. More
importantly, even when he held that we do not know our duty and that
there is "much truth in the description of the right act as a fortunate
act," it was always because of difficulties in knowing what the relevant
facts are in any situation. At one time Ross may have thought that our
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moral obligations were accidental, but, I believe, he never thought them
deeply accidental.
The point also should be made that both versions of Ross’s meta-
ethical theory are incompatible with the denial of ND, and the version
presented in FE most clearly so. Remember, there he said that
d-subjective duty is the most important notion of duty and that a
person s d-subjective duty depends on what the person believes to be
the act that will bring about the state of affairs thought by the person to
be morally relevant. For example: If the person believes that the
relevant state of affairs is returning a borrowed book as promised and
believes that mailing it will bring about that state of affairs, then the
person is morally obligated to set about mailing it. That the person is
morally obligated to set about mailing the book follows from his beliefs.
(We need not say how the person arrived at those beliefs.) According to
this meta-ethical theory the person’s moral duty does follow from facts
about the world, hence it is incompatible with the denial of ED.
Ross, as I mentioned in Chapter II, suggests that a person’s
d-subjective duty would be the same as his objective duty if the person
was omniscient. From this it would seem that Ross was committed to
holding that what we are objectively obligated to do in any particular
situation follows from facts and principles that are knowable, but
elusive. Such a view runs through much of what Ross says, and is
incompatible with the denial of ED. Indeed, I have never found a
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passage where he denied or could even be interpreted as denying ED.
Purely as a matter of exegesis we should not ascribe the denial of ED to
a theory we take to be Ross’s. This aside, there are other good reasons
to be suspect of a theory that denies ED.
To begin with, the denial of ED is clearly incompatible with
accepting constraints C3 and C4: we sometimes know what are our
obligations and there is a method persons can use to determine them. I
am hesitant to give up these constraints regardless of Ross’s view on
them, and if we deny ED, then we have to give them up.
In addition, the denial of ED seems incompatible with Cl, the
view that we can do what we are obligated to do. There is some
difficulty in explaining this incompatibility because, as I pointed out
earlier, there is some difficulty in correctly interpreting "can" in Cl.
However, I previously suggested that the relevant notion of possibility
has long been associated with the notion of responsibility. We only hold
people responsible for doing things they can do. It is unreasonable to
believe that, in this context, a person is responsible for doing an act,
when that it is the person’s obligation to do that act does not follow
from anything that is true before the person is to do it.
Indeed, if we deny ED, then it is not even clear that we can make
much sense at al 1 of the notion of an obligation to do something in the
future. Yet, if there are moral obligations, they are often to do
something in the future. When ever making a promise creates an
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obligation, it is always an obligation to do something in the future. If
there is nothing true now that implies that I have an obligation to do
something in the future, then, it seems, I cannot have that obligation.
So, if obligations are deeply accidental, we cannot have an obligation to
do something in the future.
In addition to the problem that ED, either its acceptance or
denial, causes for a theory that treats principles of prima facie
obligation in a way analogous to the way that Cartwright treats ceteris
paribus laws, there is a problem with the objective of such a theory. It
is a theory about why we had the obligations we did, or, at best, the
probability that we are obligated to do a certain act. We can only
explain obligations that already have been satisfied or not satisfied. We
cannot explain why we have an obligation to do anything in the future
or, for that matter, what properties the act must have for us to be
obligated to do it. Considering Cartwright’s example of the plants, we
can only explain why the dead ones died, the live ones lived and give the
probability of each occurring; we cannot say of any individual plant that
it will live. Similarly, I could not say of any particular act that I am
obligated to do it. This seems inadequate for an ethical theory.
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Conclusion
At times Ross suggests that acts that are prima f acie obligatory
tend to be morally obligatory. Strawson suggests this must mean either
that these acts have a simple property of tending to be right, or that
most acts having these characteristics are morally right. Strawson then
argues that accepting either interpretation leads to problems. He says
that the first requires the existence of a non-existent property and the
second is inconsistent with Ross’s view that he can directly know what
he is prima facie obligated to do. If we know that we are prima f acie
obligated to do something, then we would have to know that it has a
characteristic such that most acts having it are morally right. We are
unlikely to know this.
The second interpretation may also have the defect of having the
wrong characteristics as RMCs. There may be characteristics such that
most acts having that characteristic are morally obligatory, but are
accidental to the obligatoriness of the act; there may be RMCs such that
acts having them usually are not obligatory, because they usually are
outweighed by other RMCs.
A.C. Ewing suggests that there is another way to interpret Ross’s
claim. It may mean that other things being equal acts that are prima
facie obligatory are morally obligatory. The problem is that he does
not work out what it is for other things to be equal.
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One possible way to work out Ewing’s claim is along lines similar
to those of Nancy Cartwright's attempt to work out the relationship
between ceteris paribus laws and the occurrence of particular
phenomena. She claims that without the caveat ceteris paribus laws
are false but useful for explanation, and with the caveat they are true
but do not apply to many particular phenomena.
At the heart of her explication of the relationship between the
ceteris paribus laws and particular phenomena is her denial of ND, or
the view that there are true laws that conjoined with facts about the
world imply the occurrence of particular phenomena. If we are to
explicate the relationship between Principles of Prima Facie
Obligation and particular moral obligations in a similar way, then we
need to deny the ethical analogue of ND. This, however, we should not
do. Denying it seems incompatible with moral responsibility and,
perhaps, moral obligation itself.
Ill
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CHAPTER IV
THE MORAL SUITABILITY EXPLANATION
Introduction
Although Ross came to the conclusion that the ethical concept
expressed by "morally right" is unanalyzable, he did so only after careful
consideration. His most interesting discussion concerning this topic
came in RG as he considered a proposal made by C. D. Broad in his
book Five Types of Ethical Theoryd Broad’s thesis is that the
concepts expressed by "right" and "wrong" are actually defined concepts.
Something is right (wrong) when it is appropriate (inappropriate) or
fitting (unfitting) to a situation. Broad says:
It seems to me that, when I speak of anything as "right", I
am always thinking of it as a factor in a certain wider total
situation, and that I mean that it is "appropriately" or
"fittingly" related to the rest of the situation. When I speak
of anything as "wrong" I am thinking of it as
"inappropriately" or "unfittingly" related to the rest of the
situation . 2
Broad’s proposal encompasses all normative uses of "right" and
"wrong". These include, for example, their use in making aesthetic,
prudential and moral claims such as "she is using the right colored
glaze," "now is the wrong time to invest in Wang" and "keeping your
promise was the right thing to do." Broad’s proposal falls short,
however, of a thoroughgoing reduction of all normative concepts to the
same concept of fittingness. He hedges the reduction by holding that
there are a number of different kinds of fittingness, each specific to one
of the various areas where values are expressed. Moral fittingness, for
example, is different from prudential or aesthetic fittingness.
Ross views Broad’s proposal, including his hedge, with great
favor. Ross commends Broad’s proposal when he says that it "has the
great merit of connecting the ethical sense of right and wrong with other
uses of the words," but acquiesces to the hedge when he says that "if
rightness in its ethical application shares with rightness in other
connexions the characteristic of being relational, in another respect
ethical rightness is quite different from any other kind of rightness ." 3
Ross seems to believe that this difference between kinds of fittingness
comes in degrees, as he finds a closer connection between moral and
aesthetic fittingness than between moral and other kinds of fittingness.
In a most remarkable passage Ross almost wavers in his
acceptance of Broad’s hedge. Ross says that although "moral rightness"
expresses an indefinable and unanalyzable concept, we can begin to
define it in terms of fittingness. Of moral rightness he says:
It includes in it the generic quality of suitability, which it
shares with the rightness of an element in a beautiful
whole. And it includes in it the differentia which
distinguishes it from every form of rightness but itself. It is
a complex characteristic, just as redness is a complex
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characteristic, including in it a generic and a differential
element. Now redness, though complex, is not definable;
we can begin to define it, when we say it is a form of colour,
but we cannot complete the definition, since if we try to
state what distinguishes it from other forms of colour we
can only say that it is the being redness that does so. In the
same way we can begin to define moral rightness, because
we can say it is a form of suitability; but we cannot
complete the definition, since if we ask what kind of
suitability it is we can only say that it is the kind of
suitability that is rightness
.
4
Ross, it seems, stops just short of giving up his meta-ethical view
that "moral rightness" expresses an unanalyzable concept in favor of the
view that it is analyzable by way of a more basic value concept expressed
by "fitting" or "suitable." We, however, might do well to consider a view
that attempts to complete the definition along the same lines as Ross’s
beginning, especially if such an attempt will throw more light on the
relationship between prima facie and moral obligation.
Roderick Chisholm, in his article "The Ethics of Requirement"
does just this. He proposes to define prima facie and moral obligation
by way of the concept of requirement, a concept that is quite akin to
fittingness . 5 Let me now examine Chisholm’s proposal.
Chisholm’s "The Ethics of Requirement"
In "The Ethics of Requirement" Chisholm asserts that by "taking
'
p requires q as our single ethical primitive and making use of the
concept of an a£l, we can define all of the fundamental concepts of
ethics. 6 The applicability of this concept is not, however, restricted to
ethics. Chisholm also claims that there may be psychological, aesthetic
and epistemic based requirements. By making these assertions,
Chisholm seems to countenance the view that there is at least one
notion of requirement whose application cuts across all of these areas.
Chisholm takes requirement to be a relation that holds between
possible states of affairs or events
.
7 Representing states of affairs by
lower case letters ”
a
z" and the relation by "R” the primitive is ”pRr\
which is read as "p requires r". There are a number of important
concepts that Chisholm proposes to define by way of this primitive. The
ones of most interest to this inquiry are the concepts of a requirement
existing, one requirement overriding another , a state of affairs that
ought to be and a person being obligated to bring about a state of
affairs . 8
The first concept Chisholm defines is that of a requirement
existing. Since the mere fact that one possible state of affairs requires
another does not imply that either has occurred, or that an actual
requirement exists, we need to distinguish between a merely possible
requirement and an actual one. The definition is this:
"There is a requirement for q" for: (Ep) [p & pRq] ()
One of the most important features of requirements is that they
are not absolute. Consider a state of affairs, p, that requires another
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state of affairs, q. The requirement is not absolute in the sense that the
conjunction of p and another state of affairs, r, may not require q.
When this happens the requirement for q is said to be overridden by r.
Chisholm s proposed definition for a requirement being overridden is
this:
"There is a requirement for q which has been overridden" for:
(Ep) (Ej) [(p & pRq) & (s & ~((p & s)R<7))]io
Chisholm takes it that a state of affairs ought to be when the
requirement for it is not overridden by any occurring state of affairs.
Letting "O" be the obligation operator, the definition is this:
"(V for: (Ep) [(p & pRq) & ~(Es) (s & ~((p & s)Rp))] u
How do we get from a definition of a state of affairs that ought to
be to an account of moral obligation, that is, an account of what we
ought to do? We start by recognizing that states of affair can be brought
about by persons’ actions. For example, by handing it to him, I can
bring about the state of affairs of Joe having the book I borrowed from
him. We also need to recognize that a person’s bringing about a state
of affairs is itself a distinct state of affairs. So, in addition to the state
of affairs of Joe having the book I borrowed from him, there is the state
of affairs of my bringing it about that he has the book. 1 inally, we
should notice that the above definition of "O q" can apply to a state of
affairs of a person bringing about a state of affairs and bringing about a
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state of affairs involves doing something. Accordingly, Chisholm
defines the notion of moral obligation in terms of a state of affairs that
ought to be by saying that a person is morally obligated to bring about a
state of affairs just in case it ought to be that he or she brings it about.
Letting "A q" stand for "S brings about q” here is his official definition:
"S ought to bring it about that q" for: OA q
Although Chisholm does not give an explicit definition of prima
facie obligation, in "The Ethics of Requirement" he says that "a man
has a prima facie duty to perform a certain act a
,
if there is a
requirement that he perform a." In another work where he discusses
these topics, "Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement"
(hereafter "Practical Reason"), he offers a number of axioms concerning
requirement and definitions of various normative concepts. One of the
definitions is that of a prima facie duty existing. His definition can be
formulated like this:
PFOq: (Ep) [p & pRAq ]. 12
Although similar, clearly the definitions of a prima facie
obligation existing and a requirement existing differ; the former
involves the notion of a person bringing about a state of affairs, while
the latter need not. Just as the definition of OA q is essentially the
substitution of "A q" for ”q" throughout in the definition of Oq, the
definition of prima facie obligation (PFO) will be the substitution of
Aq for q in the definition a requirement existing.
To see how these definitions work, reconsider one of the
hypothetical situations that I described in Chapter I: Joe promises his
wife that he will mow the lawn today, finds a hit and run victim in the
road, and can keep his promise or help the hit and run victim, but not
both. Given this description, Joe would have a prima facie obligation
to mow the lawn that is overridden, and a prima facie obligation to
help the hit and run victim that is not overridden.
We can see how the definition of a prima facie obligation is
satisfied so that Joe has a prima facie obligation to mow the lawn and
a prima f acie obligation to help the injured person. Joe’s promise to
mow the law requires that he bring it about that the lawn is mowed, and
that the hit and run victim needs immediate help requires that he bring
it about that the person is helped. We can also see why we would be
hesitant to say that he has a moral obligation to mow the lawn and
inclined to say that he does have a moral obligation to help the injured
person. The conjunction of his promising to mow the lawn and the
injured person needing help does not require that he mow the lawn,
while it does require that he help the hit and run victim. The prima
facie obligation to mow the lawn is overridden, the prima facie
obligation to help the hit and run victim is not.
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Now that I have presented his definitions of the most important
normative concepts, I would like to present some of Chisholm’s view on
moral knowledge.
In both "The Ethics of Requirement" and "Practical Reason"
Chisholm says that some judgments about requirement "may be a priori
and incorrigible ." 13 These judgements include universal
generalizations, such as "promise making requires promise keeping." A
judgement that a state of affairs is an instance of one of these
generalizations may also be incorrigible. In the above example we had
an instance of the generalization about promise keeping: Joe’s
promising to mow the lawn requires that he do it. Chisholm also says
that we can judge a priori that a requirement is overridden. Without
looking at particular cases, for instance, we can judge that the
requirement to help a hit and run victim overrides the requirement to
keep a promise to mow the lawn . 14 However, we cannot judge a priori
that a requirement is not overridden and, hence, that a state of affairs
ought to be. To judge that it ought to be that Joe helps the hit and run
victim, for example, "requires a survey of all of the relevant a
posteriori evidence that is available ." 15
The view that we can judge a priori that one state of affairs
requires another, or that a ’-equirement is overridden is partially
reflected in the axioms Chisholm offers in "Practical Reason." In
particular, Chisholm says that "the relation of requirement is like the
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relations of logic: if it holds between any two states of affairs, then it
holds necessarily between those states of affairs ." 16 This view comports
nicely with Ross’s.
Objections to Chisholmian Requirement
Appealing as it is, a number of important objections have been
raised against Chisholm’s proposal. Some of the most interesting of
these objections can be found in Fred Feldman’s Doing the Best We
Can . 17 Feldman has three main objections to Chisholm’s proposal: (i)
it has it that we would have prima facie obligations contrary to what
Ross would have allowed, (ii) it has as a consequence that a state of
affairs ought to be just in case it occurs, and (iii) it mistakenly defines
the concept of what a person ought to do via the concept of what it ought
to be that the person bring about.
The Too Many Prima Facie Duties Objection
Feldman claims that the notion of requirement is so broad as to
make some things prima facie obligatory that Ross would have not
allowed. Fie says, fur instance, "an artist who has drawn a certain curve
would have a prima facie obligation to complete it in the most fitting
way" and "[a] musician who has played certain notes would have a prim a
122
facie obligation to follow them up in the most fitting, or appropriate
way. Feldman also points out that we would have prima facie
obligations to believe propositions supported by inductive evidence,
which he finds inconsistent with Ross. Feldman says:
Suppose, for example, that we see a cat on the first roof,
and a cat on the second roof, and a cat on the third roof. It
would seem, then, that there is then a requirement that we
believe that there is a cat on the fourth roof, too. This
would be based on the more general epistemic requirement
to believe that the unexamined roofs must be relevantly
like the examined ones. If this is right, Chisholm’s
proposal yields the result that we have a prima facie
obligation to believe that there is a cat on the unexamined
roof. To my knowledge, Ross never suggested that we have
a prima facie obligation to believe what our inductive
evidence supports ." 18
Ross did, I believe, make some comments that are relevant to
Feldman’s claims. In RG Ross talks about duties of beneficence and
duties of self-improvement. The duty of beneficence rests "on the mere
fact that there are other beings in the world whose condition we can
make better in respect of virtue, or of intelligence, or of pleasure." In
Foundations of Ethics he said that "where no special duty such as
that of promise-keeping is involved, our duty is just to produce as much
good as we can ." 19 Among the things he found to be intrinsically good
are virtue, pleasure, knowledge and right opinion . 20
Consiuer Feldman’s examples concerning the artist and musician.
It does not seem unreasonable to believe that an artist finishing a line in
the most fitting way, or that a musician following beginning notes with
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the most fitting notes would be more pleasing and, perhaps, more
beautiful than them doing it some other way. Since we have prima
facie obligations to increase pleasure and, perhaps, create beauty, it
does not seem unreasonable to believe that they have prima f acie
obligations to finish their work in the most fitting way . 21
Next, consider Feldman’s claim that it is fitting to believe
propositions that are fitting to be believed, ones for which we have good
evidence. It seems clear that such a strategy would lead to increased
knowledge or right opinion. Since we have a prima facie obligation to
bring about these intrinsic goods, it seems quite consistent with Ross’s
view to say that we have a prima facie obligation to believe
propositions for which we have good inductive evidence. There are
epistomologically based requirements.
The previous argument, however, is not Feldman’s strongest. He
not only claims that we would have a prima facie obligation to believe
a proposition supported by inductive evidence, but that we would have a
prima facie obligation to do something when inductive evidence
supports the conclusion that we will do it. He considers a situation,
hypothetical I hope, where a man regularly makes and breaks a promise
to meet for lunch. He says of this man:
His past behavior is good enough inductive evidence for
the conclusion that he will break his promise again today.
In this case, Chisholm’s proposal yields the result that he
has a prima facie obligation to break this promise . 22
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In coming to this conclusion, Feldman invokes this principle: If p
is good inductive evidence for q, then pRq.22
This argument is much more difficult to evaluate than the
previous one. In order to evaluate the argument, I need to evaluate the
above principle. I am not sure what to say about the principle because
accepting it in conjunction with one of Chisholm's views about
requirement would commit me to a view about induction about which I
am uncertain. Let me explain the problem.
In "Practical Reason" Chisholm offers a number of axioms
concerning requirement, including one that has that if one state of
affairs requires another, it does so necessarily. Letting "N" be the
necessity operator, here is the axiom:
A2. pRq -> N(pRq) 24
If Feldman’s principle and this axiom are true, then we would
have to accept this principle: If p is good inductive evidence for q , then
N (p is good inductive evidence for q). Since the inductive relationship
between p and g yields a requirement, it, according to A2, must yield a
requirement. Consequently, it is necessary that p and q stand in that
inductive relationship.
Whether or not we should accept this second principle seems to
be a matter of some philosophical controversy. 25 At first glance it seems
that the principle should be rejected. Although that a person, Gail, is
110 years old is good inductive evidence for the conclusion that Gail will
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die within ten years, it does not seem that this is necessarily so. Still,
someone might try to reject this example by saying that I am not
adequately expressing my inductive argument and I am relying on some
implicit premise, such as that the normal life span for persons is less
than 80 years.
I have not come to any conclusion on this principle.
Consequently, I have not come to a conclusion on Feldman’s principle
and I am not in a position to say whether Feldman’s objection is a good
one or not. If the principle concerning the necessity of inductive
relationships is accepted, then Feldman’s objection is good, otherwise it
is not.
The (p <-> Op) Objection
Feldman’s most startling objection is that Chisholm’s proposal
has as a consequence that a state of affairs ought to be just in case it
occurs. This objection relies on Feldman’s view about logical
entailment as the basis for requirements. Feldman says "if a state of
affairs, p, entails a state of affairs, <7, then p requires q" and "any
requirement based upon entailment must override any conflicting
requirement not based on entailment."26 He offers a principle
reflecting this view, which we shall label "FI":
FI. (p ) (q) (p => q -> pRq).
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Given the overriding requirement of logical entailment, Feldman
offers a proof that p <-> Op. It goes like this: Since p = > p we can
conclude that pRp. Since, for any r, if p = > q then (p & r) => q, this
requirement will never be overridden. We have shown half the
equivalence: p -> Op. The other half of the equivalence is shown by
reductio. Suppose that — p & Op. By the reasoning above we can
conclude that O ~ p. We would then have O-p and Op, which is
impossible
.
27 Hence ~p & Op is impossible. Since ~ ( ~p & Op) is
equivalent to Op -> p, we have thus completed the pernicious
equivalence.
Feldman considers and rejects the possibility of avoiding the
above difficulties by simply ruling out entailment as the basis for
requirements. He says:
Chisholm could simply deny that entailment and inductive
support are forms of requirement.... I find it hard to see
how such a claim could be justified. Requirement, as I see
it, is a relation that holds between states of affairs
regardless of the subject matter, and regardless of their
deductive and inductive connections . 28
He seems to consider such a restriction to be arbitrary, resulting
in a failure to capture the concept of requirement. If such a restriction
is arbitrary, he is right: it should be rejected. It is part of the appeal of
Chisholm’s proposal that the ethical concepts are defined in terms of a
primitive concept that is expressible in our ordinary language. By
restricting its use in such an arbitrary and artificial way "requirement"
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would become a technical term, thus depriving Chisholm’s proposal of
one of its most attractive features.
There are, I believe, two interesting responses to Feldman’s
argument. The first response is to fiddle with the placement of the
restriction against entailment based requirement; the second, more
interesting response, is to question whether understanding the primitive
as excluding entailment based requirements is as arbitrary as Feldman
makes it out to be.
The first response to Feldman has to do with the location of the
condition excluding entailment based requirements. As I see it,
Feldman only discusses a restriction on the application of the primitive
term relied on by Chisholm. We could accept Feldman’s comments on
the primitive concept and redefine one of the defined concepts so that it
prevents entailment based requirements from generating states of
affairs that ought to be.
The most straightforward way to block Feldman's argument is to
add to Chisholm’s definition of an existent requirement the condition
that ~(p = > q). Adding the condition here is beneficial in that this is
the most fundamental of the definitions. The new definition is as
follows:
A requirement exists; (Ep) [p & ~ (p= > q) & pRq]-
We can easily see that accepting this definition prevents
Feldman’s argument from going through. The question is whether the
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definition should be accepted. I think not. If Feldman is right and
requirement can be based on logical entailment, then there are some of
these requirements. Since entailment, as we are now assuming, is a
basis of requirement and entailments abound, there must be some
entailment based requirements. Since the definition disallows the
existence of any entailment based requirements, I do not think we would
be wise to accept it. Even a defined concept should reflect what is
reasonable to believe about that which is being defined.
Of course we could simply add a condition excluding entailment
based requirements to one of the other definitions, such as the
definition of what ought to be or the definition of what ought to be
done. Doing this would not affect our understanding of when a
requirement exists, would not disallow the existence of requirements
based on logical entailment, but would block Feldman’s troubling
argument. Although simply patching up the definition in this way would
work, when possible it is preferable to have a better motive for adding a
condition than that it prevents a knock-down objection.
The second response to Feldman has to do with the arbitrariness
of understanding the primitive to exclude entailment as a basis for
requirements. It has its roots in Ross’s discussion of suitability,
fittingness and rightness. Remembe r
,
Ross says that we may only be
able to give a partial definition of moral rightness. He says this is due to
there being a suitability that is particular to rightness, one we can
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distinguish only by appealing to the concept of moral rightness. By his
remarks Ross indicates there there is more than one kind of suitability.
Suppose there is more than one kind of requirement. Could it not be
that the one Chisholm has in mind cannot be based on logical
requirement, while the requirement Feldman considers can?
This is just what I maintain. Chisholm and Feldman are
considering different kinds of requirement. Viewed in this way,
however, Chisholm’s proposal seems to have an unfortunate
consequence. It appears as though he is trying to clarify one concept by
use of another that is itself muddled and easily confused with similar
concepts. If our grasp of the notion of requirement is as muddled as
that of moral rightness, we have made little progress when we define the
latter by use of the former. Still, our judgment on this matter should not
be too hasty. We should be careful to recognize the difference between
closely related concepts and unclear concepts. Even when a number of
closely related concepts are expressed by one term we need not think
the concepts are unclear or exceedingly vague. Consider, for example,
the term "possibility". This term can be used to express a number of
different concepts, such as practical possibility and logical possibility.
Only after recognizing its ambiguity can we begin to get clear on each of
the individual concepts. The mere fact that the same term is used to
express a number of related concepts does not require that the
individual concepts be muddled.
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Given this, perhaps Ross had it wrong. If there is more than one
kind of suitability or requirement, perhaps we cannot give a definition
of requirement, but can distinguish them without an appeal to the
concept of moral rightness. If we can, then, perhaps, we can give a
definition of moral rightness using the appropriate concept of
requirement. Chisholm, I believe, is attempting to do exactly that. He
gives a definition of moral rightness using the concept of requirement, a
concept he has not defined, but has attempted to distinguish. An
important feature of the concept he uses is that it does not allow for
entailment based requirements.
As I mentioned earlier, in "Practical Reason" Chisholm clarifies
his view on requirement by offering a number of axioms concerning
requirement. One these, axiom A3, has it that if p Rq, then p and q "are
logically compatible with each other." Letting ’N' represent the
necessity operator, the actual axiom is this:
A3. pRq -> ~N[{p&q) does not obtain] 29
Let us also recall FI, Feldman’s principle concerning entailment and
requirement: (p) {q) (p = > q -> pRq).
Axiom A3 is incompatible with the principle upon which Feldman
relies. Here is why: Let p be (r & ~r). Since p is a contradiction it
entails everything, that is, it entails any particular q. Also, since it is a
contradiction it cannot obtain, so N[p does not obtain]. Finally, tor any
q, N [(p&q) does not obtain]. Using Chisholm’s A3 we can conclude
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~(pRq). On the other hand, because p entails q, Feldman’s principle
clearly allows us to get pRq.w The upshot of this is that either A3 or
Feldman’s principle can be accepted, but not both.
By considering the above argument we can see that the reason
Feldman’s principle conflicts with Chisholm’s axiom. If Feldman’s
principle, FI, is correct, it will also obtain among impossible states of
affairs as, in standard systems of logic, entailment holds between
impossible as well as possible states of affairs. Chisholm’s axiom, on
the other hand, excludes requirements from obtaining among
impossible states of affairs. In addition to the axiom, there is other
evidence for the view that Chisholm would deny that requirement can
hold between impossible states of affairs.
In his introduction of the primitive notion of requirement
Chisholm makes mention of a work by Wolfgang Kohler, The Place of
V alue in a W orld of Fact. 31 There Kohler takes requirement to be a
relationship between an object of a phenomenal experience and the
context which constitutes that experience. Notice that an object is
required only as part of an experience. Since we cannot have impossible
experiences, Kohler is committed to the view that requirement must
only involve possible states of affairs. 32 Although it would be rash to
attribute to Chisholm the view that every instance of requirement is
phenomenal, he, like Kohler, clearly accepts that every instance of
requirement must only involve possible states of affairs. Every example
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he gives involves possible experiences and, furthermore, in "The Ethics
of Requirement" Chisholm actually says that he will "interpret
requirement as a relation which may obtain among (actual or possible)
events or states of affairs ."33
There are two obvious counters to the preceding comments. The
first is to say that there is only one concept of requirement and that
Chisholm’s axioms and comments about it are suspect. The second is to
say that handling contradictions in any system of logic is a particularly
messy business, and that the core of Feldman’s principle is right: when
there is a strong logical connection between two possible states of
affairs, as there is when one entails the other, the requirement relation
holds between them. Let us start with the first counter.
Should the axiom be accepted? I believe it should. As I said, we
should not be too hasty in dismissing the possibility of there being more
than one related concept of requirement. I do not doubt that there is a
requirement based on entailment, but Chisholm has given us reason to
believe that it is different from the one he is discussing. One of the ways
to distinguish related primitive concepts is to offer axioms describing
the primitive. Chisholm has done this. Indeed, Chisholm has given a
coherent explication of a concept of requirement, one to which
Feldman’s principle does not apply and which can be distinguished
without appealing to the concept of moral rightness. Consequently, I
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am inclined to believe that, unless we modify FI, Feldman’s argument
fails.
A proponent of the second counter might offer a modified
principle concerning entailment and requirement; one modified to
apply only to possible states of affairs. Letting "M" be the possibility
operator, we can label this principle "F2":
F2. (p) (q) (( M(p & q) & (p = > q)) -> pRq).
Of course the argument that Feldman used would have to be a bit
more complicated to accommodate this change. For example, in
arguing that entailment based requirements override all others, we
could no longer merely appeal to the fact that for any p and q , if p
entails <7 , then (p & q) entail q. We would have to have another
principle of entailment based requirement overridings. The necessary
principle should look something like this:
F3. (p) (q) (r) ((M(p & q & r) & (p = > q))-> {p & r)Rq).
Using these principles, Feldman’s revised conclusion would have
to be that any logically possible state of affairs ought to be. As I see it,
however, once we acknowledge the need for such principles as these the
objection to Chisholm’s view loses much of its simplicity and appeal.
Feldman’s argument no longer rests simply on the nature of entailment,
but now requires us to accept far less intuitively constructed principles.
Indeed, such modifications to Feldman’s original objection may be
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thought to be ad hoc, much as is fiddling with the location of the
restriction on entailment based requirements.
There is at least one more interesting response to Feldman’s
argument. It also is effective, I believe. Although this response has its
roots in Chisholm s discussion of axiom A3, it strays from Chisholm’s
actual proposal more than the others. It should be considered in any
case because it brings out some interesting or even startling features of
Chisholm’s proposal.
Chisholm says of A3 that it "is reflected in the principle that
ought’ implies ’can’." 34 Let us call the principle to which Chisholm
refers the "Kantian" principle. If, as Chisholm suggests, the axiom is
reflected in the Kantian principle, then the medium used magnifies
reflections. As commonly understood, the Kantian principle is much
stronger than his axiom. The axiom asserts only that the states of affairs
in the requirement relation are logically possible; the ’can’ of the
Kantian principle is usually taken to express physical possibility, at the
very least. Indeed, it often is taken to express some concept of
possibility similar to what I earlier call "deontological possibility."
On first consideration it is surprising that an axiom supposedly
having some conceptual connection to the Kantian principle is not
stronger. On second consideration it is strange that Chisholm even
appeals to the Kantian principle when he does. The Kantian principle,
as I understand it, is an expression of a necessary condition for a person
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having a moral obligation. When stated as baldly as Chisholm states it
in the axiom, it seems to express a logical connection between the the
concepts of requirement and metaphysical possibility. This cannot be
right. The principle is really about persons and their powers; agency is a
central aspect of the principle. The requirement relation, on the other
hand, need not involve any persons. It is solely about states of affairs.
It may be that the states of affairs must involve possible experiences,
but they need not involve persons. Consequently, it is rather odd that
Chisholm appeals to this principle in justifying the acceptance of the
axiom. 35 Given that A3 is too weak to express the Kantian principle and
that something like the Kantian principle must be included in a moral
theory, why is there not a stronger axiom or principle somewhere?
Chisholm comes closest to offering a full-blown version of the
Kantian principle in "Practical Reason." There he offers a definition
concerning the nullification of requirements. The definition is offered
in response to an objection raised by J. Raz while commenting on
Chisholm’s proposal in "Practical Reason." 36
Raz’s objection arises from consideration of the following
hypothetical situation; He promises John that he will make a gift of his
dog to John on July 1, but the dog dies before July 1. Surely, as Raz
concludes, he is no longer required to keep the promise, as it is no
longer possible to do so. Is the requirement overridden? We might be
tempted to say that the conjunction of the state of affairs of promising
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the dog to John and the state of affairs of the dog being dead do not
require keeping the promise. Handling things this way, however, blurs
an important distinction between ways that a requirement can cease to
exist. Generally when a requirement is overridden we would want to
claim that it is because there is some other requirement that is
stronger
. In the situation described by Raz, this need not be true.
Instead, the requirement has been cancelled or nullified. According to
Chisholm, a requirement is nullified when the state of affairs that is
required becomes physically impossible. His definition of requirement
nullification is this:
DIO The requirement for q, that is imposed by p, is nullified at t
by s =DF (i) pR<p (ii) j occurs at t
,
and (iii) it is physically
impossible that, if s occur at t
,
then q occur at t or after t. 37
The limiting case of this definition is when q has always been
physically impossible. In such a case any s will do, including eternal
states of affairs such as the one expressed by "2 + 2 = 4". This is why this
principle has some resemblance to the Kantian principle. No state of
affairs ought to be that is physically impossible.
I would like to consider the relationship between Chisholm’s
proposal, this principle of nullification, the Kantian principle and
Feldman’s argument. First, I would like to point out that if we accept
DIO, then F2 and F3 are not adequate for Feldman’s argument.
Remember, his revised conclusion would be that every logically possible
state of affairs ought to be. Consider an arbitrary state of affairs that is
137
logically possible, but not physically possible, say p. Since p entails
itself, according to F3 it is non-overridable. However, according to DIO
it is nullified. Consequently, we have an entire class of states of affairs
that satisfy F2 and F3, but are not states of affairs that ought to be. To
make Feldman’s argument work, we now would have to further weaken
F2 and F3, or introduce some new principle restricting the application
of his argument to physically possible states of affairs. Either strategy
would take us even further away from the plausibility of his first
proposal.
I believe there are even deeper problems with Feldman’s
argument. I would like to consider them by concentrating on the
inference p -> Op. Remember, for this inference to go through three
things must be true: p occurs, p requires p and p conjoined with any
other state of affairs requires p. For the moment suppose that we
accept the modified version of Feldman's principle, F2, and the
concomitant principle F3. Since by hypothesis p occurs, it is logically
possible that it occur and, according to the two principles and the
definition of ought to be, it ought to be.
The question I want to raise about the argument is this: Should it
be possible that an occurrent state of affairs ought to be? I will argue
that it should not be possible. For example, if 1 have returned a book
that I have promised to return, it no longer ought to be that I return the
book. I do not discount that some occurrent states of affairs seem as
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though they ought to be. States of affairs that occur over an extended
period of time both seem to be occurrent and seem as though they ought
to be. Indeed, some promises are just like this. If a married couple
makes a mutual promise of sexual fidelity, it can be occurrent that they
are not having extramarital affairs and it ought to be that they are not
having affairs. Although I am not certain how this should be handled, I
am inclined to believe that it can be understood as a time relativised
series of states of affairs that ought to be. Considering the case of
extramarital affairs, it ought to be that they do not have an affair at 1
pm, it ought to be that they do not have an affair at 2 pm, etc.
If my argument is accepted, then Feldman’s argument does not
work, whether or not there are entailment based requirements.
Remember, his argument relies on the thesis that an occurrent state of
affairs non-overridably requires itself and, hence, ought to be. If it is
not possible that an occurrent state of affairs ought to be, then his
conclusion is blocked. I will argue for this conclusion because it seems
incompatible with my understanding of the Kantian principle that
someone can be obligated to bring about a state of affairs that has
already occurred, and, consequently, that it ought to be that a person
bring about an occurrent state of affairs. Since the above principle,
DIO, is the closest Chisholm comes to the Kantian principle, we should
first see what the principle has to say about occurrent states of affairs.
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Reflecting but little, it should be perfectly obvious that DIO does
not preclude occurrent states of affairs from being required. The test
case for this is where 5 is the same state of affairs as q , that is, one in
which the required state of affairs is the same state of affairs that is
supposed to become physically impossible. Let 5 and q be the state of
affairs of giving John the dog. Making the appropriate substitutions we
find it is decidedly not physically impossible that if q occurs at f, then q
occurs at t or after t. In fact, it is physically necessary that if q occurs at
t, then q occurs at t or after t. If we give the dog to John at t it is
physically possible to give the dog to John at t or after t. Consequently,
according to the above definition, that a state of affairs occurs does not
nullify the requirement that it occur.
Although DIO is of no immediate use to my argument,
considering it leads to the conclusion that since the world changes, we
need normative concepts that reflect those changes. When a promise is
made and kept, for example, what we are required or obligated to do
changes no less than when it becomes physically impossible to keep that
promise. I would now like to investigate how a theory like Chisholm's
could incorporate this conclusion.
In Doing the Best We Can Feldman not only criticizes various
theories, as he does with Chisholm’s, but he also presents his own very
interesting positive theory. One of the things he considers when
presenting his positive theory is whether we can be obligated to bring
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about occurrent states of affairs. It is most informative to examine what
he has to say, but doing so requires some background information. This
background information also will be handy when I turn to Feldman’s
third main objection.
Feldman’s normative and meta-ethical theories are quite
different from Ross’s and Chisholm’s. Feldman is a utilitarian of sorts
who takes moral obligation to be a relationship between a person, state
of affairs and possible world. Roughly, his view is that a person is
morally obligated to see to the occurrence of a state of affairs just in
case it occurs in the best world accessible to the person . 38 It is the
concept of accessibility on which I wish to focus, while assuming that the
concept of a possible world is familiar, if not unproblematic.
Accessibility is a primitive concept for Feldman. He says that he
uses "’accessible’ to express a relation that holds among a person, a
time, and two possible worlds..." and that "[rjoughly, a world is
accessible to a person at a time if and only if it is still possible, at that
time, for the person to see to it that the world occurs, or is actual ."39
A world may be accessible to one person, but not another. Let us
say that it is possible that I have green beans with my dinner and it is
possible that I have corn with my dinner. The world where I have green
beans with my dinner is accessible to me, as is the world "'here I have
corn. Suppose there is no way for me to influence my neighbor’s choice
of dinner vegetable: he will have corn with his dinner. He could have
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beans, he has some in, but he will not. A world is accessible to my
neighbor where he has green beans with his dinner, but since I cannot
influence his decision, there is no world accessible to me where my
neighbor has green beans for dinner.
One of the concepts that Feldman defines by using the primitive
concept of accessibility is that of unalterability. Roughly, a state of
affairs is unalterable for a person when it occurs at every possible world
accessible to the person. Since unalterable states of affairs occur at all
the best worlds accessible to a person, indeed they occur at all the
worlds accessible to a person, a person is morally obligated to bring
about every such state of affairs.
A consequence of Feldman’s view is that, except for some "future
infected" past states of affairs, if a state of affairs has occurred or there
is nothing a person can do about it occurring, then it is morally
obligatory for the person to see to it . 40 A couple of examples are in
order. Suppose that I promised to return a book to my brother at half
past noon yesterday, but I did not keep my promise. Suppose also that
at noon yesterday I could still keep my promise and was morally
obligated to do so. Since my not returning the book is now unalterable
for me, I am now obligated to not to return it yesterday at half past
noon. Another example: tomorrow the sun will rre and there is nothing
I can do about it. The sun’s rising is unalterable for me. Hence, I am
morally obligated to see to its occurrence.
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Feldman realizes that some persons may find the view that we can
be obligated to bring about unalterable states of affairs troublesome.
He mentions something like the Kantian principle and suggests that it is
sometimes taken to imply that it is possible for a person not to do what
the person is obligated to do. To head off any objections based on this
view of the Kantian principle, Feldman discusses a possible
modification of his definition of moral obligation. According to this
definition, a person is morally obligated to bring about a state of affairs
just in case it occurs in the best worlds accessible to the person and does
not occur at some world accessible to the person. At one place he
characterized such a state of affairs, one that both occurs in some
accessible world and does not occur in another, as open.
Although there are many important differences between
Feldman’s view that a person is obligated to see to all unalterable states




-> Op), there is an interesting
connection: many unalterable states of affairs are unalterable just
because they have occurred. Consequently, his suggestion about how to
modify his view to to exclude the possibility of anyone being obligated
to bring about unalterable states of affairs is profitably considered in
deciding how to block the troublesome inference in his argument. Just
as he modifies the definition of moral ob’igation so that only open
states of affairs satisfy it, we would do well to alter the definition of a
state of affairs that ought to be in such a way that occurrent states of
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affairs do not satisfy it. Altering the definition in this way will result in
a somewhat improved view, one avoiding some of the difficulties
mentioned by Feldman.
Let us say that a state of affairs is undetermined if it has not
occurred, but it is physically possible that it occur and it is physically
possible that it not occur. For any state of affairs, p, we will represent
this as "Up". We can now offer the following revised definition.
Oq * for: (Ep) [(p& pRq) & ~(E s) (s & ~((p&s)Rq) & U q]
We can now see how to block the argument relying on
modifications of Feldman’s principles. According to the modified
principle, F2, each logically possible state of affairs, even an occurrent
one, non-overridably requires itself, but an occurrent states of affairs
does not satisfy Oq *. Furthermore, it would not do to further restrict
F2 to only non-occurrent states of affairs, as states of affairs that ought
to be are only generated by occurrent states of affairs.
To sum up: I suggested that the concept of requirement Chisholm
is considering is different from the concept Feldman used. Feldman’s
concept allows for entailment based requirement, while Chisholm's
does not. Chisholm has explicated the concept he has in mind
sufficiently to distinguish it from Feldman’s. Therefore, the argument
that Feldman produces does not apply to Chisholm's proposal. In
addition, a proper expression of the Kantian principle requires
something stronger than A3. I have suggested that we alter the
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definition of a state of affairs that ought to be in order to better reflect
the Kantian principle. If we do this, Feldman’s argument fails, whether
or not we accept Feldman s claim about entailment based requirements.
The Definition Objection
Chisholm proposes that the concept of what a person ought to do
can be defined using the concepts of what ought to be and of a person
bringing about a state of affairs. That a person ought to do something
means that it ought to be that the person bring it about. Feldman
rejects this proposal. He attempts to show that the definiendum and
definien are not even equivalent.
Feldman first considers whether that someone ought to do
something implies that it ought to be that the person bring it about. In
rejecting this implication Feldman presents a hypothetical situation
where there will be some civil strife in a foreign country, the citizens
there can bring it about that the strife is avoided but will not and he,
Feldman, cannot bring it about that the strife will be avoided. He
argues that he has a moral obligation to contribute to a relief fund for
the innocent victims of the strife because he does so in the best worlds
available to him. However, it is not the case that it ought be that he
contributes because it ought not be that the strife occurs.
Consequently, he ought to contribute but it is not true that it ought to be
that he contributes, so the implication fails.
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In rejecting the implication that if it ought to be that a person do
something, then that person ought to do it, Feldman considers the
following situation: If there is a thunderstorm tomorrow, a good
number of crops are going to be damaged. The thunderstorm will occur
tomorrow and there is nothing anyone can do about it. Feldman claims
that "it ought to be that we work in our fields during tomorrow's fine
weather, but it is not the case that that work is something that we ought
to do (because no world in which the weather is fine is accessible to
us). "41
What is the principle upon which Feldman relies in concluding
that it ought not be that he gives to the relief fund because it ought not
be that the civil strife occur? The principle seems to be something like
this: If a state of affairs ought not be, then it ought not be that, prior to
its occurrence, we take steps to mitigate its occurrences.42 If I
understand this principle correctly, not only should it not be that
Feldman gives to relief fund, but, also, it ought not be that there is a
relief fund and it ought not be that there are organizations to deal with
the victims of merely potential civil strife. In addition to finding the
results of applying this principle unintuitive, I also believe that the
principle is false.
Let us rssume that the civil strife of Feldman’s example does not
occur in the best of accessible words.43 In all accessible worlds,
however, there have been numerous occurrences of civil strife and there
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may be something to the adage "better safe than sorry." Indeed, a world
where the history of the actual world is taken into account by preparing
for states of affairs that ought not be is, I maintain, better than one
where such preparation does not take place, even if the state of affairs
that ought not be do not occur. Aristotle thought that living according
to a plan in accordance with virtue is the highest good for persons.
Whether or not Aristotle was right about this, the expression of the
ability to plan and have projects seems to be intrinsically good. This
ability is expressed to different degrees, both by individuals and groups,
and the past must be taken into account in order for it to be expressed to
a very high degree. Consequently, I believe the principle fails. It ought
not be that the strife occurs, but it ought to be that we prepare for it,
perhaps even to the point of giving aid before it occurs.
A more general point can be made about Feldman’s argument.
Although he concludes that Chisholm’s proposal should be rejected, he
also points out that his arguments make use of a theory of moral
obligation that Chisholm did not accept when presenting his proposal.
Feldman then concludes "it is not clear that the examples I have
introduced would have much impact upon his thesis, if that thesis is
understood in the way he intended ."44 Let us more closely examine why
Feldman may need to add this caveat.
We should begin by realizing that Feldman is considering a
concept of ought to be different from Chisholm’s. Roughly, for
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Feldman a state of affairs ought to be just in case it occurs in the best
worlds that are physically possible
.
45 For Chisholm, on the other hand,
what ought to be is always based on some occurrent state of affairs.
Remember, a state of affairs ought to be if there is a non-overridden
requirement for it. Notice the difference in emphasis here. Feldman’s
view is concerned mostly with what can happen, while what has
happened is central in Chisholm’s account
.
46 To put a very rough gloss
on their views, they answer different questions. Chisholm’s answers this
question: Given the way the world is, what ought to be? While Feldman
answers another: Given the way the world can be, what ought to be? It
is no surprise that they give different answers.
The situation Feldman describes is supposed to provide a good
test case for Chisholm’s theory, against which it fails. To be a good test
case we have to have good reason to accept the conclusions about the
situation that he wants us to accept. In the case at hand, we have to have
good reason to accept that Feldman ought to contribute and it ought not
be that he contribute. One good reason for accepting them would be
that they are a consequence of Chisholm’s theory. Alternatively, there
could be good independent reasons for accepting them. For example, if
Chisholm’s theory has it that Op and Oq we could accept the conclusion
that O(p&q) based on our general views about obligation.
It is apparent that the conclusions Feldman wants us to accept are
not a consequence of Chisholm’s theory and, consequently, his "thesis is
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not understood in the way he intended." Are there good independent
reasons for accepting them? Neither conclusion is obviously true, nor
do they seem to follow from any general ethical views. In fact, Feldman
argues for them by appealing to his theory. Accepting his argument for
the first conclusion requires accepting his view about when a state of
affairs is unalterable or inevitable for a person and his view on the
relationship between such inevitability and moral obligation, views,
which I dare say, are not uncontroversial. Indeed, even though I
believe there can be an obligation to give at a time when the
unfortunate state of affairs requiring the giving has not yet come to
pass, it seems reasonable to believe otherwise. The case is a hard one to
decide. Accepting his argument for the second conclusion requires
accepting a principle that I have already argued against accepting.
Consequently, I do not believe that Feldman has provided a good test
case.
Now let us examine the weather example. Feldman proposes it as
a counter-example to the implication that if it ought to be that we bring
about a state of affairs then we ought to bring it about. In this example
Feldman maintains that it ought to be that we bring it about that we
work in the fields in fine weather, while we are not obligated to bring it
about that we work in the fields in fine weather. It ought to be that we
bring it about that we work in the fields in fine weather because in the
best of the physically possible worlds we do work in the fields in fine
weather, while we are not obligated to bring it about that we work in the
fields because none of the worlds where the weather is fine are
accessible to us.
Just as in the civil strife example, we have to decide whether we
have good reason to accept the conclusions about the situation that
Feldman wants us to to accept. It seems obviously true that we cannot
be obligated to bring about fine weather, because it is not in our power
to do so. So we have good reason to accept that conclusion. What about
the conclusion that it ought to be that we bring it about that we work in
the fields in fine weather? Feldman argues for the conclusion by
appealing to his theory, which I have suggested does not make for a
good test case. I, instead, will try to determine whether or not we could
come to the same conclusion by appealing to Chisholm’s theory.
According to Chisholm’s unmodified definition of a state of
affairs that ought to be, it can turn out that it ought to be that a person
bring it about that he work in the fields in fine weather, even if the
person can do nothing about the weather. Let us say that there is only
one more day during which the crops can be harvested, there must be
good weather for the harvest and many lives depend on the crops. Let
us also say that these states of affairs found a non-overridden
requirement that a person bring it about that he work in the fields in
fine weather. This requirement seems to satisfy Chisholm’s
150
instantiation of the Kantian principle, axiom A3. It is logically possible
that there is fine weather and that the person work in the fields.
Is the requirement generating the state of affairs that ought to be
nullified? This is harder to decide. It depends on whether it is
physically possible that a person bring it about that he works in the
fields in fine weather. Since it is physically possible that there be fine
weather and it is physically possible that a person bring it about that he
works in the fields, it seems that the requirement is not nullified. We,
therefore, must conclude that Feldman's objection is good against
Chisholm’s unmodified view.
Even my modification of Chisholm’s theory, using the notion of
an undetermined state of affairs, does not help. It too is presented in
terms of physical possibility, and it is both physically possible to work in
the fields in fine weather and physically possible to not work in the
fields in fine weather. The troubling part about this is trying to decide
what conclusion we should reach.
We could simply admit that Feldman’s objection is a good one
and let it go at that. I would rather see if there is some way to revise
Chisholm’s proposal, while retaining his central theses. My first
inclination to say that my definition of an undetermined state of affairs
is no good. I take it to be a reflection of the Kantian principle, and as
such it has obvious difficulties. When I first mentioned the Kantian
principle, I suggested that the possibility it involves is usually taken to
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be stronger than physical possibility, something like my notion of
deontic possibility. Following my first inclination I would modify the
definition of an undetermined state of affairs using the notion of
deontic possibility. Using this altered definition, it would not turn out
that tomorrow's weather is undetermined.
On second consideration this tactic becomes untenable.
Chisholm’s most fundamental normative concept is that of requirement.
Requirements hold between possible states of affairs. As I pointed out
earlier, it is surprising that Chisholm appeals to the Kantian principle
in discussing axiom A3 because the axiom applies to requirements that
do not involve persons and it is persons’ powers that are at the heart of
the the Kantian principle. My concept of an undermined state of affairs
is used to restrict the definition of a state of affairs that ought to be to
non-occurrent, physically possible states of affairs. These states of
affairs need not involve persons or their actions. How, then, could 1
justify strengthening the concept of an undetermined state of affairs to
exclude things not in persons’ power when it encompasses states of
affairs that do not involve persons? According to the definition,
tomorrow’s weather is undetermined and this is the correct result. It
would be a mistake to change the definition so that it has the weather as
determined because it is not in any person’s power to change it.
My conclusion is that Chisholm’s theory is inadequate. It is
inadequate because it proposes that states of affairs that persons ought
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to bring about are a special case of states of affairs that ought to be.
Such a proposal must lack a principle that both adequately reflects the
Kantian principle and applies only to those states of affairs that persons
ought to bring about. It is the lack of such a principle that Feldman
exploits in making his successful argument. The first hint of trouble is
found when we find Chisholm talking about the Kantian principle in his
discussion of A3. A3 is much too weak, my definition of an
undetermined state of affairs is still too weak and the idea that it is
about states of affairs and not persons is wrong. Given this, there is no
way to have a principle of the right strength at the right place.
Conclusion
Chisholm proposes that we can define most, if not all, interesting
normative concepts using the primitive of one state of affairs requiring
another. Included in the normative concepts he defines are the Rossian
concepts of a prima facie obligation, a state of affairs being overridden
and a state of affairs that ought to be. Chisholm then proposes that a
person being morally obligated to do something means that it ought to
be that the person brings it about.
Feldman levels three objections against this proposal. He says
that it has as a consequence that there are more prima facie obligations
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than Ross would allow, that a state of affairs ought to be just in case it
occurs and that it is a mistake to equate a person’s moral obligation
with what it ought to be that the person bring about. I show that there
are plausible answers to Feldman’s first two objections, but conclude
that his third objection is good. The reason that Feldman’s third
objection is good is of great interest. Chisholm takes a person's actions
to be a special case of a state of affairs occurring. When doing this, it is
not possible to offer a theory that is consistent with my constraint, C3,
or what is commonly known as the Kantian principle.
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I have proposed that a theory consistent with ordinary moral
reasoning must satisfy certain conditions (Cl - C5). In order to satisfy
these conditions it must be compatible both with the view that we
sometimes know what we are obligated to do and and with the view that
there are methods that persons can use to ascertain some of their
obligations (C3 and C4 respectively). In his article "Act-Utilitarianism:
Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making
Procedure?" (hereafter "Act-Utilitarianism") Eugene Bales argues that
it is a mistake to base a criticism of an ethical theory on the theory’s
inadequacy as a method for ascertaining our obligations. He also
suggests that, despite a true theory’s inadequacy as a decision-making
procedure, it might be possible for us to know what we are obligated to
do. 1 If he is correct about this, then it might be possible for a theory to
satisfy C3, yet not be a means for ascertaining our obligations.
In this chapter I will consider Bales’s argument, the relevance of
his argument to C3 and C4, Ross’s views on ethical knowledge and
whether Ross’s views satisfy constraints C3 and C4. I will argue that
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when it is impossible to use an ethical theory as a decision-making
procedure, then that theory cannot satisfy C3. I will also argue that if
we accept the most reasonable version of Ross’s meta-ethical theory, it
is impossible to use Ross’s theory as decision making theory.
Bale’s Argument
Bales focuses his attention on objections leveled against act-
utilitarianism. Since the objections have been leveled against different
formulations of act-utilitarianism and he does not want his counter
argument to commit him to any particular full-blown formulation, he
says that he will understand act-utilitarianism as "that normative
doctrine which maintains that a particular act (as opposed to a type of
act or a class of acts) is right if and only if its utility— that is, its
contribution toward intrinsically good states of affairs—is no less than
that of some alternative." 2
Since Ross is obviously not an utilitarian, it might be concluded
that focusing on arguments against act-utilitarianism will have us
considering a subject totally unrelated to Ross’s view. Such a
conclusion would be error ?ous. Ross takes some of the prima facie
duties to be utilitarian in nature. He says, for example, that we have
duties of beneficence, duties resting on the fact that we can make the
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world better for others and that we have a prima facie to bring about
good things. Any problems involved in using an act-utilitarian theory in
ascertaining what we ought to do in a particular situation would be
found in trying to ascertain the stringency of a prima facie duty to
make the world betterfor others or a prima f acie duty to bring about
good things.
The objection that Bales considers is based on the following
feature of act-utilitarian theories: They are difficult, if not impossible,
to use in ascertaining what we are obligated to do in any particular
situation. Act-utilitarian theories are, in short, impractical. This
impracticality is supposed to have disastrous consequences. Among the
consequences mentioned by Bales are that it may be self-defeating to
use the theory in trying to decide what to do and that using the theory
may lead to a vicious regress. Using the theory may be self-defeating
because it may take so long to calculate the utility of all of a person’s
alternatives that the time for action has long passed. A vicious regress
may develop when using utilitarian standards in deciding whether to use
utilitarian standards in deciding what to do. Before we consider these
consequences, let us see why act-utilitarianism is supposed to be so
impractical.
Let me begi "1 by considering what we would need to know if we to
be successful in using act-utilitarianism, as characterized by Bales, in an
attempt to figure out what we are obligated to do. It seems that at the
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very least we would have to know all of our alternatives, the
consequences of all of our alternatives and the utility of all of our
alternatives. Ascertaining any of these poses serious problems,
ascertaining all of them seems near to impossible.
At any time we have a vast number of alternative actions we can
perform, most of them trivial. For example, right now I could raise my
left arm an inch, a couple of inches, a foot or two feet. I could do
similar things with my left leg. Indeed, I believe I could manage a large
number of combinations of arm and leg movements
.
3 As difficult as it is
to ascertain all of our alternatives, it is at least as difficult to ascertain
all of the consequences of any one of these alternatives; we would have
to know all of its effects, both direct and indirect.
I am particularly aware of the difficulty in ascertaining the effects
of my actions when I discuss a philosophical problem in the classroom. I
have some small difficulty in ascertaining the effects the discussion will
have on how students will answer questions on examinations, let alone
what the long term effects will be of the discussion. I merely hope that
one indirect effect will be that students gain an appreciation for
reasoned arguments and that they will, on occasion, give reasoned
arguments for their own views.
It r also quite difficult to ascertain the intrinsic value of any of
the alternatives I have at one time. If a man runs out in front of my car,
I would assume that it would be better to swerve and avoid running him
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down. I do not know that it would be better, because I do not know what
he is going to do in the future. It may be that his continued existence is
a bad thing. He may, for instance, be the only carrier of an unknown
incurable disease. Given the above considerations, it is reasonable to
conclude that act-utilitarianism is an impractical guide to action
.
4
Bales does not dispute this; he accepts that act-utilitarianism is
an impractical guide to action. He is not, however, immediately willing
to accept that its impracticality provides an effective objection to the
theory. Before we can decide this, he says, we first have to decide what
we are expecting the theory to do. If it is supposed to be a guide to
action, then we should reject it as an inadequate theory. If it is not
supposed to be a guide to action, then that it fails to be an adequate one
provides little reason to reject it. If it is not a guide to action, what is it
supposed to be?
According to Bales, we might expect the purpose of an ethical
theory to to be to provide any of the following; a guide to action; an
account of the characteristics which are had by all and only right
actions; an account of the considered moral judgements of informed,
mature persons in their disinterested, reflective moments; an account of
the moral reasoning of ordinary persons; an account of the moral
coinions of ordinary persons; or an analysis of the language of moral
discourse. In order to decide which of these best describes the purpose
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of act-utilitarianism we have to consider the intentions of those who
offer act-utilitarian theories.
Clearly, different persons may have different purposes. Bales
says that he is not "in a position to legislate for anyone what he ought to
take the purpose of act-utilitarianism to be, or what he ought to expect
of act-utilitarianism ." 5 He does say, however, that "there are good
reasons for believing that no ethical theory can fulfill all these
expectations in one breath ...."6 He goes on to suggest that some
conjunction of theories may satisfy all of these purposes. Although he
does not believe he can legislate how we should understand act-
utilitarianism, he does have a preferred way to understand it. Bales
contends that act-utilitarianism is best understood as a theory about
right-making characteristics, not as a decision-making guide.
If we understand act-utilitarianism as a theory about right-
making characteristics and realize the above objections are founded on
understanding it as a decision-making guide then Bales "cannot see that
they are even relevant to the question of whether act-utilitarianism, as
it is usually formulated, is true ."7 Consequently, all of the impracticality
arguments are defeated before they can even get out of the starting
blocks.
Before evaluating his argument, let us investigate the
relationship between a decision-making guide for ethics and a theory
about right making characteristics.
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Dfi.cisk>n-Mqking Guides and Right-Making Chararterktin
A good place to start with an investigation of the relationship
between the two kinds of theories is with Bales. He says the following:
Although the act-utilitarian’s account of right-making
characteristics places no a priori limitations on the
decision-making procedures he adopts, there is a sense in
which his account does dictate his procedures. His account
dictates his procedures insofar as, but only insofar as, the
procedures are or are not reliable methods for singling out,
under immediately helpful descriptions, which of the acts
open to him at a given time would maximize utility . 8
As possible decision-making methods. Bales mentions rules of
thumb, J.J. Smart’s suggestion that we roll dice or use techniques from
game theory, G. E. Moore’s suggestion that we should follow rules and
D. Gauthier’s suggestion that we should cut a deck of cards. The
difficulty, and Bales sees this, is in deciding whether a decision-making
guide is any good. Although making this decision is difficult. Bales
holds out some small hope. Of someone facing an ethical decision,
Bales says the following:
I do have a word of advice for him, however: look and see
what kind of procedure has tended to work in given kinds of
situations. If he doesn’t have a foolproof procedure for
ascertaining in each and every case which of the acts open
to him would maximize utility, at least he can look to those
procedures which have tended to be reliable in the past,
and he can look to strategists for reliable procedures to use
in the future . 9
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Implicit in Bales s claim that some decision-making procedures
have proven reliable in the past is the claim that we sometimes know
what we are obligated to do. Although he is never perfectly clear about
this, he seems to want to have it both ways. He seems to assume that we
sometimes know what we are obligated to do, while denying that a
theory need be a good decision-making procedure.
By examining Bale’s discussion and reflecting upon decision-
making procedures, we find that there are two features that determine
the worth of a decision-making procedure: the ease with which it is used
and the proportion of its results that are the correct ones. The ease with
which a decision-making procedure is used is its practicality: the easier
it is to use, the greater its practicality. Following Bales’ lead, let us say
that the proportion of results that are correct ascertains a procedure’s
reliability: the higher the proportion, the greater its reliability. Let us
also say that the quality of a decision-making procedure is a function of
its practicality and reliability. Given that this characterization of the
worth of decision-making procedures is reasonable, how do we decide if
one is of high quality?
A first step in deciding upon the quality of a decision-making
procedure would be to ascertain its reliability. How do we do this? We
either have to see by its structure that the decision-making procedure is
highly reliable, or we have to compare its results against one that we
know is highly reliable. The distinction between these two ways of
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ascertaining the reliability of an decision-making procedure is best
illustrated by considering some examples. In an election counting the
votes each candidate receives determines the winner of the election. A
high quality decision-making procedure for ascertaining the results of
an election is to wait for the election committee to announce the
results. We can see this by considering its structure. Exit polling is
another decision-making procedure for ascertaining the winner of an
election. The reliability of a poll, however, can only be ascertained by
comparing the outcome of the poll to the election committee’s
announcement
.
10 In medicine what counts as having diabetes is having a
certain level of sugar in the blood. We can tell by its structure that the
testing a sample of blood is highly reliable in ascertaining this
.
11 There
are various urine tests for diabetes whose reliability is decided by
comparing the results of the urine test to blood tests.
What about ascertaining the practicality of a decision-making
procedure? Of course, the most obvious way of ascertaining a
procedure’s practicality is by trying it out. This is not always possible,
however. Sometimes we reflect on a procedure’s structure, hoping that
our practical experience will allow us to ascertain its practicality.
Sometimes these two methods are combined. This happens when we can
only try out the parts of a complicated procedure and have to assume
that if the parts of the procedure are practical, then the whole
procedure is practical. Some decision-making procedures are obviously
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complicated and expensive, taking a lot of specialized knowledge and
equipment. For example, it would be difficult for me to ascertain the
exact contents of my tap water because there are so many substances
that might be in it and I would have to test for the presence of each one,
requiring a very complete lab and knowledge of how to do the tests, both
of which I lack. Some procedures are simple. The walk-a-straight-line
test for sobriety is very easy to administer, requiring no equipment or
specialized knowledge.
Unfortunately, in many important matters there seems to be an
inverse relationship between the reliability and practicality of a
decision-making procedure. If the procedure is easy to use, it is not very
reliable; if it is very reliable, it is difficult to use. Usually a trade-off is
required. If speed or economy is of the essence, practicality is of most
importance; if not, then reliability is the focus. Reporters want the
results of an election quickly, so they use polls. Using these polls is
quicker than waiting for the votes to be counted but, as we have recently
discovered, are not as reliable as pollsters advertise. Candidates, not
being in such a hurry, often wait for the announcements of election
commissions.
What about decision-making procedures in ethics? Assume act-
utilitarianism provides a true account of the right-making
characteristics of acts. Considered as a decision-making procedure, we
can see by its structure that it is of the very highest reliability possible.
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It would always provide the correct answer because it also determines
the results. It is, however, a decision-making procedure of the very
lowest practicality. It is practically impossible to use it and that is as
impractical as a decision-making procedure ever gets.
It is important to notice that I am not merely claiming that act-
utilitarianism is hard to use as a decision-making procedure and,
consequently, that it is has relatively low practicality. I am claiming
that it is practically impossible to use, that it does not even get off the
ground as a decision-making procedure. When G. E. Moore considered
act-utilitarianism as a decision-making procedure, he came to the
conclusion that we could never know what we are obligated to do. He
says:
In order to shew that any action is a duty it is necessary to
know both what are the other conditions, which will,
conjointly with it, determine its effects; to know all the
events which will be in any way affect by our action
throughout an infinite future. . . . Accordingly it follows
that we never have any reason to suppose that an action is
our duty: we can never be sure that any action will produce
the greatest value possible . 12
One final point about the practical impossibility of using act-
utilitarianism as a decision making procedure. It may be suggested that
the test case for deciding whether act-utilitarianism is practically
impossible to use as a decision-making procedure is the limiting case:
the case where there is only one act that is possible to perform . 13 Since,
for example, we sometimes know we can do only one thing, or, perhaps,
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we can do nothing at all, we sometimes know what we ought to do. As I
see it, however, this is not a good test case. Testing for the practicality
of a decision-making procedure should involve a decision. Also, when
there is only one possible action, any theory that satisfies Cl will be
usable as a decision-making procedure . 14 A decision about the degree
to which a theory is practical should rest on the distinguishing features
of that theory. So the decision about the degree to which act-
utilitarianism is practical should rest on whether we can figure out the
values of alternatives. Consequently, the proper test case for act-
utilitarianism would be one that requires that the values of alternatives
be ascertained, a case where there is more than one alternative.
Bale's Argument Revisited
Let us now reconsider the claim that it is not a good objection to a
theory about the right-making characteristics of acts that the theory is
not a good decision-making procedure. When a theory is not a good
decision-making procedure this means that it is not of very high quality.
There are a number of reasons why this could be so. It could be that the
decision-making procedure is not of very high reliability, that it is not of
very high practicality or that it lacks something in each of these areas.
Since it would be a knock down objection to the theory that it was not
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perfectly reliable as a decision-making procedure, the interesting case
is where the theory is not very practical as a decision-making procedure.
I believe that we should grant that it is not always a good
objection against an ethical theory that it is not a highly practical
decision-making procedure. What should we say, however, when it is of
the lowest possible practicality? When it is practically impossible to use
the theory as a decision-making procedure? My conclusion is that if we
accept C3 and C4, then, act-utilitarianism’s having the lowest possible
practicality is a good objection against it. 15 The quality of a decision-
making procedure can be determined by its practicality; if it is of very
low practicality, then it must be a low quality decision-making
procedure. Since act-utilitarianism is practically impossible to use as a
decision-making procedure, I conclude that, if it were true, it would be
practically impossible that there be a high quality decision-making
procedure for ethics. Consequently, if act-utilitarianism is true and we
are faced with alternatives, then we cannot know what we are obligated
to do.
As further support for my conclusion, consider the following
argument: (i) If act-utilitarianism is true and we sometimes know what
alternative we are obligated to do. then either act-utilitarianism is a
hi gh quality decision-making procedure or there is another high qur Uli;
decision-making procedure, call it "D" . If act-utilitarianism is true and
we know of some act that it is morally right, then we have to have some
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good reason to believe that that act satisfies act-utilitarianism. How we
get that evidence constitutes a decision-making procedure, (ii) It is not
Sfl .lhat act-utilitarianism is a h i g h quality decision-making procedure
Since it has the lowest possible practicality, it cannot be a high quality
decision-making procedure, (iii) If D is a high quality decision-making
procedure, then it has to be highly reliable. A high quality decision-
making procedure has to come up with the correct results, (iv) If D is
highly reliable, then there must be some decision-making procedure-
other tha n act-utilitarianism, whose results are compared to the results
gotten by using act-utilitarianism as a decision-making procedure.
Unless there are independent reasons for believing a decision-making
procedure comes up with the correct results, it must be compared,
directly or indirectly, with a decision-making procedure that determines
the results. If act-utilitarianism is true, then act-utilitarianism is the
only decision-making procedure that determines the results. Also,
there is no independent reason for believing that any other decision-
making procedure comes up with the correct results. (v) If act-
utilitarianism is practically impossible to use as a decision-ma king
procedure, then there cannot be another decision-making procedure
such as D. whose results are compared to the results gotten bv using act-
utilitarianism as a decision-making procedur e. If we canrot use act-
utilitarianism as a decision-making procedure, then we cannot compare
its results to those of another decision-making procedure, (vi) A^L
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Utilitarianism is practically impossible to use as a decision-making
procedure, I argued for this above. The conclusion is that it is not so
that both act-utilitarianism is true and we sometimes know what
alternative we are obligated to do.
Further comments about premise (iv) are in order. Let us assume
that there is an easily discernible property had by all and only right acts.
Let us also assume that the relationship between an act having this
property and its being morally right is purely accidental; there is no
necessary connection between this property and moral rightness. Call
this property the mark of the morally right. Would it be a good
decision-making procedure to look for this mark when trying to decide
whether an act is right? Only if there is good reason to believe that the
property is a mark of right acts. Until then it is only a potentially high
quality decision-making procedure. The upshot of this is that for a
decision-making procedure to be highly reliable we must know it usually
comes up with the correct results; it will not do for it to merely come up
with the correct results.
The major problem is that in ascertaining the worth of a decision-
making procedure for ethics we must sooner or later compare it against
the results act-utilitarianism would give as a decision-making
procedure. As Bales says above, we must "look to "ee which kind of
procedure has tended to work in given situations." Unfortunately,
172
unless we have something to which we can compare the results, we
cannot tell whether a procedure has worked.
If my previous argument is right, we must either deny act-
utilitarianism or deny C3 and C4. Indeed, even non-utilitarian theories,
such as Ross’s, may be affected by similar arguments if the theories take
utilitarian considerations into account, or if the theories are practically
impossible to use as decision-making procedures. As I pointed out
above, G.E. Moore would deny C3. At times, Ross also denied that we
could ever know what we are obligated to do.
If we deny C3 there are two interesting options. The first is
simply to accept Ross’s view that there is "much truth in the description
of the right act as a fortunate act." 16 The other option is to say that
although we can never know that an act is right it is reasonable to
believe of some acts that they are right.
Moore seems to follow the second option in Principia Ethica.
He says that we can notice that some conditions seem necessary for the
attainment of any significant good. Examples of such conditions are
being alive and trusting people to keep their promises. We can also
formulate rules expressing these conditions, such as "we ought to keep
our promises" and "we ought not harm others." According to Moore, we
should try to bring about these conditions, ^ha t is, we ought to follow
these rules. It may be that there are occasions where not following
these rules will bring about more good than following them, but since
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we we can never know when we are in such a situation, we can never do
better than following these rules
.
17 The reason why we should follow
these rules is that we can see the near consequences of not doing so and
we "assume that it is improbable that effects, after a certain time, will,
in general, be such as to reverse the comparative value of the
alternative results within that time ." 18 Moore attempts to justify this
assumption as follows:
As we proceed further and further from the time at which
alternative actions are open to us, the events of which
either action would be part cause become increasingly
dependent on those other circumstances which are the
same, whichever action we adopt. The effects of any
individual action seem, after a sufficient space of time, to
be found only in trifling modifications spread over a very
wide area, whereas its immediate effects consist in some
prominent modification of a comparatively narrow area . 19
This justification is inadequate. Let us assume that we can make
good sense of the distinction between immediate and distant effects of
an act. What reason do we have to believe that an action now will only
have ’trifling modifications’ in the future? Have we ever actually been
able to trace all of an actions future effects and compare them to the
immediate effects? His claim seems to be an empirical claim, yet has no
empirical justification. Additionally, there would seem to be many
times more future effects to an act than immediate effects. Even if each
is "trifling" the aggregate of them may not be . 20
Consider, for example, the transmission of an incurable disease,
such as AIDS. Assume that there was a first person who had the
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disease, call this person Jean. Let us also assume that everyone who has
it passes it on to two other persons, if there are two persons who do not
have it. There are some bad effects of Jean’s passing the disease on,
some immediate and some distant. An immediate result is that the two
persons to whom Jean passes the disease will become incurably ill. A
distant effect is that eventually everyone will be incurably ill. Although
Jean’s action would only be part of the cause of everyone getting the
disease it is part of the cause. It is not unreasonable to believe that the
sum of the distant partial effects of Jean’s passing on the disease are
more significant than the immediate effects of passing it on.
Let us alter the example a bit and say that someone killed Jean
before the disease was passed on. This action would have some
immediate bad effects and some distant good effects. A bad effect
would be that Jean would be caused to suffer a painful death. A good
effect would be that the disease is not spread. It is not unreasonable to
believe that the distant good effects would be more significant than the
immediate bad effects. From these hypothetical examples, we can see
that the distant effects of an act cannot always be discounted in the way
that Moore proposes.
If my above argument is accepted and we continue to accept act-
utilitarianism or, indeed, Ross’s view, then we must tough it out and say,
as Ross does occasionally, that choosing the right act takes luck.
Although I have not given conclusive arguments against this position, I
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have indicated why I am hesitant to accept it. Consequently, 1 am more
inclined to give up the theories that are inconsistent with C3. As I
pointed out, Ross s view in The Right and the Good is inconsistent
with the idea behind C3. He saw this and changed his view in
F oundations of Ethics in order to rectify this. He did this by making
what I call "The Subjectivist Move".
In making The Subjectivist Move Ross claims that the most
important notion of obligation, the common-sense notion, has to do
with subjective obligation. Although I described this view in Chapter II,
let me quickly summarize it. In Foundations of Ethics , Ross’s view is
that in any situation where we have to make an ethical decision we are
obligated to do that act which we believe to satisfy our most stringent
prima facie obligation. Our beliefs about three features of the
situation are crucial in ascertaining our obligation: our beliefs about
what acts are available to us, our beliefs about what our prima facie
obligations are with respect to these acts and our belief about which of
these prima facie obligations is most stringent.
If we accept this view about the central notion of obligation it is
easy to see how we can know what we are obligated to do. We can, upon
reflection, be certain about our beliefs on these matters. Since
believing that we have the most stringent prima facie duty to do an act
makes that act obligatory, we can know what we are obligated to do.
176
The main problem with this view has to do with moral mistakes.
It would not make much sense to say of a past act that we sincerely
thought we were obligated to do it, but now know better. When we
sincerely believed we had the most stringent prima facie duty to do it,
it was obligatory. Later when we came to the conclusion that we did not,
it was not obligatory. Whether this entails that the same act is
obligatory and not obligatory we need not decide. Since the common-
sense notion of obligation allows for moral mistakes, it allows for
sincere false beliefs about what is right. Consequently, it is a good
objection to this view that it has as a consequence that there cannot be
any moral mistakes.
Conclusion
I take it that C3 expresses a feature of our ordinary moral
reasoning. Given this I take it to be a good objection to an ethical
theory that it is incompatible with C3. (Remember, C3 only says that we
sometimes know what we are obligated to do.) 21 One way for an ethical
theory to be compatible with C3 is for it to be a very high quality
decisio.i-making procedure. Eugene Bales has argued that it is not a
good objection to an ethical theory that it is not a good decision-making
procedure, as different theories may serve different purposes. I
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accepted his argument, but argued that it is a good objection to a theory
that its truth precludes a high quality decision-making procedure being
practically possible. I then argued that the truth of act-utilitarianism
precludes the practical possibility of there being a high quality decision-
making procedure. Although it may be possible for a theory to be both a
bad decision-making procedure and consistent with C3, it is not possible
for a theory to be both practically impossible to use as a decision-
making procedure and consistent with C3. Consequently, Bales’s
argument does not achieve the desired result. Since Ross’s view
includes utilitarian elements, the objection is also good against his view
as stated in The Right and the Good.
I then examined Moore’s proposal that our talk about knowing
what we are obligated to do is loose talk, but we sometime have pretty
good reason for believing a certain act to be obligatory. I rejected this
proposal as relying on unjustified assumptions.
Finally, I considered the view that our common-sense notion of
obligation is that of subjective obligation, obligation based on what act
we believe to have right making characteristics. I rejected this view
because it precludes moral mistakes, the possibility of which our
common-sense notion of obligation countenances.
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CHAPTER VI
THE VIRTUES OF ROSS’S THEORY
Introduction
In Chapter I it was proposed that there are some conditions that
an ethical theory must meet in order to be consistent with the way that
ordinary persons reason about their moral obligations. At first glance it
appeared that Ross’s theory has a good chance to meet these conditions.
In order to see whether the first glance lead to a lasting impression,
however, his theory needed closer examination. In particular, we
needed to pay close attention to his account of prima facie rightness,
his account of the characteristics that make acts prima facie right
(RMCs) and his account of the relationship between prima facie
rightness and moral rightness. In Chapter II his theory was discussed
and it was found that it lacked a very clear definition of prima facie
rightness. This was attributed to a failure to give a very clear account of
a RMC.
In Chapter III, various attempts to define the notion of a RMC
were discussed and found wanting. Also discussed was a proposal that
did not focus on either the definition of a RMC or the definition of a
prima facie duty, but suggested that the principles expressing prim a
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facie duties have a logical structure similar to that of physical laws.
This proposal was also rejected. In Chapter IV, a proposal to define the
notion of a prima facie obligation and the notion of a moral obligation
via another normative notion was considered and rejected. Finally, in
Chapter V the discussion centered on whether it is a good objection to
an ethical theory that it cannot be used to discover what we are
obligated to do. It was found that, if we hold that we sometimes know
which of our alternatives we are obligated to do, then it is a good
objection to a theory that it cannot be used to discover our obligations.
It was also found that Ross’s theory, given its most plausible
interpretation, could not be used to discover what we are obligated to
do.
Although the problems concerning ethical knowledge are
significant, they pale in comparison to the overarching problem with
Ross’s theory: we do not have a clear account of the relationship
between prima f acie and moral obligation. This problem is
exacerbated if we believe that an adequate ethical theory must propose
the necessary and sufficient conditions for an obligation to exist. In
The Right and the Good
,
where Ross seems closest to proposing
these conditions, he appeals to the notion of a prima facie obligation
and says that we are morally obligated to do the act that satisfies our
most stringent prima facie obligation . 1 Yet he has not given an
adequate account of what it is to have a prima facie obligation and
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has little to say about their various stringencies. In fact, he says that
[f]or the estimation of the comparative stringency of these prima
facie obligations no general rules can, so far as I can see, be laid
down ." 2 Since we, as yet, do not understand the notion of a prima
facie obligation and do not understand what it is for one to be more
stringent than another, we cannot understand the criterion for moral
rightness that he seemingly proposed.
It is, of course, possible that I have not cast my net wide enough,
and, consequently, that I have have missed the correct account of the
relationship between prima facie and moral obligation. However, I do
not believe it very likely, as I do not believe that there is much of an
account to give. At times, even Ross seems to accept that trying to give
a thorough account is hopeless because there is none to give. He says,
for example, that when we are faced with conflicting prima facie
obligations and must determine which of a number of alternatives is
morally right he follows Aristotle in saying that ”[t]he decision rests
with perception ." 3
Are we then to simply give up on Ross? Not at all. It may not be
such a bad thing that he fails to give a clear account of the relationship
between prima facie and moral obligation, especially if this involves
giving the necessary and sufficient conditions of the latter by appeal to
to former. If we carefully review what Ross says, we will find that it is
not obvious that he claims to provide the necessary and sufficient
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conditions for an act to be right. In fact, if we take what he says
seriously, it is well that he does not. The places where he seems to be
trying to give such an account are the places where he most nearly goes
wrong.
Consider the passage in the The Right and the Good where
Ross seems to be giving a criterion for moral rightness when he says that
the right act has the greatest balance of primafacie rightness
.
4 In
prefacing this proposed account, he says, "It is worth while to try to state
more definitely the nature of the acts that are right. We may try to state
first what (if anything) is the universal nature of all acts that are right ."5
These statements contain hedges. In each he merely says that he will
"try" to provide an account of moral rightness. Admittedly these slight
hedges could be attributed to no more than philosophical modesty.
More important is the parenthetical comment in the second sentence.
In making that comment Ross seems to countenance the possibility that
there is no universal nature of all right acts.
I would attribute his inclusion of these hedges to two features of
his view. The first feature is that, if he is right, there are no general
principles characterizing the stringencies of individual prima facie
obligations. It should be noted that even if we had arrived at a
satisfactory characterization of a prima facie obligation this view
about stringency may have prevented us from giving a criterion for
moral rightness. For example, reconsider the the first proposal we
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examined, Ross’s "official" proposal. That proposal has it that an act is
prima facie obligatory when it has a characteristic that would make it
morally obligatory if it did not also have some other morally relevant
characteristic. Notice that it says nothing about the stringency of
prima facie obligations.
The other feature of his view that seems to warrant the inclusion
of the hedges is this: If Ross were to give a criterion of moral rightness,
it would seem that it would be via the notion of prima facie rightness.
Yet every time he attempts to characterize prima facie rightness or
the properties which make acts prima facie right, which I am taking to
be RMCs, he does it via the notion of moral rightness. Consequently,
success in giving a criterion of moral rightness via the notion of prima
facie rightness may not be very rewarding.
Let us assume that Ross did not propose necessary and sufficient
conditions for an act to be morally right. Is this sufficient reason to
reject his theory? I do not believe so.
There is a somewhat analogous situation in ethical theory. G. E.
Moore proposed a utilitarian theory, one in which he gave an analysis of
moral rightness via the notion of intrinsic goodness. Although he
suggested an analysis of extrinsic goodness and a test for intrinsic
goodness, he did not propose necessary and sufficient conditions for a
state of affairs to be good . 6 Yet his test for intrinsic goodness appeals
to the notion of goodness, as he says that a state of affairs is intrinsically
185
good when it would be good even if it existed in isolation.? Is this a good
reason to reject his theory? Again, I do not believe so. Although this is
not perfectly clear, it may be that being a simple, unanalyzable property
precludes the possibility of being able to state informative necessary
and sufficient conditions for having it. Thus Ross’s belief that moral
rightness was an unanalyzable property would be sufficient grounds for
believing that no criteria for having it are to be found.
If it would be a mistake for Ross to attempt to give a criterion of
moral rightness via the notion of prima facie obligation, why does it
seem so much as though he is trying to do just that? Apparently Ross is
not always clear about what he is trying do when presenting his theory. I
believe that his vacillation is due, in large part, to his being drawn,
simultaneously, to a couple of different approaches to ethics. The first
approach is to consider ethics a science, the "moral science". With this
view comes the commitment to a certain degree and kind of rigor, the
commitment to the existence of perfectly general and necessary moral
principles and the belief that the theorist’s task is to demonstrate these
principles and their connections. Having such a view about ethics
would, it seems, incline a person towards proposing a criteria of moral
rightness, however ill-conceived the attempt. The second approach is to
consider ethics the study of an activity. A theorist with this view would
be concerned with providing an account of the structure of the activity
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and, perhaps, the goal of the activity. Let me explain how these
comments relate to Ross’s theory.
In addition to being an ethical theorist, Ross was an Aristotelian
scholar of the highest order. He cannot have helped but be influenced
by Aristotle’s ethical theory. Some of this influence is found in Ross’s
discussion of moral goodness. I believe that it is also found in his
various discussions concerning the relationship between prima facie
and moral obligations. Indeed, as I see it, there is a very close parallel
between his discussion of prima facie obligations and Aristotle’s
discussion of the various individual virtues. I also believe that there is a
close connection between what Ross says about the relationship
between prima facie and moral obligation and what Aristotle called
"practical reason." My proposal is that to best understand Ross’s theory
and its apparent incongruities we have to understand it as an attempt to
bring to a modern ethical theory, one that focuses on the concept of
moral obligation and presupposes a modern metaethical view,
fundamental Aristotelian insights.
I do not, of course, assume that this was Ross’s intention. If
asked, he might even have said that such a proposal was preposterous.
Nonetheless, I believe that whatever worth Ross’s theory has, it is along
these lines. I will start the defense of my proposal by rehearsing some
of the main features of Aristotle’s theory. Then I will discuss how
Ross’s theory is similar to Aristotle’s and how looking at Ross s theory
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in this way allows us a better understanding of prima facie obligations
and their relationship to moral obligations. Even if we understand
Ross s theory in the way I suggest, I am not certain that it should be
accepted. To show this would involve discussing a few topics deserving
of independent treatment. The best I can do is to sketch out how his
theory might satisfy the constraints that I have proposed and mention
the topics that need further treatment.
Since I am trying to establish a connection between Ross’s theory
and Aristotle s, it would beneficial to see how Ross understands
Aristotle s ethical views. Consequently, when outlining Aristotle’s view,
I will follow Ross’s account of the N ichomachean Ethics given in his




According to Aristotle, the proper methodology of ethics is quite
different from the proper methodologies of the sciences or
mathematics. The methodologies differ because the subject matter of
ethics is less certain than the subject matters of these other disciplines
and the data of ethics is of a significantly different kind from theirs .9
Aristotle expresses his belief that there is lack of certainty in
ethics when he claims that ethics is about "what holds good usually ." 10
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This is most clearly opposed to mathematics, which is about eternal
things. As Ross points out, however, Aristotle’s claim about the
uncertainty in ethics is ambiguous. Ross says that Aristotle could be
claiming that "there are events which are objectively undetermined" or
could be "distinguishing between necessity which we can trace and that
which eludes us ." 11
Ross believes that regardless of whether human actions are
determined or not, Aristotle is mistaken in concluding that ethics is
essentially less certain than science or mathematics. According to Ross,
it is casuistry, not ethics, that is supposed to tell us whether a particular
action is right. Abstract ethics, according to Ross, "enquires what
’ought’ means, and why we ought do what we ought to do," and there is
no reason to suppose that these inquiries cannot be at least as accurate
as those of the physical sciences . 12
Although these last comments of Ross’s provide support for the
view that he thought ethics to be science-like, they are not borne out by
his ethical proposals. Since he did not offer general principles
concerning the stringency of prima facie obligations and thought that
none existed, it is hard to see how he could have thought that he gave a
general account of "why we ought do what we ought to do." Notice that
this is not merely a case of ‘he principles being difficult to apply; it is a
case of there not being any principles to apply.
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Our consideration of these first principles of ethics leads to the
second major way that ethics is different from the sciences or
mathematics. Mathematical first principles are easily abstracted from
sense-data and are, therefore, generally immune to the vagaries of
interpretation, the sciences are slightly less so, and all bets are off when
it comes to ethics . 13
Once we are on to mathematical first principles, we can reason
from them to various conclusions. Understanding and reasoning from
the axioms of geometry is supposed to be a paradigm of this process. It
is also true that in the sciences data are obtained through the senses.
Since the principles are not as easily abstracted, there is more room for
differing interpretations of the data. However, despite disagreements
about how much interpretation and learning is involved in perception,
there is fairly wide consensus on the the nature of basic perceptual
experiences. In the sciences, we may disagree on the interpretation of
the data, but we at least generally agree on what counts as the data.
In ethics, on the other hand, we reason to first principles from our
ethical experience. This ethical experience consists of our ethical
upbringing, our past judgments, the way that our community
characterizes certain experiences and various theories to which we have
been exposed. Sinc o all of these elements are interrelated and differ
from person to person, there is often significant variation in the
interpretation of ethical data. Indeed, there may even be significant
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variations in what we count as data. Aristotle says that the opinions of
ordinary persons should be taken as the starting place for an
investigation of ethical first principles. These opinions express our
shared experience and their investigation should lead to the ethical first
principles. Not surprisingly, these ethical first principles are not easily
grasped, because, as Ross points out, "they are too deeply immersed in
the detail of conduct ." 14
Since, to some extent, a person’s moral opinions are a product of
his/her upbringing, in order to have any chance of grasping the ethical
first principles, a person must have had the proper upbringing. Even so,
it would be too much to expect that any person’s moral opinions would
be perfectly consistent. A theorist tries to formulate a consistent theory
that captures these opinions. When there are conflicts of opinion the
theorist must try to see why they conflict and try to refine the principles.
Eventually, the first principles of ethics are reached. When we finally
consider these principles, we are supposed to see that they are true;
indeed, they are supposed to be self-evident.
According to Aristotle, one of the fundamental principles of
ethics is that there is a best way for persons to live. This way of living is
characterized by eudaimonia , which is variously understood as
happiness, w a ll being or flourishing. Aristotle's ethical works are
largely concerned with describing eudaimonia and explaining how it is
acquired. One description has eudaimonia as living according to a
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plan in accordance with virtue. The idea behind this characterization is
that the life best for a person must include that which distinguishes
persons from other things. Aristotle’s view is that this is the ability to
make and follow plans. Since the unrestrained expression of this ability
would not make for a good life, it has to be expressed in accordance with
virtue.
Once we accept that eudaimonia requires virtue, we must
consider virtue’s nature, both moral virtue and intellectual virtue.
Moral virtue is a disposition to feel or act in the appropriate way in a
particular situation while knowing that it is the appropriate way and
choosing it because it is the appropriate way. The appropriate way is a
"mean" relative to each person as determined by a person with practical
wisdom. Aristotle describes, in a general way, the mean for certain
types of feelings and actions. He says, for instance, that generosity is a
virtue and a mean between wastefulness and stinginess. What counts as
being generous depends on many things, such as a person's income and
responsibilities. It takes practical wisdom to determine the actual
amount that is fitting for an individual to give away. Having practical
wisdom is an intellectual virtue. It is a combination of desiring the
correct ends and knowing the relationship between various actions and
end". So, as we have seen, moral virtue requires practical wisdom.
Given that eudaimonia is an activity, we can see how a theorist
that takes it to be the central feature of morality ethics might proceed
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differently than a theorist concerned with the concept of moral
obligation. An understanding of a person’s beliefs, motives and reasons
for acting, for example, play an important role in understanding what is
involved in eudaimonia. Theorists who are concerned with giving the
logical connections between moral concepts may not need to concern
themselves with these topics at all.
Aristotle and Ross
As I said earlier, I believe that Ross proposes a theory that is best
understood as an attempt to bring Aristotelian insights to a theory of
moral obligation. What are these insights?
The first concerns the justification and methodology of ethics.
More than on any substantive issue, Ross follows Aristotle in his
approach to doing ethics, his methodology. In his only extended
discussion of methodology in ethics, Ross says that the method he uses
is "the time-honoured method of ethics"; ascribes the method not only
to Aristotle, but also also Socrates, Plato, Xenophon and Kant; and
claims that it is Aristotle’s formulation of the method that is best . 15 Not
surprisingly, this has some effect on his substantive conclusions. Ross,
for instance, shares with Aristotle the belief that commonsense views
about morality set the boundaries of acceptable solutions to problems
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in ethical theory. One place he expresses this belief is when he rejects
certain ethical theories because they have as a consequence that we
cannot know what our obligations are, a consequence that Ross believes
runs counter to the commonsense view. According to both Aristotle and
Ross, consideration of ordinary ethical views are supposed to allow us
to arrive eventually at some ethical truths that are self evident. For
Ross, these include the principles of prima f acie obligations. In a
footnote to a discussion of prima facie duties he says this:
I am assuming the correctness of some of our main
convictions as to prima facie duties, or, more strictly, am
claiming that we know them to be true. ..The main moral
convictions of the plain man seem to me to be, not opinions
which it is for philosophy to prove or disprove, but
knowledge from the start .... 16
For Aristotle, the self evident ethical truths would include the
descriptions of individual virtues.
Aristotle does not always seem to be on target with his list of
individual virtues. Wisely, Ross does not defend Aristotle's list. He
seems to accept some of the characteristics on Aristotle's list as virtues,
while rejecting others. Even though he disagrees with the actual list,
Ross uses something like Aristotle’s method of determining the
individual virtues when deciding on the list of prima facie duties.
Aristotle’s method is simply to reflect on various areas of human
activity and find the mean in each of these areas. Of course Ross does
not accept the doctrine of the mean; he does, however, try to determine
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our prima facie duties by reflecting on various areas of human activity
and the appropriate conduct in those activities. Ross says that each of




There may be some characteristics which, by accident, Ross
simply does not consider. Some of these may be RMCs, so there may be
prima f acie duties of which he is not aware. Similarly, there may be
some areas of human activity that Aristotle did not consider, and for
which he does not describe the mean. Consequently, there may be some
virtues that he misses. Since their methods are unsystematic, I
characterize their approach as the laundry list approach to ethics . 18
Ross comes up with a laundry list of prima facie obligations and
Aristotle produces a laundry list of virtues. For example,
communications is of the first importance to most human activities.
Both Aristotle and Ross recognize this. Upon reflection we can see that
the appropriate behavior in such dealings is truthtelling. Sure enough,
for Aristotle this is a virtue; for Ross it is a prima f acie duty . 19
As I mentioned, Ross does not accept Aristotle’s doctrine of the
mean. This is not terribly surprising as, in fact, not even Aristotle
accepts it . 20 Aristotle produces the doctrine to express the idea that the
virtuous act in a particular situation depends, in part, on particular
features of that situation, while trying at the same time to avoid the
suggestion that what act is virtuous is in any way arbitrary. The idea
195
behind suggesting there is a mean is the idea that there is an
appropriate way to act in any situation, but trying to characterize it is
difficult. Aristotle tried to characterize it by saying that it was a mean,
as determined by someone with practical wisdom. The idea that it is a
mean is much too simple, although it surely involves "weighing"
different features of the situation. The idea that it requires practical
wisdom to determine the appropriate act in a particular situation and
that the appropriate act cannot be adequately characterized using
general principles leads to the most important Aristotlian insight found
in Ross’s theory.
This is the view that the fundamental normative principles are
essentially incomplete. This view is related to Aristotle’s suggestion
that ethics is about things that are for the most part so. Although, in his
exposition of Aristotle, Ross suggests that Aristotle was wrong in
believing this, it turns out that a similar view is expressed in his theory.
Consider his apparent proposal that a characteristic making an act
prima facie obligatory is one that tends to make acts morally right.
According to this proposal, not all acts having such a characteristic are
morally right, although it is for the most part so.
The incompleteness of the fundamental normative principles
expresses itself in two ways. The most important way is that the
principles do not give a criterion for the application of the basic
normative concepts with which they are associated. In particular.
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Ross s normative principles expressing the prima facie duties do not
give criteria for a particular act being moral rightness and Aristotle’s
principles characterizing individual virtues do not give criteria for a
particular act being virtuous. About the virtuousness of individual acts
Aristotle says this:
[H]ow far and how much we must deviate to be blamed is
not easy to define in an account; for nothing perceptible is
easily defined, and [since] these [circumstances of virtuous
and vicious action] are particulars, the judgement about
them depends on perception .21
In talking about the moral rightness of particular acts, Ross quotes the
last part of this passage . 22
The second way this incompleteness is expressed is when it comes
to providing a decision-making procedure. Knowledge of these
incomplete normative principles must be accompanied by an ability to
apply them to particular situations. Ross is concerned with this ability
when he talks about reconciling conflicting prima facie obligations;
Aristotle calls it "practical wisdom" and refers to it in the
characterization of virtue. This ability is requires more than simple
cleverness; although, as I said, Aristotle does not fully explain it.
As I have pointed out, Ross sometimes suggests that there is some
underlying principle or definition connecting prima facie and moral
obligations. Some of the previous chapters have involved a quest tor
this principle. I have also suggested that it is a mistake to believe that
there is such a principle. Interestingly, at times Ross also seems to
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believe that there is an principle underlying Aristotle’s notion of
practical wisdom. I believe that this too is a mistake.
Consider Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s definition of virtue at
NE 1 107a 1
:
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice,
lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being
determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by
which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. 23
This translation seems to commit Aristotle to the view that practical
wisdom consists of the application of a principle. Now consider a
translation of the same passage by Terence Irwin:
Virtue, then, is (a) a state that decides, (b) [consisting] in a
mean, (c) the mean relative to us, (d) which is defined by
reference to reason, (e) i.e., to the reason by reference to
which the intelligent person would define it. 24
Just as clearly, no such commitment is required by this translation.
Although, in the above passage, it may be that Ross is expressing
the notion of a faculty or ability by use of the term "principle," Ross and
Irwin’s translations of Aristotle’s review of the definition at NE
1 138b 18 differ in a similar way, only Ross uses the term "right rule"
instead of "principle."25 In addition, he discusses these definitions in his
expository book on Aristotle. He says, for instance: The virtuous man
has been defined as acting in accordance with the ’right rule. The
framing of this rule is an intellectual operation...." 26
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This difference in emphasis is mentioned by Alasdair MacIntyre’s
in his book After Virtue. 27 MacIntyre claims that Ross’s version is
wrong and, in a parenthetical remark, suggests a cause of the mistake.
He says that ”[t]his misreading by someone who is usually a meticulous
translator of Aristotle is perhaps not unimportant; for it reflects the
large and un-Aristotelian preoccupation with rules of modern moral
philosophers."28
Whether or not MacIntyre is right, and I believe that he is, that
Ross interprets the passage in the way he does is relevant to the case I
am trying to make. I believe that Ross’s comments suggesting that there
is an underlying principle connecting prima facie and moral rightness,
so that to do what is morally right is to satisfy some criteria for moral
rightness given via the notion of prima facie rightness, reflect his
translation of Aristotle’s definition of virtue. It is also interesting to
note that Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s extended discussion of
practical wisdom in the NE ( 1 140a25 ) does not make mention of any
underlying principle. This view is also reflected in some of Ross’s
discussions concerning the relationship between prima facie and
moral obligation. Ross is ambiguous on the relationship between
prima facie and moral obligation; so too is his translation of Aristotle
view’s on acting virtuously.
Although Ross follows Aristotelian positions in many areas, he
parts company with Aristotle when it comes to the importance accorded
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the notion of moral rightness in ethical theory. Aristotle says very little
about it, spending almost all of his time talking about moral goodness.
It sometimes seems as though Aristotle is unfamiliar with anything like
the modern notion of obligation. Indeed, some philosophers have
suggested that the notion was not developed until after the advent of
Christianity
.
29 Ross, on the other hand, is best known for his discussion
of moral obligation, although he also has some interesting things to say
about moral goodness.
Ross suggests that most theorists concentrate either on the ends
of actions or on duties, and, consequently, there is a "general antithesis
between ethical systems in which duty is the central theme, and those in
which goods or ends are the central theme ." 30 Kant’s view is cited as an
example of a theory that approaches a pure ethics of duty. Aristotle’s
view is cited as one approaching an exclusive concern with goods. Ross
holds that any theorist attempting to explain all ethical data by
concentrating on one of these themes, to the absolute exclusion of the
other, will fail because "the notion of right and the notion of good are
implied in the study of moral questions, and any one who tries to work
with one only will sooner or later find himself forced to introduce the
other ." 31 He says that Kant was forced to recognize the importance of
consequences when some of his arguments for the wrorgness of acts
appeal to the badness of the consequences of the act and Aristotle
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recognizes the importance of duty when he talks as though virtuous
action is right for its own sake.
The view that ethical theories must contain both elements
reflecting the importance of goods and elements reflecting the
importance of duties is at the center of the connection between Ross’s
theory and Aristotle’s. Although, as Ross says, Aristotle sometimes
talks as if he thought that virtuous action is right for its own sake, this is
loose talk and does not express Aristotle’s "official" view. As I pointed
out, Aristotle’s official view is that all actions should be directed
towards the goal for persons. Since Ross’s view about the need to
recognize the importance of duties is contrary to Aristotle’s official
view, it is not surprising that Aristotle fails to give a thorough account
of virtues as right in themselves. Perhaps Ross can be thought of as
giving such an account.
Ross’s Theory Considered as Aristotelian in Nature
I hope that I have made a reasonable case for believing that
Ross’s theory can be understood as containing important Aristotelian
insights. Now I want discuss how accepting this '.htsis might affect our
understanding of Ross’s theory.
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First, we still have not been provided with an adequate account of
a RMC or a prima facie obligation. If Ross’s theory is supposed to
explain all the fundamental moral notions, then this is a grave defect.
Of course, he could maintain that notion of a RMC is a simple one. If
he did this the definition of a PFO given in Chapter III would be
adequate. Remember, it has it that we are prima f acie obligated to do
an act that has an RMC. This would also explain how it could be, as
Ross seems to believe, we can directly know what our prima facie
obligations are. Taking the notion of a RMC as a primitive would still
leave us without an explanation for his trying to define this
characteristic in his "official" definition he gave of a prima facie duty.
Perhaps this should then be considered an attempt to get us on to the
notion, not an attempt to provide a definition.
Second, we have not been provided with criteria for moral
rightness. This is now understandable, although it may not be
acceptable. Ross seems committed to the view that there is no criteria.
Consequently, it is a mistake to look for one, especially one given via
the notion of a prima facie obligation. The proper way to understand
the relationship between prima f acie and moral obligation is to
understand it as a relationship involving something very similar to the
Aristotelian notion of practical reason.
This brings us to the real problem with Ross’s theory. The
elements of his theory that reflect Aristotle's are from an approach to
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ethics that is different from the one in which Ross seems engaged.
Ross’s aim seems to be to provide a theory showing the connection
between various ethical concepts. Indeed, he has a number of
interesting things to say about various ethical concepts. A large part of
the structure of his theory, however, seems to be the kind that would be
used in giving a theory in ethics examining ethical activity. For
example, Ross appeals to the notion of stringency in saying which of
some prima facie obligations is morally obligatory. He says that there
is no general principle describing stringency. What is really called for
there is an account of practical reason; what should happen when
someone is presented with such alternatives. As I see it, Ross’s theory is
part conceptual theory, part practical theory; consequently, his theory
fails in each area.
Conclusion
Most philosophers who investigate the relationship between
Ross’s notion of prima facie obligation and moral obligation look for
some formal relationship, one that can be characterized via some
general principles. I argued tha, this is a mistake. Ross s view is best
understood as being partly Aristotelian in nature, with the relationship
between prima facie and moral obligations being a practical one. I
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also suggest that Ross’s theory mixes two different approaches to ethics:
the modern, in which ethics is an investigation of ethical concepts; and
the Aristotelian, in which ethics is an investigation of ethical conduct.





See, for example, p. 4 1 of The Right and the Good. This is reflected
in RMR1, which isfound in chapter I.
2 Ross, The Right and the Good
,
p. 41.
3 Ross, T he Right and the Good
,
p. 42. It does not seem that he is
making a merely epistemological claim.
4 Ross, The Right and the Good
,
p. 41.
5 Ross, The Right and the Good
,
p. 4 1.
6 Moore, Principia Ethica
, pp. 93-94.
7 Moore, Principia Ethica
,
p. 96.
8 William David Ross, Aristotle (Cleveland: The World Pub. Co.,
1959), pp. 183-227. In addition, all passages cited from the
N icomac he an Ethics (NE) will be cited using Bekker pages and lines.
For the most part, I am following Terence Irwin’s translation
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985). He uses square brackets,
"[" and "]" to indicate insertions of words not found in the text.
9 If we accept Nancy Cartwright’s arguments from a previous chapter, we
would have accepted the view that the subject matter of the sciences is
not so certain as Aristotle believes. According to her view, all physical
events are nomologically undetermined.













15 Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 1. This is also the method towhich
I ascribed in my introductory chapter.
16 Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 20-21.
17 Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 23.
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18 This characterization was suggested by R. P. Wolff’s criticism to a
proposal I made in conversation with him.
19 At NE 1 127a 15 Aristotle says that in social discourse truthtelling is a
mean between boastfulness and self-deprecation. Truthtelling in other
situations is required by justice.
20 For example, when Aristotle talks about being temperate in taking
pleasures he says that it matters what experience causes the pleasure as
well as how much pleasure is caused. See NE 1 1 19a 10.
21 Aristotle, NE, 1109 b26.
22 Ross, The Right and the Good
,
p.42.
23 Aristotle, NE, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Basic works of Aristotle ,
ed. Richard McKeon (New York : Random House, 1941).
24 This is from his previously cited translation of the N icomachean
Ethics.





27 Alasdair MacIntyre, After V irtue (Notre Dame:Univ. of Notre
Dame Press, 1981).
28 MacIntyre, After V irtue
, pp. 152-53.
29 See, for example, Richard Taylor, "Ancient Wisdom and Modern
Folly," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy
,
XIII ( 1988), pp. 54-55.
Also, MacIntyre, After V irtue
,
pp. 5 1-61. They also seem to have the
erroneous belief that if this view about how the notion was developed is
correct, then then have provided a perfectly good reason to believe that
it is an empty notion.
30 Ross, Foundations of Ethics , p. 4.
31 Ross, Foundations of Ethics , p. 5.
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